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My dissertation analyzes the impact of ethnic identification and religion on the 
formation of the post-Soviet political system, national ideology and sources of political 
mobilization taking place in the non-ethnic Russian regions of the North Caucasus such 
as Chechnya, Dagestan, and Karachay-Cherkessia since the late Soviet period, during the 
tumultuous transition phase under Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), the autocratic rule of 
Vladimir Putin (2000-2008), and quasi-liberal presidency of Dmitry Medvedev (2008-
2012).  
In conducting this research, I exposed the theoretical underpinnings of the relevant 
literature on ethnic and religious identity, the rival visions of national identity, and the 
competing theories of nationalism. The study is to a large extent designed as a reaction to 
the mainstream claim that the degree of national consolidation and stability of these 
North Caucasian republics are primarily a result of ethnic clan politics. The most salient 
inconsistency with existing explanations is that they limit themselves to assessing the 
reasons for the emergence of political mobilization in specific circumstances. Due to the 
fact that these explanations are not concerned with the process through which this 
mobilization evolves into a powerful political force, they focus  primarily on the rational 
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behavior of political elites as the key explanatory variable in determining the timing and 
location of ethnic or religious mobilization.  
This research is an attempt to move beyond these narrow elite-focused explanations 
of why ethnic or religious mobilization takes place. The main question motivating the 
research is not why but how. In the following chapters, I explain how ethnic and religious 
movements emerge on the political scene as a result of government-sponsored policies, 
how they mobilize resources to form organizational structures, how they frame their 
demands to meet expectations of their target groups, and how they recruit their 
supporters.  I argue that it is neither religious nor ethnic identity that is most appealing to 
people from an individual perspective as a basis for political mobilization. Rather it can 
be the one that it is perceived as being crucial from the point of view of the access to 
material resources and collective security arrangements. I conclude that the identity that 
is chosen for political mobilization is defined as a result of amalgamation of resources 
and politics, rather than a hangover of deep primordial beliefs. However, the pre-
existence of strong identities provides the propitious context in which such identities can 
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"A nation is a group of persons united by the common error of their ancestry and  
a common dislike of their neighbors." 
Karl Deutsch, “Nationalism and its Alternatives”. 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.1. Background  
The North Caucasus is the most unstable part of the Russian Federation. The 
political and social history of the North Caucasus has been little explored, and in 
consequence little known or understood. When Michael Gorbachev was contemplating 
liberal reforms in the Soviet Union, no one could envisage what an explosion of ethnic 
problems was to take place. This unprecedented case of state collapse inevitably left 
behind fifteen republics with feeble state capacity, torn apart by power struggles 
between the ex-Soviet elite and predominantly nationalist movements. One of the 
reasons for such a rapid decline of law and order was the multiple roles ethnicity and 
nationalism played as the most accessible and understandable foundations for group 
mobilization during the break-up of the centralized power and communist ideology in 
the late 1980s. Another cause of this “unexpected” decline was the rather contradictory 
and voluntary nature of the nationality policies conducted by the political elite in 
response to the ethnic challenges. The political traditions of Marxism-Leninism 
combined two characteristic features in themselves as detrimental to the function of a 
democratic mode of government in multi-ethnic societies: first - a doctrine and practice 
of ethnic nationalism, and second - a policy of double standards which allowed both 
declarations of self-determination and suppression by force. This research aims to 
explain the emergence and development of ethno-religious movements and the 
2 
 
variations in support for these movements in three ethnic regions of the North Caucasus: 
Chechnya, Dagestan, and Karachay-Cherkessia. It accomplishes this task by focusing 
on the Soviet ethno-federal institutions as structural foundations of political 
mobilization in post-Soviet Caucasus and by studying the similarities and differences in 
the evolution of ethno-religious movements in these regions during the protracted 
period of post-Soviet transition. In doing so, it goes beyond traditional discourse about 
the elite-centred explanations of ethnic and religious mobilization to focus on how this 
mobilization process is structured by the Soviet institutional legacy.  
Geographically, the North Caucasus region stretches along the high peaks of the 
Caucasian mountain range, from the shores of the Black Sea in the North West to the 
coast of the Caspian Sea in the South East. This region at the crossroads of Europe and 
Asia has been acclaimed by anthropologists for its extraordinary ethnic and linguistic 
diversity. However, what unites many of the peoples of the North Caucasus is a 
distinctive Caucasian identity. There are three types of landscape that define centuries-
old way of life: the coastlines along the Black and Caspian Seas, the fertile plains and 
the high mountains. Animal husbandry and grazing combined with handicrafts, the 
exploitation of natural sources and terraced gardening dominated the highlanders’ 
economy. In the lowlands, semi-nomadic cattle-breeding along with small trading and 
traditional farming prevailed. Besides, the North Caucasus people share very similar 
behavioural patterns and cultural traits due to similar life conditions enforced during 
their engagements against outside invaders and in internal fights against each other. 
During the last century the highlanders were forcefully moved from the high mountains 
to the lowlands under the slogans of collectivization, industrialization, and urbanization. 
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Thus, the whole region became totally dependent economically on the Soviet 
centralized planning system. At present, even though the Caucasian society offers equal 
opportunities to women and men, traditional gender relations and family patterns are 
maintained and therefore male values prevail in public life, because local customs and 
tribal codes of conduct had a profound impact on Islam as it developed throughout the 
North Caucasus.  
Historically, the North Caucasus peoples have repeatedly resisted attempts to 
conquer, and it was not until the late 18 century that the territory was incorporated into 
the groining Russian Empire. Following the 1917 Socialist Revolution the North 
Caucasus region was incorporated into the Soviet Russian Federation with the creation 
of nine administrative units. During the Stalinist purges whole peoples were deported 
during the Second World War under pretext of collaborating with the German Army 
during its occupation of the region in 1942. Partial and selective rehabilitation for the 
deported peoples came only in 1955. During several decades the peoples of the North 
Caucasus were largely forgotten and ignored by the outside world. The region was 
plunged to barely justified atrocities against the peoples with their forced incorporation 
into the Soviet State, which affected individuals as well as entire peoples, resulting in 
forced population transfers within the region and deportations of entire peoples, 
fostering feelings of victimization and marginalization. As Krag and Funch emphasize, 
“victimization by conquering powers is still a very strong component of Caucasian 
identity. Although there is a very long pre-Soviet history of brutal attempts to invade 
and conquest, it is the Soviet period which has left the strongest imprint of 
disenfranchisement among the peoples of the region” (1994:3). 
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The Caucasian peoples began to reassert their ethnic and national identity, as 
part of the growing ethnic and national awareness that was a salient point of the 
Gorbachev reforms in the late 1980s. However they continue to question the creation of 
titular nations which was a unique feature of the Soviet period.   There has been an 
explicit connection between the concepts of ethnicity and territory: many of the groups 
which are minorities within the North Caucasus feel that the only means of securing 
their rights is to push for ethnically defined territories and creation of political and 
constitutional arrangements to protect and promote the rights of all groups within a 
given administrative unit. While the situation is relatively under control, there are many 
unresolved issues and claims which need to be addressed if violent conflicts are to be 
avoided. Assumingly, all ethnic groups in the region are actively seeking to reconfigure 
the nature of their relationships, both with neighbours and with federal authorities. 
Economically, the North Caucasian republics have become heavily dependent on 
Moscow subsidies and direct material support. A number of post-Soviet socio-economic 
reforms and privatization have also led to elevated fears about the redistribution of land 
and natural resources. During the late 1980s, however, the political changes which were 
taking place in the Soviet Union, gave rise to new hopes for equal participation in 
decisions concerning self-governance and self-determination. With the abrupt break-up 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, the North Caucasus has now become a border region of 
renewed geopolitical emulation. As a result, most ethnic groups aspire to redefine their 
identities, their territorial claims and their lines of cooperation, engaging vehemently in 
an ongoing discussion of their future and forming constantly shaky political alliances. 
“Historical memories, particularly Russian colonization policies and Soviet deportation 
5 
 
practices, play a decisive role in the current claims and grievances, serving as criteria in 
legitimizing ethnic and national identities.” (Krag and Funch 1994:2) Invoking 
primordial ethnic bonds with clear historical rights to certain territories going back to 
antiquity is popular these days although no ethnic group in the region, whether speakers 
of vernacular, Turkic or Iranian languages, or adherents of the Jewish, Islamic or 
Christian faith, can convincingly state if they stem from one group of intruders or 
natives - mythology and imagination has become the accepted norm, giving rise to the 
propagation of myths and the distortion of facts in the political debate (Krag and Funch 
1994). Complex internal grievances and absence of constructive policies and political 
will to implement them, coupled with a growing antagonism between the region and its 
political centre have led in some areas to cruel open conflicts. Any new attempt to 
enforce externally-devised solutions and ignore local claims will only add to the feeling 
of estrangement and feed nationalistic aspirations among North Caucasian peoples.  
This contributes to a general feeling of uncertainty and insecurity in a region which 
could become subject to major turmoil and violence. The North Caucasus is therefore a 
region not only at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and of different cultural and 
political norms, but also at a distinct crossroads concerning its future development. 
Although ethnic tensions have a long history in the region, the religious aspect has 
always served as a rallying point for ethnic groups to assert their struggle against the 
oppression. Back in 1877, the people of Chechnya and Dagestan revolted against the 
Russian authority. As Akhmadov, Doss and Kumosov (2009)  point out, even though 
the rebellion was a complete failure that served primarily to produce new tactics on the 
part of the Sufi brotherhoods of the North Caucasus, the victorious Russian authorities 
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responded unexpectedly not with further oppression but rather with tolerance toward the 
Islamic religion. The religious tolerance of the post-rebellion years (1877 to 1917) has 
led Caucasians to speak of Tsarist colonialism with some respect (Akhmadov, Doss and 
Kumosov 2009).  
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, throughout the 1990s, ethnic 
minorities, particularly in remote rural areas of the Caucasus, were mainly ignored by 
the central authorities, because the lack of communication between the central and local 
entities was believed to secure stability and ensure that the incumbent political elites 
could stay in power. Whereas constitutional provisions have been crafted in a way as to 
display certain principles of equality and promotion of ethnic diversity, nothing has 
been done to enforce it. Institutional weaknesses, economic stagnation and pervasive 
corruption were to blame for neglecting minorities.  
On March 28, 2011 the Russian State Statistical Service released the preliminary 
results of the 2010 census. The country’s net population loss comprised 2.2 million 
people or 1.6 % of the general population, which declined from 145.1 million in 2002 to 
142.9 million in 2010 (RSSS 2011). The Russian Federation continued to follow the 
same pattern of the previous years, with very low birth rates, high male mortality and a 
relatively low level of immigration. On the contrary, the North Caucasus showed a 
significant growth trend. In particular, the population of the North Caucasus Federal 
District reached 9.5 million in 2010, as it added 6.3 % to its 2002 number.  Dagestan 
and Chechnya became the two regions of the Russian Federation with the highest 
growth rate, 15.6 % and 15 % accordingly. Karachay-Cherkessia’s population grew by 
8.9 % in the same period - the fourth highest result in the Russian Federation. Although 
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Muslim-populated republics of the North Caucasus, known for high birth rates and low 
mortality, raised expactations for substantial population growth, the 2010 census 
provided some surprising results showing population declines in Ingushetia (11.6 %) 
and Kabardino-Balkaria (4.6 %). Traditionally, the North Caucasus republics have high 
rates of unemployment, contributing to a constant outflow of people, mostly to inner 
Russian regions. As indicated in the 2010 government strategy for North Caucasus 
development, the region’s net loss of population due to migration in 2008 was 11,900, 
and almost all of it (9,800) was contributed by Dagestan. Dagestan’s population grew 
from 2.5 million in 2002 to 3 million in 2010, that is suspiciously astounding spike of 
population. With no significant migration flows into this republic during this period, the 
growth is hard to explain (prior to announcing the 2010 census results, estimates were 
around 2.7 million). Chechnya’s population added nearly 200,000 since 2002 and 
numbers now officially 1,275,000 that is widely viewed as artificially increased during 
the 2002 census to cover up the massive loss of lives during the Russian-Chechen wars. 
In reality, the announced increase of Chechnya’s population is probably a cumulative 
effect of a real inflow of Chechen refugees after 2002, primarily from Ingushetia, a high 
birth rate and a cumulative statistical addition of perceived population growth. The 
astonishing growth of Karachay-Cherkessia’s population from 440,000 in 2002 to 
480,000 in 2010 appears to be framed as well. According to the 2002 census, ethnic 
Russians comprised barely over one-fourth of the republican population, and have been 
reported leaving this impoverished “dual identity “republic in large numbers. In fact, 
official statistical reports documented a dwindling population trend in Karachay-
Cherkessia up until 2009, when its population was estimated at 427,000 (FSSS 2011). 
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The results of the 2010 census thus reflect not only the actual population growth 
or decline in a given North Caucasian region, but the local administration’s ability to 
exercise a certain bureaucratic solidarity and solidify its bargaining positions with 
Moscow for future concessions. While Chechnya occupies a special place, since 
Moscow itself is interested in pacifying its population by all means, Dagestan and 
Karachay-Cherkessia continue to demonstrate unwavering strength in its bargaining 
positions with Moscow, demonstrating ostensible solidarity among its ruling elites to 
manipulate the population figures to their advantage. Moreover, the federal government 
also appears to have a vested interest in skewing the figures since they have become so 
politically sensitive and ingrained in socio-economic calculations. The local 
bureaucracy of the North Caucasus republics habitually tries to beef up the size of their 
populations mainly because under the current Russian system of state budget 
redistribution, it gives certain advantages in terms of getting more subsidies to satisfy 
the needs of the allegedly bigger population. The chase for larger population numbers 
breaks down into separate city administrations and districts, especially in a diverse, 
multiethnic republic like Dagestan, where each city mayor and each ethnicity try to back 
up their social standing with impressive population figures. In Chechnya’s case, the 
local administration’s ambitions to have a sufficiently large population are matched by 
Moscow’s anxiety to cover up the results of the devastating wars it inflicted upon this 
republic. With other problems to tackle, such as frozen conflicts, widespread corruption 
and abject poverty, international organizations have generally ignored the inadequate 
policy framework in relation to national and religious minorities. In the North Caucasus, 
non-governmental actors are to a large extent dependent on foreign grants, and projects 
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initiated by local organizations tend therefore to adopt priorities set by their grant-
givers, and thus, follow the same pattern. Overall, there is a yawning gap between the 
promotion of civic identity and the protection of minorities, resulting in tensions 
between the central government, local elites and minority communities.  
1.2. Nature of the Problem and Scope of the Study  
The “classical” notion of nation-building considers ethnic difference as pre-
modern patterns of social differentiation which hampers development and therefore 
should be removed. Karl Deutsch, in his classical 1953 study “Nationalism and Social 
Communication,” viewed nation-building as the rate of assimilation and mobilisation. 
Deutsch defined the rate of assimilation as an increase or decrease of groups within a 
particular population who spoke the dominant language. Likewise, the rate of 
mobilisation was defined as an increase or decrease of those groups, which ceased to 
live in traditional systems of communication and integrated into national 
communication patterns (1953). Thus, assimilation and social mobilisation led to a 
fading of traditional forms of social differentiation in clans and tribes. According to 
Deutsch (1953,1969), nation building is inextricably linked to social transformation in 
the form of modernisation in the context of interaction between the Western polities and 
traditional social structures, emanating from the specific response of the local people to 
global modernisation challenges. However, the “classical” concept of nation-building 
may also be questioned for potential to undermine the right to self-determination which 
has been widely recognised as a fundamental human right. The focus on nation-building 
is often inconsistent with the driving forces of self-determination. In fact, self-
determination will, sooner or later, challenge this status quo because it is not self-
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evident who the subjects of self-determination are. After World War II, the principle of 
self-determination served as an unbeatable argument for claiming independence. The 
very concept of nation-building has gradually developed into an important source of 
income and glamour for a plethora of actors who were involved in it for decades. 
However, the critique of nation-building has its own flaws.  First, to what degree violent 
conflict, which involves ethnic markers, is really an expression of competing ethnic 
identity claims. In relation to this point, I shall explain that the persistence of ethnic 
markers cannot explain conflict but is rather a demonstration of conflict. Second, I 
argue that the critique of nation-building bends to ethnocentricity in that it downplays 
non-ethnic factors of political and social behaviour.  
Types of violence, as well as the ideologies and the myths that inspire them, and 
salient lines of cleavage, vary enormously. Identifying etiology under these conditions 
is a daunting task by definition. The solution is to divide the problem into discrete parts, 
the sensible assumption being that various forms of violence require different 
explanations. The causes of interstate wars are presumably different from those of 
revolutions, which are different from those of ethnic or religious conflicts. Separating 
ethnic conflict, for example, from clan, religious, regional, or other kinds of internal 
conflict is difficult, because any single conflict is likely to involve various mobilizing 
ideologies, lines of cleavage, and political objectives, each of which can change over 
time. Moreover, I believe that the adjective (ethnic, national, clan, regional, or religious) 
matters rather less for explanatory purposes than is typically assumed. For example, the 
structural factors typically adduced as causes of ethnic conflict (modernization, state 
collapse, poverty, unemployment, social policy, inequality, globalization, or cultural 
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propensity to violence) appear to be equally applicable (or equally inapplicable) to other 
forms of collective political violence. Why inadequate social policy , for example, is 
any more likely (or less likely) to produce ethnic conflict than class or religious conflict 
is not only unclear but rarely addressed by theorists of ethnic conflict or any kind of 
collective violence. 
Answering all these questions is well beyond the scope of this research.  Instead, 
I shall focus on the more specific question of whether ethnic conflict is different from 
religious conflict, and if so, whether theories of ethnic conflict are equally applicable to 
religious conflict, with particular reference to the question of militancy inspired by 
radical Islam in the North Caucasus. I do not mean to suggest that all internal conflicts 
are alike or that distinguishing among types of collective political violence is without 
value. On the contrary, I argue that theorists of collective political violence (Ikle 1971, 
Modelski 1964, Pillar 1983, Kaufmann 1996, Walter and Snyder 1999, Posen 1993, 
Stedman 1991, 1997) should be careful to distinguish the kind of violence they are 
trying to explain and to consider whether the explanation they offer is really unique to 
that type of conflict. I also argue that theories of violence should consider whether they 
can explain why particular conflicts change over time and why certain kinds of 
collective violence are more prevalent at particular moments in history. The challenge is 
to explain why Islamism is such a potent mobilizer of internal violence in the North 
Caucasus today, whereas thirty years ago it was Marxism while fifteen years ago it was 
ethno-nationalism. Relational factors help explain variation in modes of resistance (e.g., 
why we get suicide terrorism today but not yesterday) and perhaps overall levels of 
violence (militants learn about how to conduct violence more effectively). If so, I 
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believe we would still see considerable variation in violence over time and space, a 
variation that is best assessed through the changing mobilizational capacity of different 
ideologies of resistance. In other words, it is neither the structurally engrained demand 
for militancy nor potential of violence that matters most, but the changing supply of 
ideologies of resistance and by the degree to which particular ideologies discredit 
themselves in everyday life. 
The twentieth century saw a number of cyclical increases in the number and 
intensity of ethnic revolts, implicitly suggesting that democratization unleashes ethnic 
tensions and gives rise to ethnic-based conflict. Furthermore, ethnic rebellion is often 
viewed as impediment to democratization, leading to its reversal. Thus, a variety of 
theories are employed to examine the conditions under which transition to democracy 
affects ethnic conflict and the conditions under which ethnic conflict affects 
democratization: elite persuasion, political opportunity, competition, modernization, and 
internal colonialism (Yemelianova 2005). The general explanation is that 
democratization contributes to reduction of ethnic conflict that supports political 
opportunity theory. Likewise, there is a general correlation between the level of 
democracy and ethnic revolt. In underdeveloped societies, the ethnic revolt has a 
negative effect on democracy and that the effect varies by the level of development a 
society has achieved. The disintegration of the command administrative economy in the 
Soviet Union and its swift transformation into a quasi capitalist system in post-Soviet 
Russia was a reaction by the Soviet elite to emerging threats to their privileges and 
administrative power by Andropov and later Gorbachev in the late 1980s. Threatened 
by the inevitable dilution of its privileged status, the Soviet elite responded to the by 
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transforming itself into an official bourgeoisie that could legally claim the power and 
property it had already controlled by rushing ahead with laws that destroyed the 
socialist planning economy.  
According to Gurr, ethnic conflict is often defined as anti-state action taken on 
behalf of a marginalized or at risk ethnic group (2000). Ethnicity, in its turn, is generally 
rooted in common language, religion, cultural practices, and a shared history or myths 
of common experience. Marginalized minorities are groups that are considered to be at 
risk based on a history of discrimination against them, a situation of disadvantage due to 
past discrimination, or if they have organized political groups that advocate for greater 
group rights (Gurr 1993). Ethnic nationalism has long proven to be an ideological 
competitor of democracy. More precisely, ethnic nationalism is incompatible with 
democracy because it establishes rights based on group membership rather than equality 
for all (Snyder 2000). Nationalism promotes the ideological moorings for ethnic 
movements and ultimately ignites ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict on the crest of rising 
ethnic sentiment results in the reinforcement of ethnic cleavages that inevitably leads to 
the dominance of group rights over individual rights - a situation incompatible with 
liberal democracy. Not only democratic political culture is shrunk when society is 
divided along one line and cross-cutting cleavages are weak, but elections become a 
formal way to legitimize one party or ethnic group. This usually leads to a one party 
regime with essentially ethnic domination. In more diverse societies, different interests 
form crosscutting cleavages and prevent this from occurring. In fact, in societies with 
deep ethnic cleavages, minorities may tolerate authoritarian regimes, knowing their 
political treatment could be much worse in a democracy (Horowitz 1991). 
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Unlike class-based cleavages with relatively permeable borders, nationalism and 
ethnic movements are alike in that they claim legitimate authority over a certain 
territory or population, pitting them against the state and democracy, which claim 
legitimate authority over the same territory or population, undermining the legitimacy of 
the concept of a single nation existing within one administrative unit (Olzak 1998).  In 
addition to economic, cultural, and social factors that influence a country’s ability to  
adopt democratic methods of governance, the existence of ethnic conflict also 
contributes to alienation of democratic norms and practices. Democratization is most 
likely in the absence of significant political competition ignited by elites, because 
violent ethnic conflict represents a serious challenge to the status quo. Ethnic conflict 
also consolidates ethnic boundaries and thus inhibits the formation of cross-cutting 
cleavages widely known to be crucial to democracy. Besides, confidence is also 
important in societies attempting democratization, but violent conflict interferes with 
interethnic confidence, significantly reducing it. Moreover, ethnic conflict inhibits 
grass-root popular support for democracy as people tend to value stability over civil 
rights and freedoms, and will often trade both for increased security, either real or 
virtual. Although ideological challengers to democracy, such as fascism and 
communism, have widely contributed to long-term democratic reversals, recent trends 
suggest that ethnic based nationalism is more potent ideological challenger, which is 
inevitably accompanied by ethnic conflict. 
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1.3. Topic of Research, Relevance, and Contribution to Field 
My research investigated the phenomenon of changing religious identities and 
practices and changing religious and political attitudes among people of such republics 
as Dagestan, Chechnya, and Karachay-Cherkessia. I explored political mobilization, and 
potential or actual conflict that are of interest both to public policy debates and to 
theoretical discussions. First, to what extent is Islam becoming a more salient identity in 
these regions, and why? Second, under what conditions religious ideology becomes the 
basis for mass mobilization and violent conflict? More precisely, how, when, and why 
does Islamic identity become a factor in conflict with other religious confessions and 
nationalistic elites? Third, why do we see great variation in the degree to which Islamic 
identities have spurred mobilization throughout the North Caucasus? Fourth, is political 
Islamization at the social level a cause or consequence of violence, repression, and 
state’s failure to provide ethnic groups with equal access to basic constitutional 
provisions? 
My research has been particularly concerned with the impact of ethnic 
identification and religion on the formation of the post-Soviet political system and 
national ideology in post-Soviet Chechnya, Dagestan, and Karachay-Cherkessia. I 
focused on the above-mentioned ethnic republics of the North Caucasus as most similar 
cases that differ on the dependent variable I sought to explain and the independent 
variables that cause the differences in the dependent variable. Since it is impossible to 
provide a representative sample of a population that varies on so many potentially 
significant variables using only three cases, I developed the hypothesis by using the case 
comparison method. This method is useful in small-N studies because it identifies the 
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cases for which the hypothesis is least likely to hold true. If it does hold true for these 
cases, it is quite likely that it would also hold true for other cases where conditions are 
not as adverse for the theory in question.  In particular, I have sought to map the ways in 
which religious and ethnic minorities have responded to the challenges of 
modernization and globalization as well as to systematize and describe the complex 
political, social and religious situation in the region, above all, the key problems and 
conflicts, which give rise to the religious and ethnic nationalism. The extent of popular 
support for ethnic mobilization is measured in several ways, including electoral support 
for nationalist candidates, the size and frequency of public protests, and responses to 
public opinion polls and surveys conducted by international NGOs and human rights 
groups. Analysis of the nationalist movements and religious groups are based primarily 
on a content analysis of the local press, interviews with nationalist activists, government 
officials, and local experts and on archival materials detailing the development of ethnic 
and religious institutions. The primary sources used are almost exclusively in the 
Russian language. The lack of primary sources in the local languages does not bias the 
results of the research. All scholars and political figures, including nationalist and 
religious activists used Russian at least as frequently as they used their native language. 
Nationalist leaders in all of the regions published their programs and ideas in local 
Russian-language newspapers. While it is true that additional nationalist writings were 
available in the native-language press, I do not believe, based on reading several 
translated articles from these sources, that this additional material would have changed 
my findings in any way.  
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In my view, the key problem with existing institutional explanations is that they 
tend limit themselves to explaining the reasons for the emergence of this mobilization in 
specific circumstances. Due to the fact that they are not concerned with the process 
through which this mobilization becomes a powerful political force, they continue to 
focus almost primarily on the behavior of political elites as the main explanatory 
variable in determining the timing and location of ethnic and religious mobilization. As 
I emphasize in the next chapters, most institutionalist explanations boldly assume that 
the crucial political decisions are made by the ruling elites, who then incite the masses 
to follow their agenda. This research is an attempt to move beyond these narrow elite-
focused accounts of why ethnic and religious mobilization takes place. The key question 
motivating the research  is not why but how. I therefore explain how ethnic and religious 
movements emerged on the political scene as a result of government-driven 
liberalization, how they compete for resources to form organizational structures, how 
they frame their demands to meet expectations of their target groups, and how they 
recruit their supporters. The nature of these processes, I argue, is largely determined by 
the institutional design of what is established by the state. 
In the post-Soviet sphere, these questions are puzzling and pressing empirical 
issues. For example, we have little understanding of why Islamic identity became 
increasingly salient and powerful in mobilizing Chechens against federal authorities. 
Will the pattern of Islamic militancy and Islamist political opposition we have witnessed 
in Afghanistan similarly occur in the North Caucasus where Islamic cultural and 
religious identities are not that strong? If so, we should anticipate that nascent militant 
Islamist groups in Dagestan would gain popular support over time. Yet, we still need to 
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explain why Islamists fail to mobilize the population in other cases where Islam 
nonetheless pervades society? Conversely, why has Islamic identity played little role in 
the conflict in Karachay-Cherkessia, and only recently been politically mobilized in 
Dagestan? In conducting this research, I exposed the theoretical underpinnings of the 
relevant literature on ethnic and religious identity, the rival visions of national identity 
(including civic versus ethnic, and the significance of language, boundaries and 
institutions), and the competing theories of nationalism. Moreover, with regard to 
contemporary Caucasian identity, I explained the essential role that democratization has 
contributed to the facilitation of elite manipulated identity construction. I examined the 
trajectory and characteristics prevalent in the idea of identity over three periods and will 
explain why certain concepts of identity have succeeded while others have failed. The 
political environment in democratizing societies in the North Caucasus created a 
situation of intense inter-elite rivalry. As competing elites groups strive for political 
control, the difficulties in forming political coalitions and coherent policy platforms 
result in the need to rapidly mobilize mass support, and the most effective instrument 
for doing so is the manipulation of nationalist sentiments and religious believes. Thus, 
elite manipulations construct alternative visions of national and often religious identity 
and, therefore, the more virulent strains of nationalism intensify when there is an 
increase in the proportion of individuals who have a say in political and public discourse 
(Snyder 1993:90). However, before any examination of the Caucasian identities’ 
formation can be interpreted, it is imperative to shed light on the historical antecedents 
of Soviet nationalities politics and expose the essential role that ideological political 
clichés had on the consequent institutionalization of these salient identification markers 
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under the Soviet regime and reveal how Marx, Lenin and Stalin addressed the 
“nationalities question”.  
My research explored these issues by analyzing theoretically and empirically the 
trends in religious and political identification, taking place in the North Caucasus since 
the late Soviet period. I explained how the non-ethnic Russian regions of the North 
Caucasus such as Chechnya, Dagestan, and Karachay-Cherkessia pursued their 
particular pathways and inspect how the idea of national identity changed during the 
tumultuous democratic transition under Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), Vladimir Putin 
(2000-2008), and Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012). I looked at the social level to 
understand how identity plays out among ordinary people, and why religious 
identification has been changing. The data I have gathered also helps to explain why the 
trends differ from region to region, and to try to understand what motivates Islamist 
groups to use religion as a source of political opposition. Despite much theoretical 
writing, there is very little empirical data and case study work on religion and politics 
and the rise and decline of Islamist opposition movements in the North Caucasus region. 
A large segment of my research is devoted to arguments about religious identity and 
conflict, religion and democracy, and empirical studies and counters to common 
assumptions about ethno-religious conflict. The actual situation is characterized by a 
high diversity of social, economic and cultural forms of development and modes of 
governance in different regions. Each of the nine North Caucasian regions have now 
their own development trends, sets of problems, levels of violence, etc. Chechnya, 
Dagestan, and Karachay-Cherkessia are selected for a comparison of similar socio-
economic, geographic and ethnic features but different strategies of ethno-religious 
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conflict development and resolution: a full-fledged war with massive human casualties 
and much collateral damage in Chechnya, a relatively successful record of defusing the 
tensions that arose in the early 1990s in Dagestan, and a potentially dangerous 
escalation of conflict (especially in 1999-2003) in Karachay-Cherkessia, where, in 
contrast, there is still a high level of ethnic tension, conflicts between different religious 
groups, and open criticism of the regional authorities. 
Is ethnic conflict different from religious conflict? It has become common to 
argue that the terms “ethnicity” and “ethnic group” are nebulous and ambiguous, and 
that it is subsequently difficult to grasp what “ethnic conflict” means or how to 
distinguish ethnic wars from other kinds of sustained internal violence. Usually, an 
ethnic group is viewed as an objective category with different linguistic and cultural 
characteristics. As Walker Connor put it in his article on conceptual confusion in the 
study of nations, nation states, and ethnic groups: “An ethnic group may be readily 
discerned by an anthropologist or other outside observer while an ethnic group may, 
therefore, be other-defined, the nation must be self-defined” (Connor 1994:103). In 
contrast, many scholars agree that “nation should be treated as a subjective category” in 
Benedict Anderson’s much-cited formulation, a nation is an “imagined political 
community” aspiring to some form of political self-determination (Anderson 1991:3-4). 
According to Connor, members of an ethnic group, unlike nations, are not expected to 
identify with a distinct cultural community. Subsequently, ethnic conflict would be 
determined by outside observers on the basis of observable behavior that is indicative of 




One obvious problem here is that the great majority of so-called “ethnic 
conflicts” involve struggles between collectivities inspired by nationalism, with one or 
more parties appealing to the common lineage. However, in reality, language appears to 
be the decisive factor. If people from different regions with different cultures speak the 
same language, they are typically not considered different ethnicities, and conflict 
between them is typically not classified as ethnic conflict. That said, ethnic conflict is 
where combatants in a violent internal conflict speak different languages. If so, then 
conflict between Sunnis Tallish-speakers and Sunnis Lizgin-speakers in Dagestan 
would be ethnic conflict, but conflict between Russian-speaking Shiites and Sunnis 
would be religious one. Nonetheless, I suggest that language is not determinative factor 
either. The objective line of cleavage is not religious or linguistic, because each of the 
groups has a clear sense of national consciousness. It has been suggested that any 
individual has many identities that can be activated by different circumstances. If so, 
then virtually any form of collective violence would qualify as an identity conflict. 
Likewise, religion is not a less important factor than class, citizenship, or institutional 
affiliation in most cases. In real world, however, what seems to matter most is whether, 
by virtue of political/academic fashion or changing political circumstances, external 
observers chose to characterize a particular conflict at a particular moment in history as 
“ethnic”, or “religious”. Then, I suggest that we continue to draw more careful 
delineation with regard to internal conflicts by distinguishing among three different 
classificatory criteria: (1) the dominant line of cleavage; (2) the objectives of the parties 
to the conflict; and (3) the dominant mobilizing ideology of resistance involved.
1
 In 
                                                             
1 Explaining why those committed to political violence engage in  suicide terrorism rather than insurgency does not 
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other words, there is a high probability that a sustained conflict in a particular area will 
go along any of these dimensions.  
I assumed at this point that it is possible to separate “ethnic conflict” from 
“religious conflict”. The next question is whether the etiology of the former is different 
from the latter. Are the roots of Islamist-inspired violence, for example, significantly 
different from those of ethnic conflicts? While symbols and symbolism play an 
important role in provoking ethnic conflict, why this would not be true for other kinds 
of collective political violence? Why are ethnic symbols believed to be more 
emotionally potent than symbols that appeal to religion, tribe, class, or political 
ideology? It turns out that religion, as well as kinship, has been often used to bind 
together political communities, one of many means by which “imagined political 
communities” are constructed, being responsible for more violence than “ethnic wars.” 
The relationship between ethnic conflict and modernity pushes for an implicit claim that 
nationalism in general and ethno-nationalism in particular are products of 
modernization, whereas religion is anachronistic (Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Smith 
1986, Marx 2003).  The advantages of linguistic homogenization, along with the spread 
of Anderson’s print capitalism, create the need and opportunity to “invent the nation”. 
Why should we be led to believe that faith-based ideologies are more anachronistic as 
driving forces of violence that ethno-nationalism? As for the Caucasus, even if we 
accept that a common language and culture are salient prerequisites of modernization, it 
is still not clear why religion is less potent as a basis for nationhood than language, 
particularly given the nature of the state boundaries left behind by the Soviet Union. Is 
                                                                                                                                                                                  




the political project of Islamists in Karachay-Cherkessia less plausible than the project 
of the pan-Turkists who wish to construct a nation out of Turkish speakers? I also argue 
that it was not clear why rationality and reason would be more effective than religion 
and mysticism in mobilizing militant resistance, as modernization was inevitably 
associated with liberal democracy and its consequences that many militants find very 
objectionable. Moreover, religious and anti-rationalist ideologies of resistance are at 
least as potent as secular ones in offering persuasive explanations and prescriptions, 
identifying who is to blame. In sum, religious ideologies have the unbeatable advantage 
over reason-based ones: secular and rationalist ideologies require positive proof of the 
validity of their claims and can be easily discredited in practice. Put it simply, it is not at 
all clear why ethnic conflict is significantly different from other kinds of conflict in 
terms of etiology, including those inspired by religion.  
In conducting this study, I explored the theoretical frameworks of the relevant 
literature on ethnic identity, the rival visions of its components, and the competing 
schools of nationalism (primordial, constructivist and instrumentalist). Moreover, with 
regard to contemporary post-Soviet identity, I elaborated on the essential role that 
democratization has contributed to the facilitation of elite manipulated identity 
construction. By looking into the trajectory and characteristics prevalent in the idea of 
identity, I explained why certain concepts of identity have succeeded while others have 
failed and examine the development of identity construction under the Soviet regime 
and reflect on how Marx, Lenin and Stalin addressed the “nationalities question”. Then, 
I evaluated the results of this process and the centralized attempts to construct 
individual identities around the idealistic conception of the “Communist Man” and 
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explore what place different ethnic groups had in the system. Furthermore, I 
investigated how Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Chechnya pursued their 
particular national pathways and inspect how the idea of ethnic or religious identity 
changed during the controversial transition period under Boris Yeltsin. This period was 
marked by the materialization of new identities, which ranged from exclusionary to 
moderate nationalism. The final empirical period looks at how current ruling elites 
address the issue of national identity and nationhood. It should be noted that in 
conducting this study, I tried to avoid any in depth treatment of the former Soviet 
legacies and focused primarily on the post-Soviet era. 
1.4. Research Questions and Research Design 
Several scholars have pointed to Soviet institutional legacy as the main 
explanation for ethnic and religious mobilization during the late 1980s. Thus, Brubaker 
(1996) clearly describes the core features of Soviet ethno-federalism and emphasizes 
that the structure of the Soviet state played a critical role in the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Roeder (1991) points out that the extent of mobilization depended on a 
republic’s position in the Soviet ethno-federal hierarchy. His argument stipulates that 
the Soviet regime sought to control ethnic politics by delegating control of ethnic 
regions to indigenous elites, by punishing them sought to use nationalism to gain 
popular support, and by granting the loyal elites to enjoy a monopoly over 
mobilizational resources within particular ethnic community. Laitin (1991) introduces 
elite incentives to the institutionalist model, explaining that regional political elites 
incited nationalist or religious movements not whenever they had the resources to do so, 
but only under those circumstances when doing so would consolidate their power versus 
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the federal government. Furthermore, Treisman (1997) elaborates on this work by 
spelling out how regional elites employed the institutional resources provided by ethnic 
or religious institutions to gain advantage in their struggle for power with the center. 
The above-mentioned scholarship has greatly increased our understanding of the role 
played by state institutions and by ruling elites in fostering ethnic or religious 
mobilization. My research continues their effort by extending the institutional 
explanation beyond the political elites. While the existing scholarship has largely 
focused on the role of political elites in mobilizing ethnic minorities, I argue that the 
support of political elites is not an extricable component of ethnic or religious 
mobilization. Moreover, even though these authors have emphasized the connection 
between administrative status and resource allocation and the importance of these 
resources for the political mobilization of ethnic and religious movements, they have 
not explained the process by which differences in administrative status affect political 
mobilization.  
My main research methods have been textual analysis of the media (periodicals, 
radio, and TV), reports produced by both Russian and international NGOs, official 
statistics and analytical materials released by relevant state institutions (primary 
sources), as well as relevant academic scholarship and literature on the subject 
(secondary sources). The research has been undertaken over a period of ten years (2000 
– 2010). It included consultations with region-based analysts, academics, NGOs, 
political activists and religious leaders in order to gather descriptions of local religious 
and ethno-nationalist discourses, structural factors that contribute to them, rhetoric that 
relates to them and local assessment of problems and grievances. In this regard, many 
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grievances articulated are pervasive and common to the entire region, but those 
experiencing them do not have the advantage of an overall comparative perspective. 
They are usually not part of some coherent agenda but some may resonate for different 
groups according to the underlying circumstances. Socio-economic problems in the 
region are directly associated with growing tensions and social pressures. Ethnic and 
religious rhetoric intertwines with the search for ideals, ideologies, and solutions that 
the post-Soviet Caucasus is witnessing, and to which, for instance, the social justice 
aspect of Islam may contribute.  
Another methodological approach that I used is a study of institutional 
mechanisms that can shed light on intricate collision of mobilizing ideologies in the 
region. The interface between sociology, geography and political science and the key 
unit of analysis is the institutional framework of the republics chosen – Chechnya, 
Dagestan, and Karachay-Cherkessia. Institutional framework means the hybrid 
combination of institutions that derive from the Soviet institutional legacy, from 
unofficial institutions that emerged as a reaction to the organizational deficits of the 
Soviet system (such as a black market economy or networks of patronage) and from 
“traditional” institutions that have survived the Soviet system. Focusing on the 
institutional framework allowed me to catch and to understand the micro politics of 
local development impulses and to place it in the wider context of a successful or failed 
state building. The analysis considers formal and informal central (federal level) and 
local (republican) institutions that may facilitate cooperation and hinder violent conflict.   
This research takes up three related questions:  
(1) what is the difference between ethnic and religious conflict;  
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(2) are theories of ethnic conflict equally applicable to religious conflict; and  
(3) can available theories of collective violence explain why the nature of 
internal conflict changes over time, either with respect to line of cleavage or mobilizing 
ideology? My argument is that distinguishing among types of internal conflict and its 
driving forces is more difficult than is often assumed and that theories of ethnic conflict 
typically explain not ethnic conflict as distinct category but sustained internal violence 
in general, including “religious” conflict. While these theoretical frameworks usually try 
to explain why stand-off breaks out in some multiethnic regions but not others, they do 
not seek to explain us why conflict when it happens is “ethnic” rather than “religious”. 
The following narrative of ethno-religious mobilization in three republics of the North 
Caucasus reveals how institutional differences led to variations in resource availability 
that in turn caused the observable regional differences in the ability of nationalist 
leaders to mobilize the population and achieve their goals. In particular, I sought to 
explain (1) how and why the movement leaders choose to launch the mobilization 
process; (2), how the movement leaders convince others to support the movement; and 
(3) how and why a significant proportion of the population actually joins the movement.  
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"Merely quantitative differences, beyond a certain point, pass into qualitative changes."  
Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I. 
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review  
Introduction 
Studies of the political mobilization of ethnicity immediately confront a number 
of conceptual issues. First, what is an ethnic group? Second, what is political 
mobilization and how can it be compared across time, countries, and groups? This 
literature review provides a non-exhaustive overview of recent thinking and research on 
political mobilization in the studies of politics of collective identities. It does so in two 
sections. The first section defines the term “ethnic group”' and situates the literature on 
ethnic politics within a larger body of scholarship on political mobilization in conflict-
prone societies. The second section considers the main theoretical approaches in the 
study of political mobilization of ethnicity. Given this range of issues, this chapter 
outlines the dominant literature and then articulates the rationale for the approach and 
case-studies used in the subsequent chapters. 
Nationalism and Ethnic Mobilization as Subjects of Study 
While a plethora of theorists dealt with the rise of nationalism, ethnic 
mobilization and nationalist ideologies, I evaluate certain claims made by Breuilly 
(1993, 2008), Anderson (1991, 1994), Brubaker (1992, 1996, 2004), Gellner (1983, 
1988), and Deutsch (1953, 1961, 1969) . Even though these authors may not directly 
address the propensity of a given nation to mobilize behind a   particular nationalist 
ideology, they provide theoretical grounds of a broader subject with which I am 
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concerned: the conditions under which nationalism arises and becomes militant. More 
precisely, I am concerned with the more specific conditions that cause ethnic groups to 
mobilize behind a nationalist or a religious ideology.  
The above-mentioned scholars are addressing the broad question: what are those 
conditions under which most group members adopt or reject a particular set of ideas 
about the nation? In answering this question, these authors base their narrative on a 
range of separate processes. Thus, Anderson points to the rise of print capitalism and its 
role in promoting the idea of the nation in Western Europe and then spreading the 
concept to its overseas colonies. Breuilly highlights the rise of the modern state and the 
nationalist opposition created by this development. Deutsch links the rise of nationalism 
to the emergence and growth of mass communications, shared socio-economic 
preferences, and the social processes unleashed by industrialization. Gellner deals with 
nationalism in terms of the imperatives of industrialization and its influence on creating 
standard high cultures. Horowitz (1985) argues that in deeply divided societies the 
degree to which ethnicity is pervasive is variable. In those societies, ethnic affiliations 
impact not only family and social life, but also formal institutions. In his view, 
distinguishing between ranked and unranked systems, centralization of groups, and 
severity of group cleavages is important. He also argues that ethnic groups are bounded 
by kinship in such a way as to maximize the effective use of the political institutions 
and provide many services that are substitutes for what the modern state fails to provide. 
The main reasons for the persistence of deeply divided societies are ethnic institutions 
that reproduce ethnic cleavages over time - ethnic or nationalist political parties. Even 
though Lipset and Rokkan's  (1967) scholarship on cleavages acknowledges that 
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political institutions may be crucial to generate cleavages, most political scientists argue 
for endogenous political explanations based on institutionalism. As Mann (2004) points 
out, it is simply erroneous to assume an automatic process of mass mobilization in 
connection to elites’ political agenda. Likewise, we should not assume that ethnic 
political parties or armed outfits spring up instantly. Given the importance of ethnic 
mobilization, we need more research in this area. Indeed, these theories explain 
convincingly why nationalism is the pervasive variable in political science. Nonetheless, 
the factors involved in these claims are far too general to explain significant variations 
between cases. In attributing nationalist mobilization to the institutionalization of 
nationhood, Brubaker highlights a factor that existed throughout much of the post-
Soviet region and falls short when confronted with the challenge of explaining why 
Chechens exhibited a higher degree of nationalist mobilization than other national 
groups. Furthermore, Brubaker cannot explain why the nationalist ideologies supported 
by the former nations were more extreme than those adopted by the latter. In other 
words, if the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks are debilitated by an inability to 
account for differences between nations, they fail to explain variations within nations as 
well. With regard to my research, they cannot adequately explain why a given group’s 
nationalism is directed against certain groups but not others. While, by focusing on a 
nation’s feeling of relative deprivation towards groups that are culturally and 
linguistically different, Gellner attempts to provide an answer to this question, Brubaker 
suggests an alternative approach for understanding which group a particular nation will 
mobilize against. I believe that a workable theory of nationalism should be able to 
explain not only why nationalism exists, but also why particular nationalism will be 
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directed against some groups more than others. The re-emergence of militant 
nationalism as a leading mobilizing force in the post-Soviet space has refocused the 
attention of scholars towards the question of timing.  Why did nationalism re-emerge in 
the 1990s as an unquestionable mass-mobilizing phenomenon? Brubaker, in his turn, 
lays out a set of means to explain the timing of nationalist mobilization, marking an 
advance over previous accounts of nationalism, which focus on factors that tend to be 
unchanging over time. On the basis of these factors, my assessment will show how the 
opening of political space was part of a broader process of state disintegration, a process 
that provided the crucial condition for nationalist mobilization in the North Caucasus.  
Even though the political ideology of nationalism dates back to the early 19 
century in Europe, there is no fixed definition of such an ideology, but a general 
consensus of what it means, depending on how and what is being analyzed (Dekker, 
Malova, and Hoogendorn 2003).  Dekker, Malova and Hoogendorn demonstrate how 
the conceptualization of nationalism differs when it is being defined as an ideology, 
movement, process of nation or nation-state building, and one’s political stance (2003).  
Thus, it is important to set the boundaries of this ideology.  Chatterjee argues that 
nationalism is perceived as a dark, elemental and an unpredictable force of primordial 
nature threatening the orderly calm of civilized life (Chatterjee 1999).  Brubaker argued 
that we need to stop dissecting nations based on dichotomous contest. Instead, we 
should look at the possibility to connect the national minorities and study each position 
in terms of a field of activity, of differentiated and competitive positions on stances 
(Brubaker, 1996). While nationalism focuses on collective identities and prioritizes 
collective rights over individual rights, the liberal view of the nation is not based on 
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these so called “collective” and “subjective” identities.  Liberals have studied and 
overtly classify nations as being individualistic and objective. Renan clearly asserts that 
a nation is a large solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices and defines the 
nation as a group of people who choose to live together by free will, rather than social 
determinism (1996). According to Greenfeld (1992), the nation is defined as a linguistic 
group; a factor that nations commonly belong to. Nationalists emphasize that one needs 
to belong to a nation in order to be a nationalist. The self-interest, survival and the self 
determination of a nation is most important. Gellner’s (1983) definition of the nation is 
clearly subjective. He states that individuals need not belong to a nation by birth. As 
long as there is solidarity between the individuals; this may constitute towards nation-
building. Renan argues that there is no connection between nations and cultural or racial 
groups. Instead, it is all political in nature. Haas (1997) views nationalism as an aspect 
of modernization and he maintains that its followers do not necessarily wish to endorse 
a secular form of modern life. Nationalism, according to Haas, is a social construct. It 
was constructed to make life better for collectivities suffering through the transition to 
modernization. Haas argues that identities, in particular, national identities are chosen 
and are subject to change.  
The theoretical discourse within theories of nationalism is centered on two pair-
wise opposites: 1) Instrumentalism vs. Primordialism; and 2) Modernism vs. 
Perennialism. Primordialists emphasise emotions and reflective constraints as legitimate 
explanations, whereas instrumentalists think of ethnicity as a dependent variable. 
Ethnicity is therefore crafted for its strategic utility in achieving material or political 
gains, formally in the name of the group, but in fact exclusively to the elites’ advantage. 
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Modernists attach the formation of nations to the rise of modernity, whereas 
perennialists see them as enduring, inveterate, century-long phenomena, certainly 
predating modernity (Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, Anderson 1991, Greenfeld 1992, 
Breuilly 1993, Smith 1998). The existing consensus among social scientists postulates 
that identities are not inherited but rather constructed and as such are always subject to 
reconstruction. This defies assumptions that social categories are static and are fixed by 
human nature rather than by social contracts and practices; this is called “everyday 
primordialism” (Fearon and Laitin 1999:849). Nonetheless, there is a lingering question 
– why identities are socially constructed? Fearon and Laitin (1999) claim that identity 
itself refers to specific social categories: largely unchangeable and socially 
consequential attribute. As such, an individual’s label is definable by the rules of 
membership, which dictate who is and is not a member, through the expected behavior 
of members with their beliefs, desires and moral commitments as well as by the social 
valuation of members relative to one another. In addition, an individual’s identity is 
given meaning through historical and personal experiences, and through the 
acknowledgement of shared losses and triumphs (Barany 1998:240). Yet, it should be 
mentioned that an individual’s identity changes with the level of aggregation and 
society is replete with cultural entrepreneurs who constantly offer new identity 
classifications to followers in the hope that they will become the group’s tacit leaders 
(Laitin1998:11-14). Individuals in every society have a number of identities based on 
specific contextual circumstances. These identities are usually associated with language, 
stereotypes, traditions and customs. “An individual’s identities contribute to the creation 
and recreation of discourse and social cognitive structure; at the same time, those 
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identities are constrained, shaped, and empowered by the very social products they have 
a hand in creating” (Hopf 2002:1). Furthermore, the multiplicity of identity is usually 
dependent on the absence of external conflicts which may cause individuals to give 
priority to one identification marker over another. According to Eriksen (1995), 
individual and collective identities change both contextually and historically. The 
demand for identity is a by-product of individual efforts to meet basic human needs, 
which include psychological factors. In this context, religion often contains more 
cultural meaning that contributes to the construction and maintenance of individual and 
group identities and defines the broadest range of possible relationships – to God, the 
self, allies and enemies (Seul 1999). Overall, critiques of nationalism tend to see it as 
being destructive and potentially conflict-prone. This ideology to them is heavily 
embedded in aggression and ethnic cleansing.  Other scholars, like Ernst, make an effort 
to demonstrate that this view of nationalism is historically simplistic and morally 
misleading (Haas 1997). They argue that while nationalism may share conflict attributes 
within a given society, it does not mean that it has always displayed these attributes in 
the past. For them, nationalism lies at the core of human society’s organisation. 
The pervasive claim that identities are both recent and elite driven is a belief that 
is congruent with the modernist and post-modern schools of ethnic and nationalist 
literature positing that the political phenomenon now known as “nationalist” or “ethno-
nationalist” was unknown prior to the French Revolution. Instrumentalists argue that the 
creations of identities are recent constructs of elites bent on preserving order which tap 
the emotions of the masses and provide them with social and psychological security 
(Smith 1998:125). This school of thought questions primordialist explanations for the 
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origins and existence of differing ethnicities and nationalist groups. For their part, 
primordial theories view ethnicity as genetic in that an individual is born with certain 
organic characteristics, which can neither be abandoned nor adopted by an individual 
not born within the parameters of a given group (Geertz 1993:259). Even though 
instrumentalist analyses view ethnicity as mainly cohesive (meaning that any extraneous 
individual may become a part of it by adopting certain behavioral patterns) and elite 
driven, they do not hesitate to note that political elites are not free to select any variable 
with which to mobilize mass support. Indeed, in order for the elites to claim legitimacy 
the choice of symbols must in some way be related to existing cultural or social 
traditions. Instrumentalists speculate that ethnic and national identities are convenient 
tools at the hands of rival elites competing for mass support in the universal struggle for 
“wealth, power and prestige” (Smith 1986:9). Thus, instrumentalist explanations are 
popped up by rational choice theorists, who concur with those scholars who view ethnic 
or nationalist groups as self-interested collective actors, maximizing material values 
through the vehicle of communal identity (Young 1993). Constructivist theories often 
overlap instrumentalist arguments and share similar beliefs that identities are 
continually redefined and reconstructed in response to the changing conditions of the 
political environment and the manipulations of political elites. Constructivists also 
argue that culture is shaped by the perceptions of those living in a particular community 
and is usually spurred by emerging elites who “invite the masses into history” in an 
attempt to get their support (Ozkirmli 1999:218). Ethnicities, according to Young are 
“social constructs, not inherent properties of human communities”. (1992:75) 
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Identity formation is constructed and maintained through three processes of 
social influence. First, there is compliance whereby individuals conform to another’s 
expectations to secure favorable treatment. Second, there is identification when 
individuals adopt the behavior of another because this further assists the achievement of 
an individual’s need for positive self. Third, internalization occurs when an individual 
aligns with others and adopts aspects of their behavior because it is congruent with the 
individual’s values. Furthermore, when a particular “social identity is made salient, 
individuals are likely to think of themselves as having characteristics that are 
representative of that social category…social identity, in other words, leads to self-
stereotyping” (Brewer and Brown 1999:560). Another integral component of identity 
formation is the necessity of the “other”. Social identities are, according to Eriksen 
(1995), by default relational in that they are defined in contrast to other individual or 
group identities; thus, the “self” requires the “other” to generate its own identity (Hopf 
2002). Hence, it is intrinsic that the “we” is absolutely contingent on defining who “we” 
are not (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Identities play a role in homogenizing and 
simplifying, making the “unfamiliar familiar in terms of the identity of the Self…once 
an individual assigns an identity to someone else, the other person becomes a member 
of a class assumed to have a particular set of discursive practices”. (Hopf 2002:6) When 
this dynamic is applied to national identities, the other can be constituted by either 
internal actor – such as the Chechens have been constructed in the post-Soviet period. 
Yet, as Hopf (2002:1-38) illustrates, the “other” need not necessarily be represented by 
another individual nor does the relationship have to be intrinsically antagonistic. The 
dichotomy between the self and the “other” is a fundamental variable in explaining 
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modern Caucasian identity and ascertaining the dynamics of the state’s “identity crisis” 
following the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
Ethnic Group as a Definition 
The difficulties regarding determinations of ethnic groups and what activities 
constitute mobilization are considerable and consume the energy of a significant amount 
of the literature. The literature on the political mobilization of ethnic identity falls into 
two broad categories: those who argue that ethnic identities will give way to national 
ones, and those who find that ethnicity has a recalcitrant character despite the pressures 
of the so-called “melting-pot”. The former dates back to the older tradition of Marxism 
exemplified by Deutsch: A decisive factor in national assimilation or differentiation was 
found to be the fundamental process of social mobilization that accompanies the growth 
of markets, industries, and towns, and eventually of literacy and mass communication 
(1966:188). For Deutsch, ethnic identity emerges as technology makes individuals 
aware of group differences, either directly through increased communication networks 
or indirectly by bringing individuals from disparate groups together in common arenas, 
such as the industrial workplace. Although in the short run significant differences may 
lead to conflict (Deutsch 1961:502), ethnic individuals are compelled, through further 
capitalist development, to surrender their particularistic identity to larger national 
identities as a result both of the capitalist experience and state efforts to further capitalist 
expansion by inculcating a national identity. Economic development, therefore, 
generates ethnicity, initially amplifying the sense of difference between groups, but 
eventually serving to assimilate sub-groups into the larger identity. Other scholars, 
while agreeing with the analysis of Deutsch and the assimilationists more broadly, point 
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instead to the efforts of governments to homogenize their populations as critical in 
understanding the trajectory of ethnic mobilization. While the range of such strategies 
runs from ethnic cleansing to arranging the redrawing of boundaries, neither of which is 
today considered desirable as policy goals, these analyses tend more to focus on the 
assimilation strategies governments undertake, referred to as building the “state-nation” 
(Rejai and Enloe 1969, 142-144). Such efforts may include the establishment of an 
official language or religion, the adoption of the cultural symbols of one group as state 
symbols, and the use of state-controlled means of socialization to advance a particular 
identity (Linz and Stepan 1996, 28-30). “Nationalizing state policies”, while not seen as 
inevitably successful, are viewed as critical to state integrity, democracy, and capitalist 
development. Thus for these scholars subnational ethnic identities are seen as at least 
potentially transitory, with capitalism or state policies eventually homogenizing the 
population. However, in 1972 Walker Conner published some dramatic findings: of 132 
existing states, only 9% could be described as homogenous, with another 19% having a 
single ethnic group in excess of 90% of the population (1994:29). Moreover, Connor 
found 30% of states had no ethnic majority and 40% of all states were constituted of at 
least five ethnic groups. As a result, a number of scholars began to question the 
hypothesis that ethnic sub-cultures would melt away, finding instead that development 
may contribute to the saliency of ethnic identity over longer periods as a result of 
factors intrinsic to development itself. 
The dominant model exploring this ethnopolitical mobilization asserts that, at 
their base, these movements are economic in nature, arguing that where economic 
disparities between ethnic regions and the national centre are pronounced, ethnic groups 
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will mobilize. The prevalence of uneven regional economic development would seem to 
provide significant support for this model. Michael Hechter formulated the simplest 
description of this model is that of “internal colonialism”. For Hechter, where 
economically backward regional boundaries coincide with an ethnic identity, 
mobilization for improved economic conditions will emphasize ethnic rather than class 
identity. However, while economic equalization might, therefore, be desirable in 
contributing to social harmonization, these peripheral areas serve as “internal colonies” 
and the subordination of the regions to the core becomes entrenched as labor becomes 
culturally divided, with the poorer regions representing areas of less-skilled labor. As a 
result, elites from these areas have few opportunities to penetrate the political hegemony 
of the center (Hechter 1999:39-42). From this perspective, ethnic groups suffering from 
perceived economic backwardness when compared to some standard, such as more 
developed areas in the country or some expected level of development, will mobilize in 
an attempt to fix this imbalance through domestic policies (Gurr 1970, Runciman 1966). 
In other words, the ethnic group is not so much a function of relative deprivation; rather, 
it represents a basis for political mobilization to address economic underdevelopment. 
Another model follows Deutsch, but argues that increased contact between ethnic 
groups under conditions of capitalist development will not eventually assimilate; rather, 
inter-group conflict increases and persists. These conflictual models, such as that of 
Smith (1981), agree with the assumptions and logic of the economic development 
models, but find that ethnic elites are unable to penetrate the political structures 
dominated by the national group, similar to Hechter’s argument. However, the 
conflictual model differs from internal colonialism in that it finds ethnicity to be 
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stimulated by the failure of these elites to penetrate the core, after which they return to 
their ethnic groups to mobilize for institutional change (Smith 1981:125-129). A fourth 
model expands the notion of economic discrimination to include ethnic regions which 
are more economically advanced than the center.  In this case, the relative success of 
some ethnic regions leads their elites to mobilize for the retention of their relative gains 
rather than “subsidizing” the remainder of the country (Basques and Catalans in Spain). 
Thus the critical factor becomes the magnitude of economic disparity between the 
national center and an ethnic periphery, rather than simply the relative backwardness of 
the latter. 
As stated earlier, even though models focusing on economic factors impacting 
ethnic mobilization dominate the literature, there are also two competing models of 
mobilization to be considered. The first model, as outlined by Suzan Olzak (1992) and 
Joseph Rothschild (1981), argues that ethnic mobilization is an attempt by elites to 
generate mass support for their struggle for political power. Mobilization may be 
generated by competition among ethnic groups for particular sectors of employment; 
however, the emphasis by either economic or political competition models is on the 
dynamics of competition on mobilizing ethnic identity (Olzak and Nagel 1986:9). 
Ethnic identity can be seen, therefore, as a potential base of political power used by 
elites unable to generate alternate sources of support. A second alternative model 
focuses on ethnic mobilization in which ethnic identity is made increasingly salient by 
corresponding elites. Hroch (2000) argues that ethnic movements begin as small cultural 
organizations (especially literary movements) dedicated to promoting the propagation of 
literature in the minority language. Under certain conditions, political elites may use 
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these groups to generate mass support for their positions, shifting from advocates for 
particular accommodations to explicit representatives of the ethnic group (Hroch 2000: 
14-17, 25-30). This argument finds economic variation or competition as neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the political mobilization of ethnicity. 
One of the more difficult issues to be addressed in studies of ethnic mobilization 
is the determination of what elements differentiate an ethnic group from other social 
groups. From this fundamental problem arises a related question: what is the difference, 
if any, between nations and ethnic groups? In many respects the two types are similar: 
identifying markers can include language, culture, shared history, religion, race, and 
others. As a result, many scholars tend to conflate the two.  Oommen (1997) argues that 
that, for most scholars, a nation is a particular group with aspirations for their own state, 
the ostensible goal of nationalist movements. Ethnic groups often have political goals. 
When these goals include independence, for some scholars ethnic groups become 
nations, but groups with political aspirations short of independence are seemingly not so 
classified; Smith (1981:24), Connor (1994:40-43), Worsley (1984:247) find ethnicity to 
be latent nationalism, merely awaiting political mobilization. Groups characterized by 
cultural, religious, linguistic, historical criteria yet lacking claims to territory would 
appear to also be ethnic groups, yet nations seemingly require claims to territory as part 
of their aspiration to form an independent state. Furthermore, this dimension would 
seem to juxtapose nations against ethnic groups, sub-cultures, immigrant communities, 
and racial minorities. For Oommen, the critical distinction is that a nation combines 
culture with territory and, therefore, has some potential basis for political institutions, 
whereas an ethnic group, lacking territory, does not (1997:34). Another dimension 
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leading to confusion, in addition to those of political aspirations and territory, is the 
sense of inclusiveness: Erikson argues that the crucial distinction is between insiders 
and outsiders; ethnic boundaries are determined through the mutual recognition of them 
by members of the group as well as those excluded (1991:265). As a result of these 
ambiguities, which represent a significant part of the literature on ethnicity and 
nationalism, Hugh Seton-Watson argues: “no ‘scientific definition’ of a nation can be 
devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists (1977:5).” Studies of ethnicity and 
nationalism must nevertheless attempt to circumscribe the groups they are exploring. At 
present, there are two areas of discussion within these debates: 1) What characteristics 
are markers of ethnic groups; and 2) Are those characteristics relatively fixed 
(primordial) or subject to human construction? The existing literature offers little 
agreement as to those specific traits of group identity that constitute ethnicity, point 
generally to socially constructed elements, rather than empirical ones. A shared history 
and common symbols continue to dominate the theoretical discourse. Shared religion 
may be based partially in “empirics”, in that groups may have these traits without active 
attempts to create them, but the recognition of them as representing distinctive group 
identity likely requires conscious effort. Finally, the mix of elements reflects both 
empirical and constructed features, with little agreement as to which quintessentially 
define ethnic groups. Despite the lack of general agreement as to what characteristics 
define ethnic groups, there does seem to be an emerging consensus regarding the 
primordialist/constructivist debate: ethnicity is comprised both of empirical elements 
and of features that can be shaped by ethnic activists.
2
 There appears to be an interaction 
                                                             
2 For example, while ethnic symbols (such as a flag, anthem, or holiday) represent empirical facts, they are 
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between empirical features and conscious attempts to manipulate and manufacture 
elements to differentiate their group from the larger national or civic identity. Ethnicity 
is often defined as action of identification with a community of shared ancestry that 
stretches beyond everyday face-to-face interaction. Salient cultural markers like 
language, religion, customs and phenotype are used by ethnies to demarcate their 
boundaries. Meanwhile, nations are integrated communities of certain territory that have 
certain political aspirations. By contrast modern states are political units which have a 
monopoly on the use of force within a well-demarcated territory (Francis 1976, Weber 
1978, Smith 1991). Finally, ethno-symbolism questions both biology and 
instrumentalism and accepts the constructed nature of ethnicity, but refuse to confine it 
to the modern period. Subsequently, ethno symbolists prioritize such social facts like 
traditions of territoriality, myths of genealogical origin and symbolic boundary markers 
which pass through the generations. Religious institutions and rituals are considered as 
especially important in forging pre-modern ethnic sentiment. The certain role of the 
personal or group interests is recognized and acknowledged by the majority of scholars 
writing about the subject of violence in the North Caucasus. However, there is a 
remarkable difference between the approaches of Western scholars and those from the 
region that is indicative of the degree of geographical presence in the region. The 
Western scholars (Bonvicini 1998, Coppieters 1996, 2001, Wright 1996) tend to 
approach the situation in the Northern Caucasus as a case study in a row of similar 
conflicts in different regions of the world, and do not go into the details of analysis of 
the interests and motives of particular actors. They usually limit their assessment of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
consciously produced by ethnic activists precisely in an attempt to more clearly define the group. 
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material by admitting the role of the personal interests of individuals and groups in the 
conflict. On the contrary, the scholars from Russia go into the details of establishing the 
connections between the events and the interests of certain individuals to obtain more 
nuanced and credible information. Such Russian scholars as Chervonnaya (1994), 
Malashenko (2001, 2002, 2004), Trenin (2004), Shermatova (2003), and Tishkov (2001, 
2004) seek to explain the present situation in the region by the dominance of personally-
biased agendas over long-term strategy, and significant influence of personal motivation 
and unwillingness to negotiate. 
The Political Mobilization of Ethnicity 
As mentioned above, a significant part of the literature focuses on distinctive 
groups seeking political independence; for many this is the fundamental distinction 
between ethnic groups and nations. However, there are many similar groups that hold 
more limited goals, seeking institutional accommodation of their particularistic identity 
rather than statehood. Indeed, this is a commonly used demarcation between ethnic and 
national groups. At its most basic level, however, the political mobilization of these 
separate categories is the same:  groups seeking to realize accommodation of their 
distinctiveness through a variety of organizations from cultural organizations to 
paramilitary groups and political parties seeking institutional accommodation or 
advocating secession. As Miroslav Hroch argues, this range of goals may be a function 
of the level of mobilization of a group rather than qualitative categorical differences: a 
single group may, over the course of its history, adopt different goals and strategies 
without transforming into something qualitatively new (2000: 22-24). More recently the 
term “ethnopolitics” has come into use to reflect the broad spectrum of behavior and 
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goals short of seeking independence: ethnopolitics encompasses aspirations short of the 
creation of a nation-state and the congruence of culture with polity. Further, “the 
concept of ethnopolitics has the advantage of including politics that are not conflictual; 
although ethnopolitics can be conflictual, it can also be cooperative” (Ishyama and 
Breuning 1998, 3-4). While these scholars continue to differentiate between 
ethnopolitical and nationalist mobilization, determining varying levels of “ethnopolitical 
mobilization” becomes more difficult. Even when group mobilization is presented as a 
continuum, factions within a single group may pursue different strategies reflecting 
different goals. As a result, many studies rely on data reflecting the more mobilized end 
of the spectrum: mass protest and / or votes for ethnic political parties. Yet while 
political expediency and ease of data collection may justify this narrow focus, 
significant insights into the broader phenomenon may be compromised. 
Post-Soviet Russia experiences a particularly dramatic spike in ethno-political 
activism and communal stand-off in the North Caucasus. Assessing and explaining the 
causes, development, and consequences of ethnic conflicts poses a major challenge to 
contemporary scholarship. This challenge is coupled by the general unpreparedness of 
the Marxist tradition in the Russian social sciences to deal with issues of ethnic conflict 
that had been discounted as obsolete in a society of “mature socialism”. In responding 
to the driving forces of ethnic resilience in a context of profound political change, 
Russian social scientists had not only to address  new domains of research but also had 
to change their theoretical moorings, learning from and drawing upon the mainstream 
non-Marxist theoretical approaches and applying them to Russia’s realities. Most 
debates of nations and nationalism begin with the presumption that nations exist and 
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debate how they came into existence. According to V. Tishkov (1992), a monistic 
ideology and a totalitarian style of thinking and of nationalism have produced a 
powerful system of the scientific management of society. The party and the state 
bureaucracy get this knowledge from reliable scholars who can penetrate and reflect 
“objective realities” because they are armed with "the only scientific and right teaching 
- the theory of Marxism-Leninism", which includes as an important ingredient “the 
Marxist-Leninist theory of nation and of the national question” (Gellner 1988; Connor 
1984). For most scholars, however, nations and nationalism are seen as constructed; 
therefore, it becomes important to explain why and how nations developed. Modernist 
approaches claim that nationalism developed slowly over time because of economic, 
political, or cultural aspects of modern life. The modernist works are divided generally 
into three categories — socio-economic modernization, political modernization, and 
cultural modernization. Furthermore, three specific authors (Gellner 1998, Smith 1981, 
1986, and Anderson 1991) are identified as exemplifying the three different approaches. 
These three authors, and their respective works, are widely held to be the most 
influential positions within the study of nationalism. This opinion is substantiated 
throughout numerous works on the study of nationalism. For instance, Brubaker’s 
Nationalism Reframed argues that there exists a large and mature “developmentalist” 
(or modernist) literature on nationhood and nationalism, which traces the long-term 
political, economic, and cultural changes that led, over centuries, to the gradual 
emergence of nations. Furthermore, Brubaker finds the work of Gellner (1998), 
Anderson  (1991), Smith  (1991), and Hobsbawm  (1990) most salient within this 
literature. In Brubaker’s view, three approaches (socio-economic modernization, 
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political modernization, and cultural modernization) focus on three elements that are 
most relevant for problematizing and complicating the category of nation: (1) the 
transition from multiple, non-literature low cultures to a single literate and specialized 
high culture; (2) the process through which ethnic unity is made coincident with 
political unity; and (3) the manner in which state language and popular language are 
made concurrent. Brubaker suggest a broad theoretical perspective on post-Soviet 
nation building by assessing it in terms of the relations between the nationalisms of 
national minorities, newly institutionalizing states and the external national “homeland: 
(Brubaker 1996: 8).  Bruce Ware and Kisriev apply a consociational approach to the 
study of central political institutions in Dagestan, which they perceive as an example of 
“third wave plural societies” (Ware and Kisriev 2001: 128). In contrast, Hughes and 
Sasse argue in favour of combining institutionalist and behaviourist approaches, due to 
the greater role of the personal factor in Russian politics (2001:25). However, these 
studies, although contributing a great deal to a better  understanding of post-Soviet 
communities in transition, overlook some other key dimensions of this transition, in 
particular the role of informal non-institutional networks (Yemelianova 2005). To 
address the subject in all its complexity, we need to take into consideration a 
constructivist understanding of the relationship between ethnic identity, political power 
and nation formation. It must also be instrumentalist in studying the way in which 
ethnic and religious affiliation is currently employed in competition for political power. 
It will also primordialist in dealing with the way in which primordialism is presented in 
local elite agendas. In particular, this approach allows us to reveal the mechanism by 
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which the political elite mobilize primordial elements such as clan- or region-based 
networks for the consolidation and perpetuation of its power.  
The problem of conflict development and perpetuation has been approached in 
different ways, with each approach focusing on specific aspects of conflict, and 
therefore prescribing different remedies to resolution. Early studies argued that the 
issues at stake in conflicts are indivisible, and therefore negotiated settlements are 
nearly impossible (Ikle 1971, Modelski 1964, Pillar 1983). This approach was later 
adopted by many scholars studying ethnic conflict, leading some to argue that the only 
solution is partition (Kaufmann 1996). Assessed from the point of view of causes of 
conflict, conflict is seen as the violent expression of unresolved political issues and 
inequalities. The answer to this situation is often a political solution of democratic 
governance (Lake 2001, Rothchild 1997, Sisk 1996). Others scholars put more emphasis 
on the termination of conflict with stable peace agreements, arguing that conflict 
termination is hindered by security dilemmas and spoilers (Walter and Snyder 1999, 
Posen 1993, Stedman 1991, 1997). The proposed solution is a power-sharing agreement 
ensured by a credible security guarantee from international actors. These approaches, 
however, tend to focus on static factors in the conflict, rather than acknowledging the 
organic and changing nature of conflict, assuming that what initiated the conflict is what 
keeps it going, and that the groups in conflict prefer peace to war. In contrast to these 
political and security approaches, a different approach looks at the economics of 
conflict and the motivation of greed (Berdal and Malone 2000, Collier 1999, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2000, Keen 1998, Reno 1998). This approach postulates that parties may not 
only finance their war efforts through economic and political networks, but also get rich 
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while doing so. Indeed, this argument explains reasons why conflicts persist in resource-
abundant regions, and also raises a question to the assumption that belligerent groups 
prefer peace to war. The groups involved in the collective violence range from small 
networks or loosely connected organizations of individuals or paramilitaries to 
government and religious bureaucracies groups. Quite often members of dominant 
groups or political elite inflict damage on members of subordinate groups. Besides, 
problems of explanation stem from the varied scope and endurance of collective 
violence. In studies targeted specifically at ethnic or religious violence, collective 
violence has largely remain understudied as an object of explanation; it has often been 
woven into the larger and more vague category ethnic or religious conflict as well as 
undistinguished from other potential outcomes: nonviolent types of conflict, diffuse 
social violence, and others. Situations have often been coded dichotomously (conflict/no 
conflict), and many scholars have viewed collective violence “as a degree of conflict, 
rather than as a form of conflict” (Brubaker and Laitin 1998:24:425.) Thus, the study of 
ethnic or religious violence was cut off from the study of other social processes that 
remain closely connected to it. Before the early1990s, studies of collective violence and 
that of ethnic conflict remained largely isolated; generic theories of collective violence 
tended to ignore ethnicity or to subsume it within larger analytical categories of 
collective violence, arguing that there is nothing substantive about ethnicity that would 
distinguish it from collective violence. At the same time, scholars focusing on ethnic 
conflict have tended to assume that ethnic violence stemmed from the intensity of 
cultural allegiance, and that these emotional attachments constituted the single, cohesive 
set of motivations for acts of violence; any evidence of other motivations like personal 
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rivalries, revenge, or self-enrichment have been bracketed. It should be noted that 
identities by themselves do not produce conflict and violence. Therefore, it is logical to 
shift attention from theorizing ethnicity and identity formation to assessing ethnically 
motivated behavior, in particular, how ethnic identity influences behavioral patterns and 
actions that lead to conflict. At present, the hypotheses that address particularistic 
identities of peripheral communities with distinct cultural characteristics as caused 
mainly by their underdevelopment (Hechter 1975, Nairn 1977, Blaut 1987) have lost 
much of their credibility. Indeed, the claims that successful modernization should low 
the salience of ethnic identities and reduce ethno-national strife (Deutch 1966, Haas 
1966, Lipset and Rokkan 1967) remain unsubstantiated and even self-contradictory, 
since modernization is always uneven and differential. Obviously, in the politics of 
identity, ethnicity remains the most controversial aspect. Ethnic identities are 
alternatively characterized as irrational and based on false consciousness (Hobsbawm 
1990, Ignatieff 1994, Banks 1996), as contextual and constructed (Eriksen, 1993), or as 
a primary source of all other identities (van den Berghe 1981, Schöpflin 2000).  
Many scholars that address the relationship between ethnicity and conflict focus 
on the ways in which internal ethnic conflict becomes internationalized. Steven Lobell 
and Philip Mauceri (2004) discuss the internationalization of ethnic conflict by 
investigating two types of interstate conflict: diffusion and escalation. Authors such as 
Posen (1993), Lake and Rothchild (1996) also use the security dilemma to evaluate why 
ethnic groups may fight one another. They examine the causes of internal ethnic conflict 
and argue that ethnic conflict is usually caused by an ethnic group’s collective fears of 
the future. Lobell and Mauceri (2004) are not the only scholars that examine the 
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international dimensions of ethnic conflict by focusing primarily on the internal origins 
of conflict. The concept of diffusion or “spill-over” is also discussed by Douglas 
Woodwell’s (2004), who is particularly interested in analyzing the role of domestic 
ethnic rebellion in promoting international conflict. He finds that the likelihood of 
ethnic spill-over into bordering states is higher if one of the ethnic groups involved in 
the dispute constitutions a majority population in one of the states. Other authors also 
use the concept of the “escalation” of internal ethnic conflict to explain the magnitude 
of ethnic conflict. Saideman (1997, 2001) explores several theories that have been used 
to explain outside support for secessionist conflicts. In particular, if threatened by 
another state, states will likely to intervene to support secessionist movements in that 
state; states will be more likely to support secessionist movements in strong states; and 
states are more likely to support secessionist movements in states with which they share 
borders (Saideman 2001). Saideman argues that none of these explanations is entirely 
satisfactory. Specifically, the vulnerability argument does not empirically hold, as many 
“vulnerable” countries do, aid secessionist movements in other states. In addition, he 
argues that this theory is incomplete since it suggests that countries may or may not be 
able to support secessionists. Both the vulnerability and realist arguments do not 
account for the domestic ethnic politics of these countries, which he finds to be, 
arguably, one of the most important elements in explaining why countries would 
intervene. Saideman presents an alternative argument, where he suggests that the 
domestic ethnic politics must be considered in order to determine why some countries 
choose to support secessionist movements within other states.  
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In contrast to theories of ethnic based nationalism, another manifestation of 
individual and group sentiments is classified as civic nationalism. Whereas ethnic 
nationalism is attractive to individuals on the basis of communal culture, language, 
tradition, and race, civic nationalism is distinguished by appealing to a collective 
allegiance to certain constitutional principles and/or institutions which are perceived as 
just and effective (Snyder 2000). Civic nationalism is often viewed as an effective 
substitute to ethnic nationalism because of its tolerance and inclusiveness. Moreover, 
civic nationalism ostensibly allows any individual who adopts the state’s political creed 
acceptance into the group and it depends primarily on birth or long term residency. 
However, it would be erroneous to presume that civic nationalism is benign in contrast 
to essentially exclusionary ethnic or religious nationalisms. In case of the North 
Caucasus, where the quasi civic nation is primarily composed of political elites from the 
same religious or ethnic group, the idealistic values are exceptionally vulnerable to 
becoming instruments of repression. Obviously, the probability is augmented 
exponentially during periods of social upheaval and political transformations such as the 
transition of a totalitarian regime to a democratic one.  
The so-called “Islamic awakening” concept, actively pushing forward by Iranian 
clerics,  as the central cause of the violent actions in the Northern Caucasus attracts my 
attention due to the deep split between the opinions expressed on the topic by different 
parties. First of all, if accepted as the initial cause of the conflict, Islamic awakening 
does not explain all the manifestations of violence in the Northern Caucasus. Thus, the 
most ardent jihadist Shamil Basaev attacked Dagestan’s villages in the fall of 1999 
killing mainly Muslims in the first place. This fact was interpreted by some scholars as 
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the proof of the inappropriateness of classifying Basaev’s actions as jihad, since his 
actions were aimed against the Muslims. However, from the strictly theological point of 
view, for those who view the events in the Northern Caucasus as jihad, the refusal of the 
people of Dagestan to support the insurgents and to fight the federal troops can be seen 
as revolt against Islam calling for punishment (Polonskaya 1986). Such widespread 
criminal activities as trade in hostages and dead bodies, kidnaping trafficking in drugs 
and weapons do not only run counter to the theory of Islamic awakening, but also 
roughly defy the principles of Islam. This contradiction between the Islamic rhetoric 
and manifestly secular profit-oriented activities, which are obviously incompatible with 
Islamic faith, gives me reason to look at the rhetoric of Islamic Awakening in the 
Northern Caucasus as a mere disguise for justifying the large scale criminal activities 
and struggle for power. Another vision of the role of Islam in the Northern Caucasus is 
coupled with ethnicity and used instrumentally by the leaders to rally the forces and 
unite a group around some common idea. Thus, Lieven (2002) describes the scheme 
that explains why ethnicity-based struggle sometimes appears as religion-based to 
external observers
3
. Due to the threat, the ethnos develops a stronger attachment to its 
religion and especially those forms that allow for military and/or cultural resistance. 
During the struggle, new religious forms and institutes may also emerge. Therefore, the 
struggle lead by this group appears to the external observer as religion-based, while 
actually it is based on ethnicity (Lieven 2002). Islam appears to be an especially 
convenient religion for rallying people for violence, because this particular religion 
                                                             
3 During several centuries, a certain ethnos or ethno-cultural identity is being formed, possessing a strictly 




regulates all aspects of life, and therefore “serving Islam” gives legitimization to actions 
that would be otherwise disapproved or found sinful”. (Malashenko and Trenin 
2002:69) Taking into consideration different aspects of social, economic, and cultural 
situation, this interpretation of the role of Islam views Islamization of the Northern 
Caucasus as a consequence rather than as a cause of the events in the region; therefore, 
the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism is explained as reactive. As Malashenko and 
Trenin (2002) point out, the radicalization of Islam in the Northern Caucasus appears to 
be a reflection of economically disastrous situation combined with endemic corruption 
and massive deviation from Muslim norms and values by the post-Soviet ruling elites. 
In this respect, Islamic fundamentalism is seen as the only way out. Indeed, return to the 
norms of Islam provides the young males of the Northern Caucasus, marginalized 
materially and socially due to the general decline in the economic and cultural spheres 
of life, with the opportunity to assert them. The young Caucasian males balance the 
social humiliation and lack of prospective, especially painful due to the traditional 
Caucasian values of pride, by associating themselves with the ideology that fills their 
deprivation with meaning. Islam gives them motivation to reject, on the basis of 
religious beliefs, the benefits of which they are already devoid. Malashenko and Trenin 
(2002:88) illustrate their argument by describing the phenomenon of “New Muslims”; 
educated university students from Northern Caucasian cities, who favorably distinguish 
themselves from the rest of the population by their devotion to the Muslim faith and 
observing all the tenets of Islam. However, most scholars express serious doubts about 
the actual possibility of creating an Islamic state in the Northern Caucasus, even granted 
the consent of the Russian Federation.  
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During the Soviet years, traditional and Muslim law systems were strictly 
prohibited, and even ethnographic research in this field was not welcome, which limited 
scholars interested in this field limit their research to pre-revolutionary years. New 
specialists, educated rather hastily, often demonstrate striking ignorance not only in the 
field of traditional and Muslim law, but also in general legal culture (Bobrovnikov 
2002). For example, despite the large number of Muslim educational institutions in 
Dagestan, their programs are mainly limited to the study of the Arabic language and the 
rules of reading the Qur’an. None of the rectors of Muslim universities in Dagestan 
have either institute or university degree. This precarious situation inevitably leads to an 
extremely low level of education, which is often strikingly evident; i.e., in Northern 
Caucasian Wahhabis center Karamahi the name of a Sharia court on the front of the 
building shows rough spelling mistakes (Bobrovnikov 2002:280). Another conspicuous 
problem with implementing traditional or Muslim law system in the region is linked to 
the lack of unity within Muslim community. Since some of the Islamic leaders of the 
region belong to Wahhabis group, and some to the Sufi brotherhood or the pro-official 
Spiritual Board, newly established Sharia courts as well as other Islamic institutions 
become a fierce battle field about the true understanding of Islam, which often end up in 
violent clashes (Bobrovnikov 2002). Some scholars also express the opinion that 
Islamic leaders themselves realize the practical impossibility of actual creation of an 
Islamic state, and therefore the struggle for an Islamic state becomes the banner cry for 
self-realization. 
Scholars writing on the topic of violence in the Northern Caucasus offer a wide 
spectrum of opinions and explanatory theories. The theories developed by the authors 
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vary according to several criteria. First, the persuasiveness of a theory largely depends 
on the degree of objectivity with which the author approaches the issue; the objectivity 
is reflected in the interpretations offered by the scholars as well as in their choice of 
terms. The second factor affecting the coherency of a theory is the breadth of the focus 
on different aspects of violence in the region and the time frame of the events taken into 
consideration. The review of pertinent literature completed in this research shows that 
the choice of variables made by the authors while commenting on the subject of 
violence in the Northern Caucasus is generally characterized by professional neutrality.  
Some scholars, however, poised to explain the violence in the Northern Caucasus, can 
be singled out by the selective approach to facts, which results in assumptions that 
propagate the author’s opinion rather than reflect the actual situation. The problem of 
selective approach to facts is closely linked to the question of choosing the focus on the 
different aspects of violence in the region. Although the manifestations of violence in 
the Northern Caucasus are numerous and diverse, disregarding the close interconnection 
between different aspects of violence in the region leads inevitably to the omission of 
important factors contributing to the impartial assessment of the situation.  
The current review of scholarship allows me to conclude that the most 
persuasive assumptions are those that study the violence in the region as a complex 
phenomenon, rather than as a number of independent events and unrelated facts. Indeed, 
scholarship characterized by the close attention to particular spheres of violence in the 
region is valuable due to the fact that it offers a deep incursion into many aspects of the 
topic, i.e. the history of its development, its causes, consequences, implications for the 
participants and so on. However, such scholarship often fails to place the facts within a 
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larger picture that significantly undermines the overall value of its assumptions for 
understanding the situation in the region and crafting workable solutions. Another 
important problem consists in the fact that most of the authors writing on the topic of 
mobilizing ideology of violence address it only once. The scholarship resulting from 
such an approach reflects the state of affairs at a particular point of time, but overlooks 
the dynamics inherent to the conflict. The static approach to the situation also results in 
the failure to pinpoint the trends in the development of the conflict that weakens the 
ability of the scholars to make well-supported assumptions. There is a number of 
scholars whose works can be described as being perfunctory for understanding the 
situation in the region in question: Karny (2000), Seely (2001), Avtorkhanov (1991, 
1992), and Chervonnaya (1994), whose works may be better described as interesting 
due to their literary quality but leading towards emphasizing the findings that interest 
them and neglecting the rest of the picture seriously undermining their scholarly value. I 
am not in the position to judge whether this selectivity is a result of an honest failure of 
a scholar to encompass all the aspects of relevant information, or a deliberate attempt to 
misrepresent the situation in favour of the side with which a certain author sympathizes. 
There is also a cohort of researchers, who do not ground the question of violence in the 
Northern Caucasus as central in their scholarship, but nevertheless make a valuable 
contribution to the understanding of the issue: Bobrovnikov (1995, 2001, 2002, 2006), 
Girenko (2001), Karpov (2001), Kazantsev (2002), and Polyakov (2001).  
There is also a common trend that appears to be the manifestation of the same 
misbalance between the focus on the particular types of violence in the Northern 
Caucasus and their place within the larger picture - simplification of the events and 
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fitting them into certain categories analogous with those of other seemingly similar 
conflicts in other parts of the world or in different epochs. The on-going salience of 
ethnicity and nationalism in the North Caucasus is often explained by competition 
between the central and elites or as a manipulative ideology employed by political elites 
to secure their power base. While the term ethnocracies has become popular in Russian 
scholarship, it remains unclear to what extent and why the ethnic elites are securing the 
support of their brethren. The elite-manipulation explanation of ethnic and religious 
conflicts has many grey zones. It assumes that the ethnic groups are incapable of 
making rational decisions about their own lives, and it fails to explain why ethno 
national forms of identity have become so successful, while others fail to attract 
sufficient support (Moore 2001:12). It is still unclear whether, in the post-Soviet 
context, ethnic solidarity is mainly based on historical memory (real or constructed and 
manipulated) and common experiences, which constitute usually  legitimation myths, or 
if it is a straight  rational response to the plethora of social, political, cultural, and 
economic factors. It is also important to explore at the degree to which ethnic politics 
provide real or perceived benefits, for example, social and professional advancement, 
new economic opportunities, or cultural reproduction, to the members of corresponding 
groups. Numerous attempts to fit the situation in the Northern Caucasus into pre-
existing typology, heftily borrowed from the study of other conflicts are of little value, 
if at all. While the degree of subjectivity and the tendency towards simplification vary 
from one author to another, there is a common feature that characterizes the majority of 
the reviewed scholarship - approaching the issue from a somewhat one-sided 
perspective, which depends on the disciplinary background of the particular scholar. As 
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a matter of fact, scholars studying violence in the Northern Caucasus in all its diversity, 
come from different disciplinary fields, and their theories often lay parallel to each other 
in the study of the same issue from the different angles. However, due to the lack of 
integration between the different theories developed on the subject, the theories 
belonging to different disciplinary fields often proceed in parallel.  Amalgamating the 
findings and conclusions made by the scholars belonging to different disciplinary fields 
would be highly beneficial for assessing the situation in the North Caucasus. Among 
scholars whose theories appear to be most successful in encompassing the major 
spectrum of the ideology of violence in the region and simultaneously prove to be 
acknowledging the complexity of the problem and making an effort to accept the 
maximally broad perspective at the issue of violence in the Northern Caucasus are 
Lieven, Coppieters, Furman, Tishkov, Debiel and Klein, Malashenko and Trenin. The 
analytical approaches developed by these scholars take into consideration the vast scope 
of manifestations of violence and understanding the intricate nature of their 
interdependency. More important, they admit the impossibility to provide a coherent 
explanation rather than resort to simplistic temporal explanations. 
Conclusion 
As my research deals with the regions of the North Caucasus, pertinent literature 
varies widely in scope and approach, and there are frequent cross-references between 
them. In general, however, the literature provides valuable insight into the political 
processes since the early1990s, and especially into the growing Islamization of initially 
secular ethnic movements and Moscow’s failure to react adequately by none-violent 
policies. It will also discuss the importance of informal power structures, and observes 
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that in the Caucasus, personal networks have more weight than formal structures and 
even governments. The common argument drawn from pertinent scholarships is that 
most ethnic and religious conflicts stem from the struggle of individual elite leaders for 
positions in government and economy; the mobilization of the rest of the ethnic 
community, from this point of view, is mainly a product of “ideological manipulation” 
(Gammer 2008:29). Historical references give an overview of the relation between 




Chapter 3 - Ethnicity and Religion in the North Caucasus 
Introduction 
The chapter focuses upon ethnic groups in terms of historical perspective. It also 
sheds light upon the role of these groups in the process of the revival of national 
identities after the break-up of the Soviet Union. It particularly deals with the 
geopolitical factors and cross-national linkages in regional and multinational interests in 
the formation of the ethnic identities and nationalistic elites. My argument is that ethno-
nationalism is the outcome of this peculiar ethno-federalist administrative structure and 
bureaucratic hierarchy, where ethnic minorities struggle to consolidate their presence. 
The other argument is that decades of the Soviet monopoly on national questions caused 
pervasive alienation of ethnic groups from Soviet and later Russian ethno-cultural 
environment. I analyze how the large ethnic minorities were recognized and granted a 
de facto privileged status, while smaller ethnic minorities and those without formal 
recognition deprived of the same rights.  
Among the numerous consequences of Gorbachev’s reforms and the subsequent 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been the rise of ethnic nationalism. In the 
non-Russian parts of the North Caucasus, this process has been accompanied by the 
resurrection of clan and other primordial social networks, which under Soviet regime 
had been held at bay. This chapter examines political and social transformation in post-
Soviet era with particular reference to nature the identity-building policies of the ruling 
elites, and their relationship with the clan system and religious confessions in the North 
Caucasus. It will be also concerned with religious revival and radicalism in the region 
and their correlation with related policies. The chapter will clarify some debatable areas 
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in the current academic discourse on ethnicity and nationalism and suggest a conceptual 
framework to the study of post-Soviet societies in the Caucasus. The ethnic factor that 
played a significant role in late Soviet and post-Soviet politics, contributed to the rapid 
transformation of the ethnic organizations into political movements and parties. Due to 
the fact that the Soviet Union was an asymmetric federation that consisted of territorial 
units with different status, the lines of all violent conflicts in the Caucasus can be traced 
back to the system of ethno-federalism in the USSR.  On the first level, there were the 
fifteen Union republics (SSR, Soviet Socialist Republic). According to the Soviet 
constitution, union republics were sovereign states and possessed such institutional 
prerequisites for statehood as political institutions and symbols, a constitution, borders, 
and a titular nationality, as well as education and mass media in the language of this 
titular nationality. Besides, they had the constitutional right to have their own armed 
forces, and to secede from the Union. (the Constitution of the USSR 1977).  
Historical Background 
The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was defined as autonomous 
territory of a national minority within a union republic. The ASSRs also possessed 
political institutions, borders, a constitution and a titular nationality, as well as 
education and mass media in the language of this nationality. However, an ASSR did 
not have the right to secede from the Union, but could be transferred to another SSR, 
provided that the center and both the relevant SSRs agreed. The next level down from 
the ASSR was the autonomous region, which was also the territory of a national 
minority within a Union Republic. The autonomous region had a high degree of control 
over local affairs but had lesser privileges than the ASSR. The language of the titular 
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nationality of an autonomous region was considered to be an official language, but was 
not entitled to national universities or media outlets in the local language. It also had no 
bureaucracy of its own and had to share functionaries with the administration of the 
union republic, which meant that key administrative positions were distributed at the 
republican level.  
Even though all federal units were completely controlled the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Soviet system of ethno–federalism granted the 
members of the titular nationality a high degree of control over local affairs, education, 
services and positions in the administration (the Constitution of the USSR 1977, article 
6). The most important aspect of this system was that each federal unit had its own 
titular nationality on a particular territory. Once central control weakened, this linkage 
of a territory to an ethnic group provided a propitious breeding ground for a 
groundswell of secessionist aspirations. Socialist ethno-federalism had provided the 
titular nationalities with a clear cut territory, a state bureaucracy, mass media, an 
education system and national symbols. These were tangible assets that considerably 
reduced the negative costs of secessionism. By 1991, nationalities had been given a 
chance to assert themselves and they intended to take it to its logical conclusion of 
autonomy if not independence. During the “Parade of Sovereignties”, while the Russian 
state was at its weakest point, the status of several ethnic autonomous formations was 
even increased: the Adyghea, Altai and Khakassia autonomous oblasts were constituted 
as separate republics. This idea continued to be upheld as bi-lateral treaties were also 
made with all the North Caucasus regions, giving them almost full autonomy. This 
period of asymmetric federalism has been characterized as both positive and negative in 
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terms of the creation of post-Soviet identity in the Russian Federation (Gammer 1999, 
Hughes and Sasse 2001, Walker 2003, Hirsch 2005).  
During the early period of Yeltsin’s presidency (1991-1994), the Kremlin 
administration made a number of vigorous efforts to solidify a civic identity among 
Russian citizens, always referring to the people of Russia and not to the ethnic Russians. 
Yeltsin needed to get popular support for these policies and so when it seemed people 
were no longer responding to the idea of the Russian civic identity he changed his 
position, focusing on a highly exclusive definition of Russians during the Russian 
presidential elections in 1996. After he had won the presidency, Yeltsin’s nationalist 
rhetoric died down again. He introduced several new policies that were clearly aimed at 
taking away power from the ethno-territorial basis of the Federation and moving to a 
more civic identity: and the Russian national passport reform (Tuminez 2003, Walker 
2003). The National Cultural Autonomy Act was passed, aimed at fulfilling the promise 
of the Russian Constitution to confer extra-territorial rights on all ethnic groups 
regardless of place of residence. NCAs were formally set up throughout the country to 
address national and cultural rights of citizens outside any national territory. In 1997, in 
a clear move towards a civic identity for Russia people were no longer required to 
define their nationality or ethnicity as they had been throughout the entire Soviet period. 
However, the passports were only produced in the Russian language and the old 
imperial Tsarist double headed eagle was put on the cover. This produced anger on both 
sides of the spectrum. Nationalist Russians were angry that their ethnic identity was 
being erased. Minorities were angry that their languages were being ignored and feared 
the threat of further Russian assimilation.  
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Initially, Vladimir Putin’ presidency (2000-2008) had nothing to do with 
regional populace or elites. He closely followed the suggestions of Valery Tishkov on 
how to galvanize a civic identity in Russia. In particular, Tishkov claimed that the 
propagation of common civic values and symbols among citizens of the Russian 
Federation is crucial for state building purposes. In fact, Putin went much further by 
resuscitating the music from the Soviet anthem that everyone knew and had the same 
composer write new words to the same tune. The Red Soviet flag became the flag of the 
armed forces to appease Russian nationalists and aging communist party’s 
functionaries, while the tri-color flag was accepted as the national flag and the double-
headed eagle became the new national emblem. Tishkov’s also stood for complete re-
organization of the federal nature of the Russian Federation in such a way that it was no 
longer based on ethno-territories to avoid (or at least slow down) the inevitable 
disintegration of the Federation.  The partial solution was found in the form of seven 
federal administrative districts that overlapped ethnic boundaries: Central Federal 
District, Northwestern Federal District, Far Eastern Federal District, Siberian Federal 
District, Urals Federal District, Volga Federal District, and South Federal District 
(which covered the North Caucasus republics as well as neighboring Stavropol krai, 
Krasnodar krai, Adyghei republic, and Rostov oblast) Although these federal 
administrative districts are run by central bureaucracy and headed by President’s direct 
appointees, local elites managed to adjust themselves quite rapidly to such a new type of 
vertical federalism. The last and the most controversial of Tishkov’s recommendations 
on precedence of individual over collective rights and guaranteed representation of 
ethnic minorities in government has only been implemented in part due the yawning gap 
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between declarations and actions of Putin’s vertical quasi democratic superstructure and 
its ideological paucity. However, Putin has allocated many resources to shape a viable 
civic identity for the people of the Russian Federation in his desperate attempts at re-
creation of a strong state. In theory, a civic identity needs to be based on a sense of 
common purpose and identification with the institutions of the state. The people of the 
Russian Federation seem to be showing by voting for Putin, that a strong paternalistic 
state matters much more to them than nebulous democratic ideals or civil liberties. This 
has nothing to do with historical memories of the Caucasian peoples, because it is not an 
imperial paternalistic state that they could identify with and aspire to build their own 
identity upon. Moreover, a number of Putin’s appeals to Russian   Orthodox nationalists 
in his direct political and financial support of the church are further alienating the 
Muslim communities of the North Caucasus. In addition, the never-ending 
indiscriminate military operations to mop the ground with whoever is caught dissipate 
the remnants of any over-arching civic loyalties over there.  
 3.1. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Religion 
This section explores the intricate triangle relationship between manifestations 
of nationalism, ethnic identity and religious affiliation. State failure always generates 
uncertainty, breeds fear between groups, and opens windows of opportunity for all kinds 
of political entrepreneurs, thus elevating the risk of violent conflict. What is at stake is 
eventually the right to impose the new rules. In short, during a chaotic transition, the 
cost of seizing power by violent means dwindles, while the potential for gains grows.  
Concurrently, the opportunities granted by the option of peace decline together with the 
crumbling former regime. The risk of violent conflict increases, especially when 
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weapons and ammunition are widely available. This was the case in the Caucasus, 
which was flooded with weapons to such a degree that neither successor states nor rebel 
groups encountered any difficulties in arming their supporters from the arsenals of the 
dissolving Soviet army.  In the North Caucasus, more than elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union, the so-called shadow economy by the early 1990s had evolved into a particularly 
complex social phenomenon that successfully co-opted multi-level bureaucracy and 
established its own norms and rules as a basis for the organization of local communities. 
Agriculture and tourism became two major pillars that were particularly involved in 
shadow economic activities. The former stimulated growth of networks that connected 
the producers of high-value products, primarily fruits and flowers, with the markets 
across the USSR. The latter brought the growth of local networks aimed at servicing 
millions of unregistered tourists, who were not allowed to travel outside the Soviet 
Union. The shadow economy has also successfully adapted to the post-Soviet situation.  
The most conservative estimates put its share at 55 - 60% of GDP in the North Caucasus 
regions. Clan politics, an unavoidable attribute of the ethno-social environment in 
traditional and transitional societies, is the most crucial element in assessment of the 
distinctive features characterizing the socio-political and economic environment in the 
post-Soviet Caucasus. In addition, clan politics is often a contributing factor to conflicts. 
As Russian social scientist Oleg Tsvetkov noted, “in many regions (republics), the 
elites’ (clans’) hold on power is made possible only by the constant and ruthless 
suppression of competing clans, which leads to the constant reproduction of conflicts 
rather than their settlement” (Avksentev, Gritsenko, and Dmitriev 2007: 66–67). It is 
necessary to make an important distinction here that ethnic clans are not identical to 
68 
 
ethnic groups and, therefore, need not be ethnically homogeneous communities. As a 
rule, a few closely related families form such groups and then, to ensure their 
functioning, recruit individuals who are not related by blood to the clan founders and 
may not even belong to the same ethnic group. According to Avksentev et al., a clan’s 
ethnic makeup becomes significant to its members only when the clan comes into 
conflict over economic or political resources with another clan primarily drawn from a 
different ethnic group (2007). Furthermore, when such conflict unfolds, ethnicity plays 
a much greater role as clans recourse to ethnic mobilization to achieve a decisive 
competitive advantage and both sides increasingly identify themselves as opposing 
ethnic communities. Many scholars have pointed out the negative role played by 
extended family networks in the post-Soviet Caucasus. Indeed, the so-called “ethnic-
clan capitalism” developed not only because the state failed to guarantee contracts but 
also in response to decades of Soviet regime characterized by unprecedented  
arbitrariness toward citizens that led to pervasive public distrust of that state.  
 In the North Caucasus, the degree of compliance with the law among post-
Soviet citizens, where ethnic traditions and blood ties were no less important than the 
law, turned out to be much lower than similar indicators in the West (Rozmainskii 2004: 
64). In this juncture, the institutional environment itself gradually fell under clan rules 
of either a planned or a market economy (Oleinik 2000:175). The most salient aspect of 
economic cooperation in an ethnic-clan economy is the clear division between “us” and 
“them”, because deals are limited to relatives or people in the same clan. All other 
agents find themselves in the category of “them.” Moreover, a significant number of 
clan deals take place, in whole or in part, in the shadows, because participants need to 
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hide their connections from “outsiders” (Rozmainskii 2002: 48–57). Thus, as former 
President of Karachay-Cherkessia Mustafa Batdyev admitted, the shadow economy and 
unpaid taxes in his republic account for at least 70 % (Semenov 2005). Opportunism is 
another aspect of economic pattern in an ethnic-clan economy that impedes efficient 
resource distribution - in a situation where the state does not guarantee enforcement of 
contracts, everyone is a bold opportunist. As a result, inadequate and contradictory 
laws; the spread of opportunism and near-sighted investment as behavioral norms; 
limited rationality in economic behavior; an orientation toward self-enrichment among 
individuals; relations based on family and clan ties; a large share of barter and cash in 
trade; a significant shadow sector and the gradual erosion of boundaries between legal 
and illegal types of activity—all these characteristics of ethnic-clan capitalism  are 
indicative of complex degradation in the region (Kosals 2000). Under such 
circumstances, political power has become the main capital resource in the republics of 
the North Caucasus, where ethnic clans scramble to obtain power at all cost precisely 
reflect their views of the methods needed to ensure their economic well-being. The 
quasi-democratic presidential campaigns in Chechnya, Dagestan and Karachay-
Cherkessia have demonstrated a desperate struggle of ethnic elites for political power 
and for an ethnic division of interests. At present, ethnic and family clans have become 
real political and economic actors in the republics of the North Caucasus. As political 
practice in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Karachay-Cherkessia proves, economic 
development and modernization are absent from the group of interests shared by actors 
in the ethnic-clan economic mindset. Their main goal is to ensure access to federal 
transfers and control the branches of the economy that offer immediate profits.  
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Moreover, they do not use material and financial resources extracted from the local 
economy to modernize means of production, encourage innovation, or improve 
education or other areas that traditionally lay a foundation for modernization. Instead, 
they invest these resources in operations that provide quick returns, usually real estate 
transactions outside their own republic or country (Ware and Kisriev 2002, Vaskov 
2010).  
All violent conflicts in the North Caucasus developed for a certain period into 
markets of violence, in which military and law enforcement operations were combined 
with profitable economic activities (Torbakov 2005). The interpenetration of markets of 
violence and shadow economy may explain the lack of any progress in resolving the 
Caucasian conflicts, since endemic corruption and pervasive budget money-laundering 
does not produce credible economic alternatives. Once a highly profitable market of 
violence is established, there is a strong rationale for the parties to stabilize the status 
quo. If local officials get a share of the revenues from the market of violence, or are 
themselves acting as warlords, they have an interest in preserving the violence at low 
levels. In such cases, sustaining low-intensity conflict with reduced risks of violent 
clashes becomes a quite rational objective of both the separatist and the bureaucracy at 
all levels. Historically, the operational pattern of imperial Russia’s conquest of the 
territories of the North Caucasus as well as the corresponding social, economic and 
political arrangements it made to integrate it, established the main frames of the region’s 
current conflicts. The Soviet rule only exacerbated the pre-existed tensions and 
grievances and pre-determined Russia’s failure to develop viable democratic 
mechanisms to address these legacies. Historically, Russia’s advancement in the North 
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Caucasus took place in the context of the rising competition with Persia and the 
Ottoman Empire and of growing concerns about the involvement of European states in 
the region. The strong geopolitical basis of Russia’s engagement with the North 
Caucasus and the convoluted process of conquest and incorporation resulted in a 
complex set of policies being applied towards the North Caucasus and its peoples. As a 
result various communities in the North Caucasus have had very nuanced relationships 
and collective memories with the central government over the past two centuries. While 
some groups were incorporated peacefully, others offered a fierce resistance, leading to 
widespread violence and the mobilization and consolidation of local identities, 
including religious ones (Broxup 1992). Large areas of Chechnya and Dagestan were 
conquered by Russia by the 1780s. In response, a fierce resistance movement emerged 
under a succession of figures that combined religious and political leadership, the most 
famous of which was Sheikh Mansur. This was to become the first organized military 
action to unify the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus, in this case the Chechens, 
Cherkess, Ingush, Kabards, Ossetes and various peoples of Dagestan. In 1829-1859 the 
North Caucasus was the place of an armed uprising (the Great Gazavat) that brought 
various local communities together to fight for or against Russia (Gammer 2006). The 
enduring resistance crystallized a number of leaders, including Imam Shamil, who led it 
for 25 consecutive years until his surrender in 1859. There were regular gazavats in the 
region during the next 60 years. The recent conflicts in Chechnya are often referred to 
by the insurgents as gazavats.  
The subsequent Russian domination in the North Caucasus had an important 
impact on all aspects of life in the region, including religion. Not only did Islam gain 
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broad base support among local peoples, but it also became a powerful tool for the Sufi 
Islamic orders and a variety of other religious groups to mobilize resistance against 
Russian domination. In response, Russia quickly adopted policies to divide and rule the 
different Muslim communities and the Caucasian low intensity conflicts acquired a 
strong religious dimension that resulted in damaged relations with all Muslims in the 
Russian Empire. Even though the annexation of the North Caucasus created a large 
Muslim enclave in the Russian Empire, it was not the largest one. Muslims were an 
important element in Orthodox Russian society from the early 1700s. The Russian 
authorities always sought to use to transform religious authority into an instrument of 
imperial rule, imposing legal requirements to declare religious allegiance and to submit 
to the authority of the relevant clerical estate rather than to an imperial authority (Crews 
2006).  In fact, Russia made Islam a pillar of imperial rule, as a wide variety of Muslim 
clerics and lay persons became a forum for the resolution of conflict between Muslim 
communities, and was thus able to present itself as a conservative guardian of Islamic 
piety. This situation led to a complex intermeshing of Sharia law with Russian imperial 
legal system. Thus, the character of Islam and its political and social functions were 
transformed by exposure to broader currents of modernity that affected the Muslim 
communities of the Russian Empire during this period while, at the same time, being 
subordinated to imperial authority.  
The successful military campaigns of the 18th and 19th centuries shaped new 
dividing lines in the Caucasus, and many of these divisions were institutionalized and 
legitimized by imposing territorial and administrative arrangements to secure its 
effective control over the various communities. In particular, Dagestan was 
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administratively separated from Chechnya. The introduction and enforcement of new 
forms of territorial administration along with new policies of economic development 
was often accompanied by punitive land redistributions in which non-Caucasian re-
settlers benefited at the expense of the indigenous population.  These swift changes led 
to the emergence of sizeable towns to accommodate the Russian military command, 
civil administration and emerging business infrastructure. Annexation also brought with 
it significant changes in the demography of the entire region. Indeed, demography was 
the key to Russian imperial and later Soviet rule in the North Caucasus: conquest and 
partial russification were accompanied by large population shifts from the mountains to 
the plains and lowlands. The gradual demise of the Russian Empire after World War I 
and the revolution of 1917 left the North Caucasus in chaos until 1923. Within the 
North Caucasus, competing ethnic and religious groups struggled over alternative 
political projects for the region. Confronted with a serious challenge to its control of the 
North Caucasus, the Soviet regime fed Muslim communities with promises of national 
self-determination (Walker 2003, Tuminez 2003). This policy proved particularly 
effective since, while the majority of the former religious elite rejected the revolution, 
the Soviets were able to secure the support of some Muslim activists attracted to 
nationalist ideas. The success of the Soviet military and political strategy brought with it 
new difficulties, especially with respect to the religious authorities. Initially, the Soviet 
regime demonstrated much caution and hesitation in limiting the role of Sharia law and 
religious institutions that had been introduced after the 1917 revolution. 
The claim that  national identity is easier to build on an ethnic basis than on a 
civic one is particularly true in Russia, where Marxist-Leninism and Socialism were 
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portrayed and fostered by the Soviet Union as the key to its identity (Lenin 1914, 1916). 
Since 1991, there were numerous attempts at creating a new concept of identity for the 
Russian Federation on the basis of different ideologies, but the pendulous nature of 
policies has had divisive as well as amalgamating effects. The official Soviet national 
policy, from its very inception, acknowledged the difficulties posed by the existence of 
the many different nationalities within it, as a positive rather than a negative feature. 
Initially, people were encouraged to foster a dual identity as a Soviet citizen as well as a 
person from a certain nation. In theory, all national identities were expected to lose all 
ethnic bases and become the political and class identity of the Soviet citizen. With this 
in mind, Vladimir Lenin crafted a federal system for managing the different regions 
within the Soviet Union. Nations were differentiated and given a measure of national 
self-determination within the boundaries of the Soviet state (Davis 1967). This did not 
only apply to the national republics in the Caucasus such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, or 
Armenia but smaller territories within the republics were also given ethnic labels even 
when the titular nation was not a majority in the region. The official unifying ideology 
for the Soviet Union was Socialism but in the early days of the Civil War Lenin quickly 
realized that nationalism could be heftily used as a strong motivating factor for people 
and as a useful tool for strengthening the Soviet state. A lesson was learnt from 
experiences of the Tsarist Empire; nationalist aspirations could be a strong destabilizing 
force that added potency to revolutionary movements. In Lenin’s view, complete 
institutionalization of ethnic identity would bring its powerful potential under control.  
Thus, he founded a new federal structure in such a way that it manipulated national 
manifestation and, to some extent, even encouraged it (Page 1950). The so-called 
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“Literacy policy” meant that indigenous cultures that previously had no written 
language could be formalized and allowed greater expression. Each of the national 
republics was allowed to use their own languages and have institutes of science and 
culture. During this period the people of the newly formed Soviet Union experienced 
more freedom than they ever had before. Nations were granted the right to secede from 
the Union if they chose to do so. Naturally this was more in theory than in practice. The 
crucial aspect of Lenin’s policy towards nationalism emphasized the eradication of 
Great Russian Chauvinism (Chulos 2000). Russia had always held a privileged role in 
the Tsarist Empire which was the cause of much resentment by the other nations (Lenin 
1914, 1916). Lenin decided to overcome this resentment to the point of excluding any 
references to Russia in official documents simply referring to “the Workers’ State”. 
Lenin’s national policy was meant to bring the different nations together in a voluntary 
union, not just one enforced from Moscow (Page 1950, Davis 1967). The identification 
of different nations was supposed to be supranational, gradually the nations were meant 
to merge, and the only identity would be that of a Soviet citizen, nationalism would 
simply disappear. In the North Caucasus, the Soviet national policy continued the 
imperial policy of divide and rule towards the Sufi sheikhs and succeeded in reshaping 
the political and socio-economic character of the North Caucasus, disarming the local 
population, along with set of policies to weaken the clerics and the nationalists who had 
initially supported the revolution. As a result, both sharia courts and the imperial system 
of muftiates were abolished in 1926 and scripts based on the Cyrillic alphabet were 
imposed on the languages of the region, breaking the links created by the common use 
of Arabic and Turkish. The public assaults on religious symbols launched in 
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conjunction with the compulsory collectivization of agriculture provoke fierce 
resistance and the region was once again plunged into the wave of indiscriminate 
reprisals and ideological intolerance (Wixman 1980, Tekushev and Shevchenko 2011).  
Following Lenin’s death, Stalin selected the most questionable aspects of 
Lenin’s nationalities policy, and then proceeded to consolidate the Soviet state under 
these principles despite his own Caucasian origin. Not only did Stalin clearly reinstate 
Russian ethno-cultural supremacy drawing on Russia’s heroic past to encourage 
national spirit during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), but he also reintroduced old 
Tsarist policies of the predominance of the Russian language and culture (Suny and 
Martin 2002). To some extent, this concept was espoused by all of the subsequent 
leaders of the Soviet Union and was still mentioned in official propaganda on the eve of 
its collapse in 1991. The idea of an over-arching Soviet identity was most 
enthusiastically carried out in the Caucasus. As the Soviet Union began to falter and its 
outlying Caucasian territories set out to formulate their ethnic claims, the Russian 
Federation was in the unique position of having based its national identity on its civic 
identity as the statutory leader of all other nations. The abrupt loss of Russia’s 
leadership role and the end of Soviet socialist ideology left Russian identity in a state of 
limbo. By 1936, still apprehensive about pan-Islamic solidarity, the Soviet regime set 
out, alongside its continual efforts to undermine the position of the religious authorities, 
to redraw the region along broadly ethno-linguistic lines, establishing new ethno-
territorial political entities. This policy created numerous anomalies, because natural 
diversity of the population ensured that the new borders cut across regional, linguistic, 
ethno-religious and clan ties (Hirsch 2005).  The artificial division of the administrative 
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units (such as the repeated subdivision of the Circassian people of the north-western 
Caucasus into the ‘new’ nationalities of Adyghea, Cherkessians and Kabards) as well as 
the forced fusion of different nationalities into single territorial unit ( for example, the 
creation of the Kabardino-Balkaria autonomous oblast in 1922) further exacerbated 
ethnic tensions. Under these conditions, the formation of a new cohort of dependable 
ethnic and religious elites became a central part of the Stalinist social engineering 
project. The new appointees took a central part in the subsequent campaign to extend 
Moscow’s control over the region and to drive forward the Soviet project of 
transformation and modernization. They were also prominent in the series of anti-Islam 
campaigns conducted during this period. The destruction of mosques and desecration of 
Islamic values was widespread in the Muslim parts of the North Caucasus, which 
despite the hardline policies remained the most troublesome zone of the Soviet Union 
up until its collapse. As a result of the pervasive anti-Islam campaigns of the late 1920s, 
much of the intellectual culture of Islam in the North Caucasus, which had prospered 
and persisted until 1917, was obliterated. In particular, the destruction of mosques and 
Islamic educational institutions disrupted the system of Islamic confessional education, 
while the switch from the Arabic script ensured that new generations were cut off from 
previous Islamic scholarship. The religious life of ordinary Muslims, who were 
deprived of opportunities to worship openly, became confined to Sufism with a focus on 
local traditional rites and practices. Stalin’s death in 1953 allowed the North Caucasus 
to enter a period of relative stability. To a great extent, Islam enjoyed resurgence in the 
decades after World War II and acquired a conspicuously political character. In 
particular, adherence to the tariqas increased among the Chechen and Ingush as a result 
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of their period of exile when the tariqas became symbols of ethnic affiliation and an 
effective instrument of community survival. Once again, religious and ethnic aspects 
were fused as Sufism merged with the social and economic organization of the 
community 27. The mere fact that not a single mosque was allowed to function in the 
Chechen-Ingush ASSR for almost 20 years after the return from exile is still 
remembered as both discrimination against Islam and a violation of national rights. 
There is ample evidence that Islamic practices and networks developed covertly 
throughout the North Caucasus, especially among the younger generation. These 
networks contributed much in strengthening national identities in sharp opposition to 
Russia, and in diverting youth from ubiquitous Soviet ideology and public life (Ro’i 
2000).  
Despite the growing scholarship on Islam in the North Caucasus, the North 
Caucasus Muslim community remains largely “a thing in itself”, posing more questions 
with every passing day. First, how many Muslims are there in Russia? Second, who can 
be considered a Muslim at all? Taking the whole spectrum of opinions into account, one 
can find that at the turn of the 21 century the number of Russian Muslims is anywhere 
between 15 and 35 millions (Malashenko 1998:7), but the number most often mentioned 
in scientific publications and the  mass media is around 20 million. In 2001, scholars at 
the Russian Academy of Civil Service indicated that the number of those “who adhere 
to Islamic traditions” in Russia is 15 million (Mukhametshin and Dubkov 200:155). 
However, this calculation left out of calculation both legal and illegal Muslims 
immigrants living in Russia for decades. For example, according to various sources, the 
number of Azerbaijan citizens alone is between 1 and 1.5 million. In the late ‘90s they 
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opened in the Moscow district of Otradnoye a Shiite mosque, and there are contentious 
plans to open Shiite mosques in other cities as well. The second largest migrant Muslim 
ethnic group in Russia is Kazakhs: their number is just under one million. Therefore, the 
total number of Muslims in Russia must be more than 15 million. There are two 
opposite views on that lingering question. First, the number of devout Muslim believers 
in Russia is not above three million. The Monitoring.ru opinion-sampling service found 
that Muslims constituted around 5% of the total number of believers in Russia, which 
this source estimates to be approximately 55% (Tulsky 2001). Second, according to the 
Moscow Institute of Sociological Analysis, in 1997, Muslims made up 6.2% of the total 
number of believers, and 6% of the overall population (Zubov 2000). 
Who is to be counted as a true Muslim? There is no reliable confessional 
statistics in Russia, and so the data collected both on the federal and regional level, 
including the republics of the North Caucasus, fail to give a coherent answer as to who 
can be considered a “true Muslim.” Respondents are usually asked how many times a 
day they perform prayers, how often they go to the mosque, how profound their 
religious knowledge is, whether or not they know the suras of the Quran, and so on. On 
the basis of such criteria a conclusion is drawn whether a person can be regarded as a 
believer. However, in the case of Islam such an approach does not seem useful, because 
it does not make it possible to gauge the number of Muslims in Russia and about the 
role the Islamic factor plays in present-day Russia; the main problem is that religious 
observance has nothing to do with a person’s self-identification within a larger 
collective identity (Malashenko 2005). Thus, a different approach is more often used to 
determine whether a person is a Muslim or not. This approach has nothing to do with a 
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person’s observation of the religious rites or his knowledge of religion. A person’s 
connection to Islam is determined by his self-identification, the environment in which 
he was born and grew up. Finally, Muslims comprise ethnic minorities, and their 
confessional self-identification is a most important part of their national self-
identification (Malashenko 2005). Especially in the North Caucasus, belonging to Islam 
actually becomes equivalent to belonging to an ethnic group. The logic behind this 
approach is simple. An individual who has a Muslim name becomes a Muslim believer, 
because he was born Muslim. Islam then turns out to be a consolidating supra-ethnic 
factor in front of the Russian majority. Consequently, the self-awareness of a person as 
a bearer of a minority’s religion is further reinforced by the increased xenophobia in 
Russian society, and Islamophobia in particular. It is important to note that unlike the 
large Muslim minority groups in Western Europe, the Russian Muslims are mainly 
autochthonous. As a matter of fact, Islam penetrated the territory of the present Russian 
Federation before Christianity. In the year 642 the Arabs penetrated the territory of what 
is now Dagestan and began spreading Islam further across the Caucasus. In 2000 (1420 
on the Muslim calendar), the Russian Muslims celebrated the 1400th anniversary of 
Islam’s advent to Russia. However, acoording to Malashenko, the indisputable fact that 
Muslims are part of Russia’s indigenous population and that Islam has been present on 
Russian soil centuries has not yet led to the formation of a consolidated Muslim 
community having common interests and being able to express them politically in one 
voice: the three regional Muslim enclaves – the Volga river Area, the North Caucasus 
and Moscow continue to remain quite isolated from one another (2005). 
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As ethno-nationalism crystallized as the dominant factor determining political 
conflicts in the North Caucasus in the early 1990s, the region also experienced religious 
revival. Decades of intensive anti-Islamic campaigns had depleted Islam, both 
institutionally and intellectually, as the Soviet authorities had tried to rewrite a 
legitimate past for Islam by selling it as a secular attribute of national cultures (Hunter 
2006).  The fusion of nationalist aspirations thus provided a major stimulus for a 
religious resurgence that was initially fragmented along ethnic lines. By 1992 the 
Spiritual Board of Muslims of the North Caucasus was replaced by independent bodies 
for each republic, as the formerly underground parallel Islam displaced much of the pro-
Soviet religious hierarchy in the region. In particular, a number of violent conflicts 
broke out between followers of traditional forms of Islam, various branches of Sufism, 
and adherents to more radical forms, the Salafists.
4
 A lack of understanding of the 
complex ethnic, religious, and social situation in the North Caucasus kept the federal 
authorities on the margins of events and they were left no choice but to side with the 
proponents of traditional Sufi Islam. At the same time, both Chechnya and Dagestan 
emerged as the key locations for the standoff between different versions of Islam in the 
region. Even though the clandestine penetration of Salafists groups in the region began 
on the eve of the collapse of Soviet Union and the subsequent deep economic and social 
crisis, the power of the movement was to be found not so much in socio-economic 
grievances as in the destruction of local Muslim culture and the social upheavals to 
which Muslims in the North Caucasus were subjected in Soviet times (Bobrovnikov 
                                                             
4 Salafism is a radical fundamentalist movement within the Sunni branch of Islam that advocates a return to the ‘pure’ 
Islam supposedly practiced by the Salaf, the first three generations of Muslims, including the Prophet Mohammed. In the 




2002).  Despite the fact that both traditional Islam and Salafism co-existed in Dagestan 
during the early 1990s, Dagestan has historically been the main bulwark for the former 
in the North Caucasus. 
When the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan was established in 1990, the 
Sufi sheikhs quickly seized control of it as well as the corresponding system of religious 
education (Shikhsaidov 2004). However, this institutional arrangement did not establish 
the dominance of traditional Islam over the numerous Salafist groups. In Dagestan, 
traditional Islam is very sensitive to ethnic lines, and some Sufi groups do not recognize 
the new muftis, who predominantly descend from the Avar ethnic group. Within a few 
years, rivalry over the Islamic institutions quickly merged with the republic’s internal 
power struggle, in which ethnicity played a key role. In sharp contrast to the followers 
of traditional Islam, who secured influence through control of the official Islamic 
institutions, the Salafi pragmatics positioned themselves explicitly above the egregious 
amalgamation of corruptive bureaucracy with official Muslim institutions. Most 
important, being equally distant from both the authorities and from ethnic rivalry, the 
Salafists were able to use their radical ideology to enjoy respect and support by 
transcending ethnic and clan considerations. The indifference of the self-contained 
authorities and the traditional clergy to resist the spread of crime, corruption and 
perceived moral degradation created very propitious grounds for reaching out to young 
people who were especially attracted to the movement’s combination of piety and 
rejection of religious hierarchy. Step by step, Salafist groups made impressive headway 
in the North Caucasus during the 1990s. Moreover, new converts were able to seize 
even political power in a few mountainous villages Karamakhi, Kadar and 
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Chabammakhi that were then governed according to narrow interpretations of the Sharia 
law.  
With the establishment of a necessity alliance between secular and religious 
elites, the central authorities dispatched additional army units to Dagestan to stamp out 
the self-proclaimed Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan in August of 
1999, as combat troops surrounded the Dagestan villages of Chabanmakhi, Kadar and 
Karamakhi and took them by full-front attack. Subsequent sweeping arrests of Salafist 
clerics in the North Caucasus were not long in coming. The indiscriminate repressive 
actions, combined with the unintelligible slogans of sovereign democracy, served to 
consolidate the Salafist groups and helped them to overcome their internal divisions 
(Makarov and Mukhametshin 2003). It also drove the Salafists underground and shifted 
their agenda from a struggle with traditional Islam to one with the regional and central 
authorities. Furthermore, the fierce persecution of Salafism resulted in the rapid 
propagation of radical Islamist movements across the region and, in particular, in 
Kabardino-Balkaria, in Nogai communities in Stavropol krai, and in Karachay-
Cherkessia. However, Salafism’s intolerance of national cultural traditions coupled with 
rigid social, religious and ethical demands on adherents proved incompatible with the 
majority of region’s population who was grown up in the Soviet Union and further 
limited its propagation. 
As a rule, organizational structure of the Salafist jamaats does not overlap the 
traditional Muslim communities, which are organized along territorial principles, 
incorporating the population of a village or city district grouped around a mosque. The 
Salafist jamaats are extra-territorial and dispersed. One jamaat can encompass many 
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small groups, united in one or several networks. Even though the membership of the 
separatist jamaats is diverse, their base is the Muslim youth of the region. A growing 
number of students and young bureaucrats are joining the Islamist movements, 
demonstrating that separatist views are spread among the intellectual elite in the North 
Caucasus republics, particularly in Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia. When social 
injustice and endemic corruption are rampant, the best response seems to be the 
introduction of Sharia law. The jamaats unite not only members of different ethnic 
groups, but also representatives of other countries: Tajikistan, Pakistan, and the Middle 
East. Official propagandists usually describe these outsiders as mercenaries, even 
though many of them arrived for ideological reasons. Although the separatist groups get 
financial and logistical support from foreign donors, the biggest portion of funds comes 
as kickbacks from local shadow business and corrupt bureaucracy (Malashenko and 
Trenin 2004).  
The Salafist/Wahhabist ideology of the separatist movement in the North 
Caucasus leads to a literal interpretation of this principle with very strict limits and 
prioritizes an armed battle for faith against the enemies of Islam, including other North 
Caucasus Muslims who do not support the separatists. As a result, there is 
indiscriminate use of force against ethnic Muslims who serve in the government, 
military, or law enforcement. Such a dogmatic position also serves to justify killings of 
those Muslims who have no relationship to the authorities. In the early 90s, the secular 
nationalists used to bargain with Moscow for some level of autonomy as well as for 
personal entitlements. This kind of arrangements worked well enough to contain 
groundswell of nationalistic aspirations in relatively stable legal frames.  It does not 
85 
 
work anymore since the separatists’ ideology does not allow any compromise with the 
“infidels.” Moreover, the Islamist core of the North Caucasus separatists’ ideology sets 
very clear long-term goals of this movement. It is no longer the separation of Chechnya, 
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia or Dagestan from Russia, but the destruction 
of the Russian Federation as the only tangible impediment to the proclamation of 
Sharia-governed territory that would ultimately unite all Muslims in the Caucasus in a 
single political space. Thus, ethnic identity will be once and forever subdued by 
religious identity (Malashenko and Trenin 2004, Markedonov 2007).  
For most of the Caucasus communities, religion serves as a component of their 
ethnic and regional identity, but is not their primary collective identity. For example, 
solidarity on an Islamic basis with Muslims beyond the Caucasus is still minimal, 
although beginning to rise among such ethnic groups as Avars, Dargins, Nogais, 
Karachays and Kumiks. Most communities of the region hold in high regard their local 
cultures, and they are not particularly susceptible to identification with the broader 
Muslim world. Furthermore, my argument is that Islam rarely serves as a unifying 
ideology of primary identity uniting the Muslim residents in the region, and many 
conflicts prevail among members of the same religion. The ghost of "religious 
fundamentalism" has served to feed prejudices, planting essentialist cultural views of 
Islam and justifying the authoritarian regime in Chechnya and numerous post-Soviet 
bureaucracies in Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia 
3.2. Divisions of Power and Ethnic Identity 
This section examines the relationship between ethnic identity and power 
balance in the North Caucasus at different periods of its history with particular focus on 
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three case studies: Dagestan, Chechnya, and Karachay-Cherkessia.  With the rapid 
advance of the German army in the Caucasus, the Soviet authorities began to fear that 
some ethnic groups might shift their fragile loyalties. Thus, the Soviet regime officially 
recognized Islam and reanimated mufti   for the North Caucasus. Having reached the 
North Caucasus in 1942 on its way to sever the Caucasian oilfields from the Soviets, the 
German occupational authorities disbanded all collective farms, reopened mosques and 
vowed to guarantee religious freedom and sovereignty for those groups that were 
willing to cooperate. What happened then was one of the darkest periods in the history 
of the indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus. Between November 1943 and March 
1944, on the basis of decrees signed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, entire 
ethnic groups (the Balkar, Chechens, Ingush and Karachay) were evicted, loaded into 
cattle wagons, and transported to Central Asia and Siberia with exceptional security 
measures under the pretext of mostly unfounded accusations of collaboration with the 
German authorities. Those who managed to flee the deportation were apprehended and 
executed.  It was not until 1957, when the remnants of exiled peoples were officially 
rehabilitated and shortly afterwards around 90 000 survivors returned to the North 
Caucasus to reclaim their land and property. Their return provoked enormous tensions 
all across the North Caucasus, some of which persist today. Shortly afterwards, the 
Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Kabardino-Balkaria Soviet 
Socialist Republic, and the Karachay-Cherkessia Autonomous Region were brought to 
being in 1957, but not all of their former territories were returned to them.  Areas of the 
former republics that were retained by Dagestan, Georgia, North Ossetia, and Stavropol 
became sources of intense disputes over land ownership. 
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The concept of “mature socialism” proclaimed in the late 1960s as result of the 
Communist Party’s assessment of Soviet reality assumed that Islam and its clerics had 
been fully integrated into the Soviet system (Evans 1977). Strictly speaking, the decades 
of heavily centralized rule during the Soviet period had a significant impact on social 
organization in the North Caucasus. Confronted with the apparent complexity of social 
relations in the North Caucasus, Soviet national policy was strongly shaped by a 
perception of the dominance of social institutions and loyalties defined principally by 
clan, tape, and kin. Obviously, this assessment of the nature of the region’s socio-
political character stems from the imperial Russian approach to the region as well as a 
reflection of the so-called “orientalist tradition” in Russian scholarship and colonial 
policy (Jersild 2003). The skillful manipulation of these cleavages for political purposes 
was an important element in both regimes’ efforts to enforce law and order in the 
Caucasus. This concept did little to contribute to the social modernization of the region 
and mainly served to further entrench traditional modes of social organization. There is 
empirical evidence that, in the relative stability of the post-Stalin era, it even promoted 
the informal economic activities and bureaucratic machinations that have laid out the 
basis for the pervasive of corruption following the collapse of the Soviet regime.  
In the mid-sixties, the Soviet policy of promoting national identities in the North 
Caucasus began to gain tangibles results, as clear signs of a growing national 
consciousness were emerging, and larger fragments of the indigenous populations were 
making significant social, economic and political progress. The advancement of multi-
layer national bureaucracies pushed the urbanization and modernization of the region’s 
non-Russian inhabitants. Concurrently, growing numbers of the indigenous peoples 
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found their way into higher education, contributing to the emergence of national elites. 
These complex developments coupled with the resurgence of Islam, challenged Soviet 
regime in the North Caucasus in a number of ways. In particular, the advancement of 
the non-ethnic Russian populations weakened the domination of the ethnic Russian 
settlers over the predominately rural societies of the indigenous peoples, eroding the 
central government’s control. This process not only weakened the Soviet regime’s 
ability to forge loyal local cadres but also undermined the position of the Russian 
language and the center’s control over the educational institutions, the key economic 
sectors and the regional executive bodies (Evans 1977). 
Gorbachev’s reforms allowed, for the first time, a public sphere where dormant 
political ambitions could be articulated. Among the first to occupy that public space 
were nationalist movements in the Union republics. A common feature of these mass 
movements on the periphery of the ailing Union was that initially they set off as pro-
democratic movements. However, by 1989, the national movements of the Baltic 
republics and popular fronts of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia had turned to 
enforcing more radical positions, increasingly exploiting the ways and means of 
secession from the Soviet Union. Then, a number of the first partly-free elections to the 
republican and local representative organs increased the political weight of popular 
movements. Having obtained democratic legitimacy after elections of 1990, local 
bureaucracy initiated the dismantling of the vertical hierarchy of the Communist party 
to secure its new political capital and administrative resources. On March 6 1990, facing 
open confrontation with local elites, Gorbachev had to allow a multiparty system by 
abolishing the article 6 of the Soviet constitution, which guaranteed the primacy of the 
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Communist Party. Once a vertical chain of command was shaken, both the Union 
republics and the Autonomous republics grasped as much sovereignty as they could. For 
most republics, sovereignty, in this context, did not yet mean independence, but in the 
first place control over resources, property rights, taxation, and legislation. However, 
from spring of 1990 until its collapse, the Soviet regime was locked in a devastating 
multi-level power struggle. By the end of 1990, the power balance in the Soviet Union 
had rapidly shifted away from the center to the republics, and within the republics, 
towards the so-called national-democratic movements. In a desperate attempt to save the 
union, Gorbachev presented a draft of a new union treaty that involved some 
decentralization of power to the republics but maintained a strong federal center. 
Although this union treaty was accepted by 70 % of the Soviet citizens in March 1991, 
it did not stop the republics from taking control over resources and property rights, thus 
approving a de facto dismantling of the Soviet system. As soon as the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist and the unprepared republics were left to deal with this unexpected 
independence internal violent conflicts flared up in Tajikistan, Moldova, and all across 
the Caucasus.  
Gorbachev’s reforms had another dramatic impact on the North Caucasus. 
During the years of selective political and economic restructuring, the weakness of 
central political authority along with the unmasked decomposition of the Soviet 
bureaucratic apparatus allowed the emergence of a plethora of grass-root political and 
religious movements imposing diverse visions of the region’s future. Nonetheless, it 
was not Islam that became the primary gear to mobilize popular support against ailing 
Soviet - Russian domination. Rather, a variety of nationalist movements that sought to 
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push for self-determination and to advance cultural and linguistic demands sprung up all 
across the North Caucasus. During this period, the legacy of Soviet territorial division 
and nation building was questioned by every single ethnic group. Previously dormant 
border disputes and conflicts erupted in North Ossetia and Ingushetia and in several 
other locations, including along Russia’s border with Azerbaijan (Hunter 2006). With 
the demise of the Soviet Union, much of the older Islamic elite, many members of 
which were tainted by collaboration with the Soviet-run Islamic institutions, were 
aggressively challenged by a younger generation of religious scholars and alike. A 
variety of parties claiming their inspiration from versions of Islam appeared. Porous 
frontiers along with political liberalization also exposed Muslims to long-awaited 
external influences - Salafism began to spread in the North Caucasus, starting from 
western Dagestan and later from Chechnya (Hunter 2006).  
The intricate nature of Russian imperial and Soviet policies in the North 
Caucasus provided the fertile ground for many conflicts, which followed the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. The mobilization process that accompanied the decline of 
the Soviet regime was initially challenged along the lines of ethnicity and nationalism 
was due largely to the legacies of the Russian imperial and Soviet endeavors to coddle 
ethnic cleavages, including separate national identities. Surprisingly, the post-Soviet 
rulers did little to question this heritage in the North Caucasus and rather served to 
accelerate the crumbling of over-arching loyalties and to provoke even further 
fragmentation. In the early 1990s, it was primarily the structural legacy of the Soviet 
Union’s territorial administration policies that determined the nature of the conflict over 
political power and access to resources in the North Caucasus.  During this period, a 
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spate of interlinked tensions and conflicts spread across the region, ignited primarily by 
ethno-national issues. The federal government had to cope with increasingly belligerent 
demands for territorial delimitation and structural reforms, stemming from the repeated 
border changes and the mass deportations of the early 1940s. In addition, a yawning 
crisis of leadership at the regional level and in the relationship between the North 
Caucasus republics and the federal authorities culminated in Boris Yeltsin’s famous 
appeal to Russia’s regional elites  to “take all the sovereignty they could swallow”5 that 
only further accelerated nationalist mobilization in the North Caucasus. Soon 
afterwards, in 1991 the Russian Parliament passed the Law on the Rehabilitation of 
Repressed Peoples, which moved the issue of the return of land to former deportees to 
the top of the political agendas of the North Caucasus, providing a legal justification for 
redrawing the borders and redefining the status of many of the administrative units in 
the North Caucasus. The secession in 1992 of Ingushetia from Chechnya flamed a 
dispute between the Chechens and Ingush over Sunzhensky administrative district and 
fueled tensions between the Ingush and the North Ossetians over Prigorodny 
administrative district. Russia’s continual failure to clarify Ingushetia’s borders led to a 
violent conflict between Ingushetia and North Ossetia in the autumn of 1992 with nearly 
600 deaths, tens of thousands of internally displaced people, and continued tensions 
over the issue throughout the 2000s. Yeltsin’s propagandistic support for the revival of 
the Cossacks, who had also been repressed during the Soviet period, within the 
framework of the Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples also rekindled 
                                                             
5 In September 1990, President Yeltsin repeatedly reiterated this sloagan during his visit to Tatarstan. 
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tensions between non-Russian communities and the Cossacks who had a long history of 
military standoff with the native peoples of the North Caucasus. 
Due to considerable institutional ambiguity with an uncertain division of 
responsibility for policy towards the North Caucasus between different ministries, the 
parliament, the presidential apparatus and growing security agencies resulted in 
Russia’s failure to respond effectively to the spiraling conflicts over territory with a 
coherent policy. Instead, relations between federal center and the regions were further 
obfuscated by conflicting pieces of legislation on the distribution of authority between 
the center and the regions: the 1992 Federal Treaty, the 1993 Russian Constitution, and 
a set of bilateral treaties between Russia Federation and its regions. With no definitive 
legal base for federal relations and absence of a well-defined institutional framework, 
Russia resorted to improvised solutions with temporal measures to address the conflicts 
in the North Caucasus in particular. In part, this situation was a reflection of an 
underlying challenge with regard to what kind of state the new Russian Federation 
should become. At an ideological level, this challenge was boiled down to two 
irreconcilable positions: Russia as a genuine, modern, and democratic country and 
Russia as centralized, paternalistic great power to ensure its territorial integrity and 
incremental influence on the former Soviet republics. In the meantime, unscrupulous 
post-Soviet bureaucracy was primarily centered on its relationships with local elites as 
the principal means for reinserting influence in the region. Even though the North 
Caucasus joined with the rest of Russia in creating formally democratic regional 
institutions and in conducting direct elections for regional leaders, the obvious 
shortcomings of this approach became particularly salient as these institutional 
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arrangements were easily manipulated by incumbent elites. In desperate need to contain 
mounting ethno-religious conflicts and secessionist aspirations, Yeltsin’ cohort grew 
more reliant on the local elites to guarantee stability of his ailing regime that was often 
institutionalized in the form of bilateral agreements and personal relationships. These 
internal bureaucratic arrangements resulted in unabashed expansion of the prerogatives 
of the regional functionaries accompanied by omnipresent corruption and patronage 
politics at all levels of administration. Within one decade, the North Caucasus became a 
chaotic aggregation of privatized pseudo-democratic constructions reaching out to 
criminal outfits and extremist groups, including those drawing on religious ideas. While 
the local elite had little interest in changing the so-called “status quo” that might harm 
their positions, the situation in the North Caucasus continued to deteriorate questioning 
the very existence of the Russian Federation. Vladimir Putin’s hand-pick appointment 
as prime minister took place at a time when there was a pervasive sense of crisis in 
Russia and an acceptance of the population for the authorities to enforce law and order 
at all cost. Therefore, Putin made relations between the federal government and the 
regions a key policy target with the North Caucasus in the first place. In Putin’s view, 
the only cost-effective way to bring the situation in the North Caucasus under his 
control was the direct system of centrally appointed high-ranking regional officials, 
administrative restructuring, and intensive militarization. Under pretext of fighting 
international terrorism and religious extremism, he quickly consolidated his power base 
for further centralization of power and curtailment of political and civil liberties.  
The invasion of Dagestan launched by Chechen Islamist militants in 1999 gave 
the Prime-Minister Putin another unbeatable argument for launching a campaign to 
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solidify the so-called “vertical power’ intended to restore Russia’s dominance in the 
North Caucasus. As early as May 2000, Putin insisted on introduction a set of measures 
designed to strengthen central executive power over the regions. Thus, seven federal 
districts were created, each comprising several regions under the guidance of a 
presidential plenipotentiary envoy (Smirnov 2007). All federal institutions in those 
regions were completely refashioned to fit the new vertical structure. Until 2009, the 
North Caucasus republics along with South Russian regions were incorporated into the 
Southern Federal District. Federal authorities demanded immediately that the regions’ 
constitutions and legislation be brought into compliance with the federal constitutional 
provisions and legislative norms. The key task of Putin’s centralizing reforms was 
designed to undermine the ability of the regional elites to challenge the center and to 
address the concern that Russia’s territorial integrity was questioned by the increasing 
power of the regions. Due to the peculiar nature of the socio-political situation in the 
North Caucasus, Putin’s plans had quite limited effect. Within one year, the federal 
bureaucracy of the Southern Federal District bogged down in local crisis management, 
rather than challenging the entrenched positions of the regional clans. By 2005, Putin 
still could not break the power of the post-Soviet elites in their own regions and lacked 
the political leverage to do so. His vigorous efforts to replace the self-contained 
bureaucracy were therefore backed up by public appeals to curb the growing instability 
by more authoritarian measures. 
In response to mounting obstacles to his growing authority, Putin set about 
dislodging local nomenclature who did not meet his expectations either professionally 
or personally. However, replacing this type of ethnically-elected bureaucracy initially 
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proved difficult, but the 2004 terrorist slaughter in Beslan provided Moscow with a 
long-awaited pretext to abolish elections for regional leaders in favor of direct 
appointments and to downgrade regional parliaments to puppet roles in local power 
balances. The painful replacement of the long-serving leaders of the North Caucasus 
republics reflects the growing confidence of the Federation in addressing both the 
religious hard-liners and the clan-style politicians. On the one hand, Putin’s incremental 
pressure on loyal local elites through direct intervention and distribution marks a return 
to Russian imperial and Soviet politics of maintaining control in the region. On the 
other hand, it is now clear that this strategy of undermining clan structures and extremist 
networks has only intensified tensions and produced new conflicts that result in power 
shifts within the system rather than changing the system itself (Perovic 2006).  
The above-mentioned situation highlights the essential weakness of such an 
approach: lack of local legitimacy of the hand-pick appointees who have not gained 
their positions through a democratic scrutiny. Thus, patronage politics, personal 
relationships, and clan ties continue to dominate the region, increasing the regimes’ 
reliance on law enforcement and military. The 2010 year became another failure for the 
federal government’s project of seeking to invest money in the region in exchange for 
stability as   Aleksandr Khloponin, who was designated by the Kremlin as the 
experienced manager for the project, did not succeed in turning the situation around by 
additional infusions of money from the central government into the bottomless budgets 
of local ethnic republics (Rosbalt News Agency 2010). He seems to fail to make local 
top officials to resolve their issues through his apparatus, rather than by circumventing it 
(as in case of Ramzan Kadyrov, who continues to do so in public without any 
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reservation). Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in the end had to admit that the 
Khloponin project did not meet his expectations (Rosbalt News Agency 2010). In 
reality, there were very few, to say the least, willing to invest something in a region 
where there is a permanent war, and even then those who did had received personnel 
assurances from the Kremlin for all the risks associated with the instability in the 
region. The Kremlin’s bold administrative move to split the Southern Federal District 
into two administrative units, one of which, called the North Caucasus Federal District, 
covered most of the region’s national republics – Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, 
North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia – as well as the Stavropol 
krai. However, Adyghea, an integral part of the North Caucasus region, was bracketed 
and remained within the Southern Federal District. In desperate attempts to remain in 
power, the governors of the North Caucasus republics have been adopting the tactic 
successfully employed by Ramzan Kadyrov, in which priority is given to the 
paramilitary structures directly subordinated to them. However, a strategy to counter the 
insurgents by paramilitary units composed of representatives of the loyal indigenous 
population of a particular republic is unlikely to result in something even remotely 
similar to what has been allegedly achieved in Chechnya, because it ignores the many 
differences between the organization of Chechen society and that of the other multi-
ethnic republics. Although the aggravation of the situation in the North Caucasus had 
multifaceted manifestations, including social, political, economic and religious, the 
dominant and defining factor overshadowing all of them was the ongoing armed 
insurgency that compelled the Russian authorities to confess that the situation in the 
region in 2010 indeed significantly worsened compared to 2009. While in 2009, the 
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violence and unrest was concentrated mainly in Ingushetia, in 2010 the much larger 
Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria came to the forefront. This conflagration of violence 
is now viewed to have an impact on Russia’s Black Sea area, where it hopes to host the 
2014 Winter Olympic Games. Russian government’s decision to hold these games in 
the Chircassian historical homeland along with the assassinations of leaders of 
Chircassian nationalistic organizations in 2010 might be indicative of a policy aimed at 
further exploiting interethnic and inter-ideological tensions. 
Sociological data provided by the Russian Public Opinion Centre (Press release 
#1398, October 24, 2011), the Levada-Centre (December 12, 2011) and the Public 
Opinion Fund (December 15, 2011) attest that between May 2009 and December 2011 
all the positive ratings of the state’s leaders and of the party in power have tended to 
diminish and the negative ratings have tended to grow. The negative dynamics of 
approval ratings are practically the same for the President Medvedev, the Prime 
Minister Putin and the “United Russia”. This means that the emerging trend is about the 
political system as a whole, indicating a process of its diminishing legitimacy. 
Qualitative surveys (focus groups) conducted by the Center for Strategic Research 
Foundation in 2010 and 2011 substantially enlarge the picture of the ongoing changes. 
Although the method does not appear to be rigorous enough, it has considerable 
prognostic power compared with qualitative surveys. The forecast horizon may be 
between eight and twelve months. The forecast is based upon the emergence within the 
focus groups of new opinions which have not yet become widespread, but have never 
previously been voiced at all, or upon the prevalence of opinions that previously were 
only occasionally expressed. Quantitative surveys are usually tardy in detecting such 
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changes (Belanovsky and Dmitriev 2011). Belanovsky and Dmitriev believe that the 
key change in the political consciousness of Russians is not only diminishing 
confidence in the Putin-Medvedev tandem, but a growing demand for a new leader, a 
third leader (2011). Putin, unlike Medvedev, has preserved part of his traditional 
electorate, but his supporters form their opinion of him on the basis of his past 
accomplishments, mainly the post-Yeltsin stabilization. But the same people agree that 
the situation in the country has deteriorated and that there are no signs of improvement. 
In the former years Putin practically had no anti-electorate, with the exception of the 
politicized part of the Moscow middle class. Now such an anti-electorate may be 
observed even in the quantitative surveys published by the Public Opinion Fund in 
2011. There are many angry pronouncements at the focus groups about the situation in 
the country and against the country’s leaders, something that was not the case before. 
There is yet another subjective factor that diminishes Putin’s personal legitimacy. In the 
early 2000s Putin’s image gained a lot because he was comparatively young, especially 
in contrast to the negative memories of ailing Brezhnev
6
 and Yeltsin. After the negative 
experience of Brezhnev and Yeltsin, the Russian people categorically do not want to see 
an old and ineffectual leader (Belanovsky and Dmitriev 2011).  
The 2011 parliamentary elections exaggerated victory of the ruling “United 
Russia” party in the North Caucasus and played a key role in enabling the ruling 
“United Russia” party to win over 50 percent of the mandates. The North Caucasus’ 
vote was more important this time than in previous elections, in 2007, when “United 
                                                             
6 Leonid Brezhnev (1906 - 1982) was the General Secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party 




Russia” still enjoyed considerable popular support opinion across Russia. The ruling 
party partially compensated for its profound loss of popularity in ethnic Russian regions 
with the help of the North Caucasian vote, which is largely seen as having been 
fraudulent, believes the well-known Russian analyst on the North Caucasus, Konstantin 
Kazenin (Dzutsev 2011b). Dagestan and Chechnya were the two top Russian regions 
where “United Russia” added votes in comparison to the 2007 elections. In Dagestan, 
the party improved its performance from 89.4 in 2007 to 91.4 this time. In Chechnya, 
the ruling party received 99.5 percent of the vote this time, 0.1 percent more than in 
2007. In stark contrast to ethnic Russian regions, United Russia’s results were on 
average approximately 30 percent lower than in 2007, amounting to what appears to be 
a crushing defeat for the Kremlin (Dzutsev 2011b). The rigging of the vote took on 
perhaps its most grotesque forms in Chechnya, due to the republic’s quasi-dictatorial 
regime installed and supported by Moscow. According to Chechen officials, voter 
turnout was 99.45 percent. On December 2, Chechen officials announced that the total 
number of registered voters in the republic was 608,797. On December 5, summarizing 
the election results, Chechen officials announced that a total of 611,099 ballots had been 
cast – that is, 2,302 more ballots cast than the total number of registered voters. 
Chechnya’s central electoral commission quickly responded to the criticism by raising 
the official number of voters to 614,109 (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/197042/, 
December 5, 2011). On December 6, the Russian Communist Party’s branch in 
Dagestan staged an unprecedented protest in Makhachkala against the elections, which 
they said were unfair and rigged. “False elections – rotten authorities” was one of their 
slogans. Members of the Russian liberal party Yabloko joined the Communists in 
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protesting. The Communists said they were supported by half of the republic’s 
population in the December 4 election, while according to the official results they won 
just 7.5 % of the vote (Dzutsev 2011b). The Moscow-installed authorities in the North 
Caucasus have no other choice but to provide winning results for the ruling party. They 
can hardly use this as a bargaining chip. Rather, the reverse is true: Moscow could use 
bad results for the ruling party as a pretext for dismissing regional governors. In the 
current situation, however, when the North Caucasus vote has become so pivotal, 
Russian nationalists and democrats alike might focus on how voting in the North 
Caucasus contributes to inhibiting democracy’s progress in Russia. So, paradoxically, 
the rigged votes in the North Caucasus further contribute to preventing the democratic 
evolution of Russia, while official Moscow’s demands and expectations of the North 
Caucasus elites contribute to hampering the political development of this region 
(Dzutsev 2011b).  
3.3. The Roots of Instability and Ethnic Clashes 
This section outlines the nature and roots of ethnic conflicts in key regions of the 
Northern Caucasus – Dagestan, Chechnya, and Karachay-Cherkessia. The demographic 
numbers provided are very mostly approximate, since the exact numbers of ethnic 
groups in the territories are not available until 2013 (expected official release of the 
2011 census). The analysis will move along the "east-west axis" because there are 
significant cultural and economic differences between the western and eastern 
territories. The western regions contain a higher percentage of ethnic Russian (i.e., 70% 
of the population in the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories, but only 10% in Dagestan). 
The level of industrialization and urbanization also decline as one moves east, just as 
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the relative importance of the Islamic factor rises in the east. Since the early 2000s, in 
Russia there has been salient shift toward an undisguised racist contempt and suspicion 
toward ethnic minorities, especially Caucasians. When moving to other parts of the 
Russian Federation, people from the Caucasus face discrimination in the workplace, 
public space, and harassment from law-enforcement personnel. Likewise, in the post - 
Soviet Caucasus, the search and definition of the new Russian “we” has perilous and 
deadly consequences. New Russian social identity is being deliberately constructed as a 
binary and antagonistic relationship with an historic, internal “other” in an overtly 
confrontational manner. The enduring effects of this process have caused mutual 
animosity between a numbers of ethnic communities that had nonetheless managed to 
coexist for a significant time. What this research has shown is that, for example, when 
levels of hostility between Russians and Caucasians are rising, there is a deliberate 
coordinated effort to increase the distance between communities and the 
conceptualizations of “self” and “other”. Conversely, under periods of relative peace, no 
explicit attempts at distancing occur while limited efforts to close the gap transpire. In 
both of these social processes, the state-owned media has had a leading role. What are 
the implications of these findings? Certainly, the mutual ethnic distancing continues and 
Russian authorities have increasingly embraced radical Orthodoxy as a mechanism to 
further solidify the existing dichotomy between Muslim non-Russian “they” and ethnic 
Russian “we”.  
This new post-Soviet xenophobic surge has contributed to certain trends among 
non-Russian minorities: to remain as much as possible within their own ethnic territory; 
to increase ethnic power and autonomy within those territories; to consolidate their 
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economic and social position at the expense of the neighboring ethnic Russian 
population; and to resuscitate their traditional culture, native language and, in the first 
place, the Islamic faith. The exodus of the ethnic Russian population from the republics 
of the North Caucasus is among the key reasons behind the surge of separatism in these 
regions. It should be realized that by now Chechnya and Ingushetia have grown 
practically mono-ethnic (FSSS 2011). The exodus of the Russian population is taking 
place in all of the regions of the North Caucasus which used to be homes to 
considerable Russian communities such as the Kizlyar and Tarum districts in Dagestan, 
the Prokhldnensky and Maysky districts in Kabardino-Balkaria, Adygea, and the 
Zelenchuk and Urup districts in Karachay-Cherkessia. Moreover, even in traditionally 
Russian administrative units of the Stavropol krai (Neftekumsk and Levokumsk) this 
trend has taken an irreversible direction. In fact, such republics of the North Caucasus as 
Chechnya, Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria are 
already governed by ethnocratic regimes deliberately assisting the expulsion of the 
ethnic Russians, who face discrimination at all levels of the local bureaucracy, while a 
system of economic and legal entitlements for the titular ethnic groups is being overtly 
upheld by Moscow. Despite the fact that between 70-90% of the budgets of the 
republics of the North Caucasus come from the federal subsidies, clan social structure 
with its narrow-minded rent-seeking agenda keeps the population predominantly 
frustrated with the functioning of state institutions, and this frustration in many cases 
acquires ethnic or religious dimensions (if not both). 
The Russian Federation is faced with an intrinsically complex situation in as 
much as this meant that many competing visions of national identity could be 
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introduced into the political discourse (Tolz 1998:993). Yet, despite the unique Russian 
situation, political elites still had to grapple with the central issue facing any attempted 
nation building, namely reconciling mutually exclusive ethnic and civic allegiances. 
Moreover, according to Holmes (1997:299), “the uncertainty and instability of early 
post-Communism lead many citizens to search harder for their own ethnic identity – in 
language, territory, and history…seeking to strengthen one’s own identity involves 
becoming more exclusionary towards others – to seek clearer demarcation from “them”. 
Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) was the first post-Soviet leader to grapple with the 
complexities of the Russian identity problem including the territorial aspects of 
constructing a Russian national identity answering the question of “what are the 
boundaries of the Russian nation” and “who are we the Russian people?”  Moreover, 
Yeltsin had to react to demands from non-Russian regions to obtain as much autonomy 
from Moscow as possible. These demands, often exclusionary by definition, can be 
classified broadly as those on the right, who projected a national identity premised 
territorially along the borders of the Russian Empire, versus those on left, whose 
territorial vision bent on the former Soviet borders. These rival conceptualizations of 
Russian identity were allowed to flourish because of the societal void and the lack of 
robust political institutions (Snyder 2000). 
The Russian Federation, like the former Soviet Union, is an example of the 
asymmetric ethno federation, in which only certain federal units are based on ethnicity. 
Finally, in the Russian Federation, again as in the former USSR, autonomous ethnic 
territories are regrouped into categories according to their status in the federal structure 
and degree of autonomy. The highest-level autonomies are called “republics” and were 
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headed by “presidents” up until May 2011; lower-level  autonomies are called 
autonomous provinces or autonomous districts. Historically, the origin of ethno-
federalist debates can be traced to the years before World War One in two of the three 
vast multi-ethnic empires that then still dominated the landscape of Eastern Europe - 
Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The best-known participants in these debates 
were such theorists of the international socialist movement as Plekanov, Lenin, Martov, 
Luxemburg, Schachtman and Trotsky. They all shared the same hope to direct looming 
disintegration of the empires into sovereign ethnic states by transforming them into 
democratic federations with some scope to ethnic self-expression. Such an agenda 
deviated from both imperial conservatives and from socialists like Rosa Luxemburg 
who promoted a working class politics overriding ethnic loyalties or Vladimir Lenin, 
who sought to satisfy ethnic aspirations by creating autonomous ethnic territories (Rees 
1991, Milner 2011).  
In Russia, the new Soviet regime succeeded in reconstituting most of the empire 
winning decisive support among non-Russian ethnithities by allowing them territorial 
autonomy within an ethno-federal framework - a concession that their monarchist 
adversaries in the civil war were not able to make. Later, this ideological writ gave rise 
to the Soviet ethno-federal model that still exists in certain parts of the post-Soviet 
world, including the Russian Federation (Hirsch 2005). The most important variable of 
the Soviet ethno-federal model was the extent to which the formal autonomy of ethnic 
territories has been filled with real content. In the 1920s the administration of 
autonomies was largely entrusted to indigenous Soviet and Communist elites (where 
such elites pre-existed) who were allowed considerable autonomy. Under Stalin, 
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however, these elites were repressed as “bourgeois nationalists” and the real autonomy 
was reduced to formal existence on paper. The post-Stalin period saw the gradual 
emergence of new indigenous elites and a concomitant expansion of autonomy. 
Gorbachev’s reform of the Soviet system led to acceleration of this trend, with many 
autonomies aspiring “sovereignty”. The process of autonomization reached its peak 
under Yeltsin in the early 1990s, when many autonomies were able to negotiate special 
relations with the federal government. In the early 2000s, President Putin put the 
process into reverse and reduced the real autonomy of autonomies to the lowest level 
since Stalin’s era. Even though affluent representatives of the federal political elite in 
the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods have looked at the ethno-federal system as an 
inconvenient and irrational obstacle inherited from the past, the Russian ethno-federal 
model has not been formally abolished.  As Russian political scientist Alexander Kynev 
argues, the aversion to asymmetric federalism is largely psychological and emotional in 
nature, although it does have a salient political dimension. Indeed, the asymmetric 
character of ethnic autonomies is perceived as a chronic deficiency that undermines 
symmetry. By the very fact of their existence, they seem to justify the right of regions to 
develop their own political and institutional mechanisms, thereby threatening the unity 
of the country (Kynev 2010).
 
One obvious reverberation of elite hostility to territorial 
ethnic autonomy in the post-Soviet period has been a revival of the “Austro-Marxist” 
idea
7
 of extraterritorial ethnic autonomy that have then been presented as more 
genuinely representative of the ethnic group concerned than the leadership of any 
particular autonomy in an attempt to delegitimize the latter (Shenfield 2011). Putin’s 
                                                             
7 Historically, the so-called  “Austro-Marxist” advocated alternative extraterritorial schemes for autonomous ethnic 
institutions in the fields of education and culture. 
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impetus to recentralize governance in Russia has dramatically reduced the autonomy not 
only of autonomies but of all federal units. In order to strengthen central control, Putin 
installed his plenipotentiary representatives in seven federal districts created over the 
federal units and unilaterally refused to recognize the validity of the federal treaties 
concluded by Yeltsin (Kynev 2010). The crucial step came in 2004, when popular 
elections of heads of federal units (regional heads) were replaced by what amounted to a 
system of presidential appointment following formal consultations with members of the 
regional elite. The Council of the Federation (the upper chamber of the Russian 
parliament) was also reformed in such a way that regional leaders lost an important 
channel of influence over national policy.  
These swift changes lead toward the emergence of a new generation of regional 
high-ranking bureaucrats, answerable exclusively to the federal authorities and the 
Russian president in the first place. Over the period 2003-2008 the Putin administration 
waged an unprecedented campaign to make contiguous federal units to merge to form 
larger units. Despite the widely advertised rationale for reducing the number of federal 
units in favor of administrative convenience and economic efficiency, all the mergers 
sought by the Kremlin involved the absorption of autonomies into larger neighboring 
non-ethnic territories, revealing that the amalgamation campaign was actually another 
attack on the founding principles of the Russian Federation. As a result,
 
when the 
campaign was tacitly wrapped up in 2008, only six federal subjects had been eliminated, 
reducing the total number of federal units from 89 to 83. In the other three federal 
subjects as well as in Adyghea, resistance at both popular and elite levels was 
sufficiently strong and persistent to resist pressure from the Kremlin. The on-going 
107 
 
Putin-Medvedev reign is also far from being a monolithic dictatorship. Real power still 
remains widely diffused among various national and regional political and economic 
elites with diverse and often conflicting interests both inside and outside Russia. 
Moreover, much effort is made to maintain the appearance of legality and democracy. 
Even though the amalgamation campaign was actually initiated by the Kremlin, the law 
of 2001 on which the campaign was based
 
required the initiative for each specific 
amalgamation to come from the federal units concerned. Thus, even a passive position 
was capable of thwarting the Kremlin’s designs. As Andrei Zakharov explains the 
durability of ethno-federalism in Russia, in theory the Russian Constitution could be 
revised overnight to eliminate federal principles, and yet despite all the “centralist 
rhetoric” of the Putin-Medvedev years this idea has never even been seriously 
considered (Zakharov 2010). The main reason is that a hypothetical obliteration of 
federalism would unavoidably exacerbate the so-called “ethnic question” – Russian’s 
worst nightmare. This circumstance sharply reduces the number of options at the 
disposal of those who would like to reform the administrative-territorial system, which 
constantly bents toward the same solution—that of combining the territorial with the 
ethno-territorial principle in organizing the country’s political space. 
3.4. The Elite-Society Conflict and Religious Radicalism 
“Reality must be faced. The main problem confronting your country is not one of private 
ownership, freedom and economy; your problem is the absence of true faith in God, the very problem that 
has dragged, or will drag, the West to vulgarism and an impasse. Your main problem is the prolonged 
and futile war you have waged against God, the source of existence and creation.” 
 




Contrary to common expectations after the ignominious defeat in Afghanistan, 
Soviet Muslims were not instrumental in bringing about the fall of the Soviet regime. In 
fact, Islamic reaction was well enough mixed as the abrupt collapse meant that they 
would no longer enjoy imperative social and material benefits which they had relied on 
for more than  a half century (Polyakov 2001, Makarov and Mukhametshin 2003, 
Hunter 2004). In addition, the fall from relative Soviet stability occurred rather 
instantaneously and plunged many Islamic communities into dire economic conditions 
created a fertile soil for the construction of new identities. When the local elite took 
advantage of the absence of an over-arching authority to engage in self-enrichment, it 
resulted in increased crime and failure of basic social services regardless of ethnic or 
religious affiliation. In such an environment of socio-economic devastation and 
ideological vacuum, a plethora of foreign and domestic Islamic radicals, espousing a 
return to pristine Islamic values, capitalized on ethnic and religious identities to push 
their own parochial objectives.  
The process of Islamic revival that started in the early 1990s made the Russian 
Muslims aware of being part of the Islamic civilization and the world Muslim umma. 
These are the main results of the so-called Islamic “Renaissance”: increased religious 
conciseness and appreciation of being Tatars, Avars, or Chechens, being not just an 
ethnic group but part of a rising civilization; rebirth of the Islamic religious customs 
along with  an unprecedented growth in the number of mosques and religious schools; 
formation of the Islamic spiritual elite; and finally, politicization of Islam that  made it 
one of the most popular subjects with the Russian mass media, especially in view of the 
latest events in the North Caucasus. The post-Soviet politicization of Islam in this 
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region of the Russian federation has taken three inter-connected paths. First, the 
formation of political organizations based on the principle of Islamic ideology and 
involving Muslim clergymen in politics. Second, the creating conditions for secular 
politicians and representatives of ethnic elites to be responsive to Islamic values. Third, 
the engagement of Islam as both domestic and foreign policy factor by political subjects 
to gain advantage. 
The first Islamic political organization in Russia was the Islamic Rebirth Party 
(IRP), created in the Soviet Union in June 1990. Although this party was not meant to 
become one of Russia’s influential organizations, it gave an impetus to Islam’s 
politicization after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s the IRP had 
around 5,000 active members, most of them residing in Dagestan. The party’s agenda 
was limited to holding press conferences, articulating verbal support to the Muslim 
activists and publishing its leaders’ speeches in the press. Even though IRP rapidly 
bogged down in endless rows of its leaders and ceased to exist in 1994, it created a 
precedent for the appearance of an Islamic political organization recognized by the 
authorities. Beyond the IRP, several Islamic movements, both national and regional, 
appeared in in the mid-1990s : the Muslim Public Movement “Nur” (“Light”), the 
Union of the Muslims of Russia (UMR), Dagestan’s Islamic Democratic Party (later 
renamed the Islamic Party of Daghestan), and the Islamic Center “Kavkaz.” Among 
other smaller groups the espoused religious ideology were branches of international 
Muslim organizations (such as the “Muslim Brothers”), formed mostly on an ethnic 
principle. While taxonomy of political Islam is still an open question, I have found two 
salient trends of its manifestation. The first trend is represented by the UMR and “Nur” 
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vowing to become established on the national political scene as defenders of the social 
and religious interests of the Russian Muslim community, while at the same time 
cooperating with the central and local government bodies and trying to influence them 
as much as possible.
8
 Historically, both the UMR and “Nur” appeared at a time when 
the political situation was very unstable and therefore unpredictable.  Despite their 
claims of independence, in order to survive, they had to side with one of the influential 
secular political forces. During the 1995 parliamentary elections “Nur” got 0.58% of the 
votes in the whole of Russia (393,500 voters). In Chechnya and Ingushetia it got 23%, 
in Tatarstan 5% and in Bashkiria 1.25% of the votes (Malashenko 1998:141). After the 
1995 parliamentary elections and the 1996 presidential elections won by Yeltsin, 
massively employing both anti Chechen and anti-Islamists rhetoric, the activity of these 
Muslim organizations began to decline. With no seats in the Duma
9
, both the UMR and 
“Nur” receded into the political oblivion. The second trend crystalized as a response to 
on-going deterioration of socio-economic conditions of the Muslim community. For 
instance, in the UMR’s numerous press releases and the speeches of its leaders it was 
repeatedly pointed out that the rights of Muslims were neglected, and that the Kremlin 
openly violated the principle of neutrality towards  Russia’s main religions,  Russian 
Orthodoxy and Islam,  in favor of the former. Parochial interests of the local opposition, 
as a rule, do not care much about what image it has in the eyes of the central authorities. 
On the contrary, the main goal was to mobilize as many frustrated Muslims as possible 
to advance their agenda on the regional level, criticizing the local authorities for paying 
                                                             
8 By the end of 1995 there were “Nur” party cells in 72 regions of the Russian Federation.  
9 As a result of additional elections in Dagestan only Nadirshakh Khachilaev managed to become a member of the 




little attention to the needs of the Muslims and for doing nothing to counter the 
degradation of the Islamic values. 
Contrary to the official Russian rhetoric asserting that the politicization of Islam 
in Russia is caused by the countries of the Middle East, I would rather argue that the 
above-mentioned radicalization and politicization  of Islam are proceeding against the 
background of unceasing resentment felt by the Muslims against the Russian autocratic 
regime which, while being unable to overcome Russia’s lingering economic difficulties, 
has bogged down in corruption, nepotism, embezzlement, and created unlimited rent-
seeking opportunities for its immediate bureaucratic apparatus, preventing ordinary 
citizens from taking any active social position. The amalgamation of the peculiarities of 
historical development and Islamic tradition with the present deep socio-economic crisis 
has predetermined the use of Islam by the local opposition as a tool for satisfying their 
political ambitions and promoting their agenda of transforming the region. In particular, 
the idea of an Islamic alternative to chaos and disarray that has become widespread in 
the North Caucasus is encapsulated in the three levels of the Islamic project comprising 
its own plan for the organization of society and of the political space: 1) North 
Caucasian; 2) sub-regional (Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan; 3) local, that is, suitable 
for mostly rural enclaves (Malashenko 2001).  Vigorous attempts to establish an Islamic 
state have failed in both Chechnya and Dagestan where the majority of the population 
opposed the idea of Islamization of the social and political spheres. The demands of the 
fighters for the purity of Islam - the home-grown Salafites - to renounce their multi-
century customary form of religious belief, Tarikatism (a variety of Sufism) were rather 
frightening than uniting. There was one particular reason for this failure - the 
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Dagestan’s local elites justly believed that such unification would inevitably lead to 
redistribution of power and of the material resources in favor of the Chechens. Although 
the radicalization of Islam in the turbulent 1990s revealed its limits, on the municipal 
level, however, there still are opportunities for a selected implementation of the Sharia 
law. Indeed, some politicians and experts in politics of collective identities consider it 
possible to employ the Sharia law on a limited scale in order to keep it within the 
supremacy of the secular federal laws. Thus, Leonid Syukiyainen (1997), a major 
authority on Muslim legal system in Russia, believes that the prospect of Sharia being 
included in the legal system should be regarded not as a necessary evil but as a natural 
process of the restoration of legal traditions which in the North Caucasus go back many 
centuries. In addition, the majority of Russia’s Muslims belong to the most liberal 




In the North Caucasus the local authorities have recorded manifestations of 
radical Islamic views being spread by graduates of educational institutions in Saudi 
Arabia (King Fahd University), Kuwait, Tunisia (“az-Zeituna”), Egypt (“al-Azhar”) and 
Morocco (“al-Karaviin”). The most active international Islamic organizations, which 
spread Islamic fundamentalism by popularizing among the North Caucasus Muslims 
extraneous interpretations of religious and socio-political questions, are: the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth (headquartered in Saudi Arabia), the “al-Haramein” (Saudi 
Arabia), the Ibrahim al-Ibrahim charitable foundation, the Kuwaiti organization 
                                                             
10 There are four Sunni theological schools in Islam: Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki and Hanbali that are popular in the 




“Da’ava al-igasa”, the Sudanese International Association of the Islamic Appeal. 
Beginning with the engagement of the Soviet Army to Afghanistan in 1979, the Soviet 
Union, and then Russia, was continually involved in conflicts in which it had to oppose 
Muslims both inside and outside the country. Now Islamophobia is spreading in Russian 
society aggravating  tensions not only in areas where Muslim and Slavic populations 
live in close proximity to each other – in the North Caucasus,  but also in several other 
regions where the number of migrants from the Caucasus is rapidly growing 
(Kudryavtsev 1998:170-171). There is no doubt that today, several decades later, ethnic 
Russians resent the opening of mosques, religious centers, and Muslim cemeteries. 
Rinat Mukhametov, a much-cited expert on Islam, told the Kavkazsky Uzel 
(www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 17, 2011) website that the election of the muftis in the 
North Caucasus had hardly any influence on the lives of believers in the region. 
According to Mukhametov, the estrangement of the official clergy from the believers is 
common all across Russia, but nowhere is it as evident as in the North Caucasus. 
Mukhametov said that the “modernization” of the official Islamic bodies was needed in 
order to overcome the gap between the Muslims and their clergy. Instead, Mukhametov 
pointed out that the government tried to employ controversial figures like 
Allakhshukyur Pasha-zade, the previously unknown chairman of the Caucasus 
Muslims’ administration who is from Azerbaijan, which is a Shia country, while the 
Muslims in the North Caucasus are Sunnis (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, June 21, 2011). 
Ruslan Kurbanov, another expert on Islam and the Caucasus with the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, told Kavkazsky Uzel: “Republican governments strive to press ahead with 
the most convenient candidate for them for the mufti’s position. The fact that he will not 
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have any authority with the majority of believers does not bother the government a bit.” 
Kurbanov said Kabardino-Balkaria is “shivering” because of the growing fighting 
between the militants, the police and the relatives of the victims who want to take 
revenge. In Kurbanov’s opinion, the situation in Karachay-Cherkessia was improving, 
while the infighting between very active Muslims, Russian Orthodox and followers of 
traditional religions in North Ossetia was jeopardizing the situation in that republic 
(www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, June 21, 2011).  
Dictatorial policies to impose control over the Muslim community in the North 
Caucasus seem to be not only proving ineffective, but also are contributing to further 
regional destabilization and protest. Almost all top Russian high-ranking officials, 
including the president, the head of the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor 
General’s Office and the Minister of Interior have had to acknowledge the worsening 
situation in the region. Even according to official information, the total number of 
militant actions against Russian authorities in 2010 increased by three times compared 
to 2009 (Trud. 2010). Independent sources, basing their data on open news reports, 
indicate the losses among the civilian population, including those killed by the Russian 
law enforcement forces, totaled 117 people in 2010 (Kasparov 2010). During 2010 the 
North Caucasus insurgency movement suffered several major blows among its ranks as 
more than 300 insurgents were killed in the North Caucasus in 2010, a majority of 
whom were liquidated in Dagestan during the last four months of the year (Rian News 
Agency 2010). These numbers, however, include a certain percentage of those whose 
participation in the ranks of the resistance movement has not been proved.  Thus, the 
federal security  forces liquidated in special operations such prominent figures as Said 
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Buryatsky (Alexsandr Tikhomirov, killed on March 4, 2010); the chief ideologue of the 
military resistance to Russia, Emir Seifullah (Anzor Astemirov, killed on March 24, 
2010), the leader of the Kabardino-Balkaria Jamaat who was one of the major 
ideologues of the radical wing of the militants; and Magomedali Vagabov (or Emir 
Seifullah of Gubden, killed on August 21, 2010), the leader of the Dagestani Jamaat. 
For the first time in decades of insurgency in the North Caucasus, a prominent field 
commander was apprehended alive in a special operation – Akhmed Yevloev-Taziev 
(captured on June 9, 2010), the chief of the Ingush Jamaat. In response to federal anti-
terrorist operations, a group of the most famous and capable of Chechen commanders – 
Emir Aslanbek (Vadalov), Emir Hussein (Gakaev), Emir Tarkhan (Gaziev) and Emir 
Mukhannad announced the voluntary resignation of the leader of North Caucasus 
insurgents and founder of the Caucasus Emirate, Doku Umarov, and the election of 
Emir Aslanbek Vadalov as their new leader. But at the request of the radical wing of 
militants (especially of those who live far away from Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus), Doku Umarov soon changed his mind about resigning, thus triggering a 
serious crisis in the ranks of the armed resistance. As a result, today virtually all of the 
Chechen commanders (nearly 90 % of rebels who continue to fight) remain outside of 
the control of Umarov, reporting instead to Emir Hussein (Gakaev). Umarov, on the 
other hand, enjoys the support of non-Chechen jamaats, such as those in Dagestan, 
Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, who refused to recognize Emir Hussein as their 
legitimate leader. Doka Umarov demoted and put under the Sharia court all of those 
who disobeyed him, but the harsh measures have had little impact on the schism (The 
Jamestown Foundation 2010).  
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As reported by the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, there were 529 armed 
attacks on law enforcement and military personnel in 2010: insurgents killed 218 and 
wounded 536 people (Interfax News Agency 2010). The current situation in the North 
Caucasus is more often described as a “low-intensity civil war”. The statistics given by 
the Caucasian Knot website paint a more detailed picture. In particular, the number of 
terrorist attacks increased dramatically in Kabardino-Balkaria (from 12 in 2009 to 41 in 
2010) and Dagestan (from 69 in 2009 to 112 in 2010), and decreased substantially in 
Chechnya (from 62 in 2009 to 39 in 2010). Stavropol Krai that had not been hit by 
terrorist attacks targeting civilians in 2009, did see such attacks in 2010. Strikingly, the 
numbers given by Russian law enforcement agencies are no longer trusted by President 
Medvedev himself, who has literally said that all these figures for the North Caucasus 
are nothing but “nonsense” (RIA Novosti News Agency, November 19, 2010).  
According to the Russian Interior Ministry, during the period of January-
November 2011, “300 participants in underground banditry, 366 rebel bases and 
ammunition caches were neutralized; over 1,400 small arms, 175,000 units of 
ammunition and over 500 kilograms of explosives were confiscated” 
(http://vvmvd.ru/news/news_2862.html). Another government source informs us that 
300 militants were killed by Russian Interior Ministry troops 
(www.rosbalt.ru/main/2011/12/02/919650.html). If this figure is correct, then all the 
other force agencies, such as the police, regular military, FSB (Federal Security Service) 
and GRU (the Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate) killed only several 
people during the course of the year (Vatchagaev 2011).  Vatchagaev considers that the 
statistics, concerning the situation in the North Caucasus in 2011, is not improving, as 
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the federal authorities in the Russian Federation would like to present it (2011). The 
republics in which the most insurgent activity is going on change, but the general 
amount of violence across the North Caucasus remains more or less at the same level. 
He then asserted that the security situation in the North Caucasus is profoundly 
deteriorating, given that there is a growing radicalization not only of the region’s 
Muslims, but also of its nationalists. The primary problem with Russian information 
sources is their inconsistency (Vatchagaev 2011). 
The statistics that the Russian military, police and other law-enforcement 
agencies provide invariably evoke multiple questions, since the different agencies, such 
as the military, police, FSB and prosecutors, continue to employ different methods of 
counting. For the purpose of my research, the data provided by the Kavkazsky Uzel 
(Caucasian Knot) website is the most valuable because it sheds light on the dynamics of 
the conflict in different regions of the North Caucasus. In 2010, the insurgents were the 
most active in Kabardino-Balkaria in percentage terms, not in absolute numbers. 
Dagestan was the hottest spot, whereas Chechnya occupied the second position in terms 
of casualties and damage (Vatchagaev 2011).  According to Kavkazsky Uzel, the issue 
of kidnappings and disappearances is also a growing problem: in 11 months of 2011 
there were 64 such cases, 28 of which took place in Dagestan, 20 in Chechnya, 13 in 
Ingushetia and three in Kabardino-Balkaria.  Overall, there were 1,205 victims of the 
conflict in the North Caucasus, including 683 killed and 522 injured, during the first 11 
months of 2011. In 2010, the total number of casualties in the region was 1,710 
(Vatchagaev 2011).   
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The federal authorities do not seem to be particularly optimistic about the 
situation in the North Caucasus. Thus, Deputy Prosecutor General Ivan Sydoruk stated 
that since the beginning of 2011, the number of terrorism- related and extremism-related 
crimes in the North Caucasus increased by 29 percent in comparison to the same time 
period in 2010 (www.yuga.ru/news/246467/). Dagestan is far ahead of other territories 
in terms of casualties. There were 685 casualties in the republic from January to 
November of this year, of whom 372 were killed, including 156 rebels, 93 law-
enforcement agents and 123 civilians, while 313 people were wounded. Chechnya held 
second place as of November 30, with 202 victims of the fighting between the 
republic’s rebel underground and security forces. A total of 92 people were killed in the 
republic, including 63 rebels, 21 servicemen and 10 civilians, while 110 people were 
wounded. Kabardino-Balkaria had 158 victims during the same period, of whom 116 
were killed (76 rebels, 28 servicemen and 15 civilians) and 42 were injured. Ingushetia 
suffered 103 casualties, of whom 69 were killed (40 rebels, 19 servicemen and 10 
civilians) and 34 were injured. North Ossetia had 25 casualties (including 15 rebels and 
6 servicemen killed and nine people wounded). Karachay-Cherkessia had 24 casualties, 
including six rebels and six servicemen killed and nine people w wounded). In 
Stavropol region there were eight casualties, including three people killed and five 
injured (Vatchagaev 2011). 
Aleksandr Khloponin, the special representative of the Russian president in the 
North Caucasus Federal District, was forced to admit on November 30, 2011: “There 
are still cases of young people leaving for the forest [joining the rebels]. There is certain 
tension in Karachay-Cherkessia, where there are pockets of underground banditry, so a 
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lot of work lies ahead”.11 As a result, a number of officials at different levels have 
started to talk about a deterioration of the situation in Karachay-Cherkessia. During a 
visit to this republic on November 17, Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev called 
the situation in Karachay-Cherkessia “protractedly tense” and compared it to Dagestan 
(www.xn--c1adwdmv.xn--p1ai/news/kavkaz/kar-cher/1468253.html). This stark 
statement was against the backdrop of the relocation of the Russian military base from 
Botlikh in Dagestan to Maikop in Adygea, it can be assumed that the government 
expects tensions in this part of the North Caucasus to rise prior to the Olympics in Sochi 
in 2014. However, following the destruction of the Karachay jamaat by security forces 
in 2006-2007, the armed opposition in the form of the jamaat showed few signs of 
activity (Vatchagaev 2011).  Interior Minister Nurgaliev also reported that the law 
enforcement agencies had prevented over 50 terrorist attacks this year as of September. 
He added that 313 rebels were neutralized and 399 participants in the illegal armed 
formations were arrested.
12
 Note that Nurgaliev’s figures for the number of rebels killed 
in nine months of 2011 are greater than the figures his own ministry gave for 11 months 
of the same year. In addition, it is unclear why the number of wounded people was 
lower than the number of the killed, as normally more people are wounded than killed 
(Vatchagaev 2011).     
In other words, even the head of the Russian state had to admit what had been 
obvious for so many analysts working on Russia and specifically on the North Caucasus 
- the information released by Russian officialdom should be treated with great 
                                                             
11 I am reffering here to one of Khloponin’s remarks on proliferation of radical religious ideologies in Karachay-
Cherkessia made on numerous occasions in public  on November 30, 2011 http://interfax-
russia.ru/South/main.asp?id=276976  (accessed January 11, 2012). 
12 As cited by RIA News Agency (http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20111116/490310056.html). 
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suspicion. At the beginning of the 21 century Islam’s influence on the political life in 
Russia has become an indispensable factor, widely exploited by both the seemingly 
secular political establishment in the center and the regional elites in the Muslim-
populated regions of the North Caucasus in its own interests. In my view, this process of 
a gradual radicalization of Islam is determined by the religious form of expressing 
social protest, which is natural for a part of the Muslims, and by the aggravating ethnic 
and political tensions in the Muslim-populated areas of the North Caucasus. Even 
though terrorism is broadly viewed as the key permanent threat across the North 
Caucasus, the decision-making in this e sphere still mainly relies on the analysis of 
particular information, macroeconomic indicators, and diverse criminal statistics. This 
matrix typically ignores views that terrorism, separatism, and xenophobia should be 
viewed not only from the legal but also from the social and psychological positions, and 
the corresponding phenomena have to be assessed on the basis of broader behavioral 
statistics. Indeed, it is among the Muslim population that the activity of the ideologists 
of terrorism meets with the most favorable response. The ideologists knowingly exploit 
the complexities arising in the course of the revival of Islam in post-Soviet Russia as 
well as and the numerous shortcomings of the regulation of the activity of religious 
institutions. These are the most salient reasons making it easier for the ideologists of 
terrorism to push for their coarse: (1) demography and migration; (2) socioeconomic 
depression, pervasive corruption, and marginalization of the majority of Muslims 
regardless of their ethnic affiliation; (3) the shortage of Muslim theologians trained by 
local religious institutions to address challenges posed by radical missionaries, 




3.5. The Mountain Jews: Certain Aspects of Ethnic Identification and Political 
Orientation 
Even though the ethnic factor played a significant role in Soviet and post-Soviet 
politics in the North Caucasus and contributed to the rapid transformation of the ethnic 
organizations into political movements and parties, one ethnic group, the Mountain 
Jews, stands out as an exception. Unlike other ethnic groups, no Jewish community in 
the North Caucasus has ever mobilized politically to get official acknowledgment on the 
basis of its ethic and religious identity. Why? The answer to this question lies in 
explanation of certain aspects of ethnic identification and political orientation of this 
ethnic group discussed in this section. 
The Mountain Jews represent a unique sub-ethnic group in the North Caucasus. 
They use the so-called Jewish-Tat language, based on a Middle Persian dialect that 
includes a vast body of lexical borrowings from the Aramaic and Hebrew together with 
elements of the contemporary Russian and Azeri languages (Semenov 2003:169). The 
Mountain Jews have preserved almost no written records of their arrival and settlement 
in the North Caucasus. The Jewish presence in the North Caucasus, however, is 
indicated not only by remains of abandoned cemeteries with Jewish gravestones, and, in 
many mountain villages, epigraphic inscriptions, and fragments of Jewish sacred books, 
prayer books, and other temporal evidence (Semenov 2003:170). Culturally, the 
Mountain Jews belong to the Iranian Jewry with which they had been maintaining close 
ties even before the Eastern Caucasus became part of Russia in the early 19 century. 
These ties are linguistically confirmed by their knowledge of the Zeboni imrani, the 
122 
 
language common to all Iranian Jews who spoke different dialects within their ethnic 
groups. In the 18 -19 centuries a great number of Iranian Jews, mainly from Gilyan, 
moved to the Eastern Caucasus where they joined different ethnic groups of Mountain 
Jews. Many of these Mountain Jews, who sometimes call themselves Tats, insist that 
they are descendants of Israel's Lost Tribes who began their wanderings after the 
destruction of Jerusalem's first temple in 722 B.C. From generation to generation, the 
Mountain Jews have passed on the tale of their lineage from the Israelite captives of the 
Assyrian-Babylonian conquest of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. The original 
places of their settlement are designated as Babylonia ancient Media and Iran up to the 
eastern Caucasus. Other stories say that the Mountain Jews migrated north from Persia 
around 300 years ago, at the invitation of a local khan, and were separated from their 
kin in Iran as the borders of empires shifted. However, a different theory suggests that 
the Mountain Jews are what remain of the mighty Khazar nation, an indigenous 
Caucasian people who converted en masse to Judaism in the eighth century, in a vain 
attempt to resist Orthodox Christian Russians and Islamic Arabs. “According to Kings 
II, when ancient Israel was destroyed, some citizens headed, in the eighth century 
B.C.E., to the conquering land of Assyria and beyond to Media on the Caspian's 
southern shores. A hundred or so years later, descendants of these exiles, along with 
other monotheists, were joined by Jews of the Babylonian diaspora. They lay the 
foundations for Persian Jewish society, some of whom apparently headed north to the 
Caucasus, with those in the areas that would become Azerbaijan and Dagestan 
eventually acquiring the identification of Mountain Jews." (Funke 1999) The Talmud 
also mentions the existence of a Jewish community in Derbent, and some prominent 
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Talmudic sages are known to have either come from or established Yeshivot in Derbent 
and other cities in the North Caucasus (Brook 2009). It is possible that the Mountain 
Jews are descendants of Persian-Jewish soldiers who were stationed in the Caucasus by 
the Sasanian kings in the 5 or 6 century to protect the area from the onslaughts of the 
Huns and other nomadic invaders from the east (Blady 2000). 
The available historical evidence indicates that the influx of Jews from Iran into 
the North Caucasus took place under the Achaemenid dynasty (7 century – 4 century 
B.C.) and Sasanid Persia (3 century B.C. – 6 century A.D.) (Ikhilov 1960). The 
migration of the Jewish tribes into the highlands of the North Caucasus increased 
dramatically during Arab and Turkish conquests of the Caucasus and the spread of 
Islam. In the North Caucasus, where religious tolerance and cultural diversity co-existed 
for centuries, the Mountain Jews found propitious conditions for their new homeland. 
As Blady points out, a literate, monotheistic people, well versed in trade  and finances, 
who existed as a distinct community and actively supported the mountain peoples and 
the Khazars in their wars with the Persian (and later Arab) conquerors, the Mountain 
Jews became  active in the economic and cultural development of the region (2000). In 
Blady’s view, Judaism evidently became the state religion in the 8 century, the 
formative period of feudalism in the North Caucasus. Indeed, the acceptance of Judaism 
as the official religion in pagan Khazaria can be explained by the presence of such an 
active Jewish population and by the desire of the Khazar aristocracy to show, by their 
acceptance of Judaism, their independence from both the Muslim Arab caliphate and of 
Christian Byzantium (Saffron 1997). However, after the destruction of the Khazar 
Khanate to the Arabs and the Russians by the end of the 10 century, some Khazars 
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migrated to the Volga and the Crimea, and many Khazar Jews flee to the intractable 
areas of mountainous Dagestan.  When the Arab caliphate fell to new conquerors such 
as the Persian shahs and Turkish sultans, the Mountain Jews found themselves under the 
control of local rulers with the legal status of dependent peasants. In 1813, after the 
inclusion of Azerbaijan and Dagestan into the Russian Empire, the Mountain Jews 
accepted Russian citizenship. The development of capitalism in Russia and the drawing 
of the North Caucasus into the mainstream of trade and financial relations contributed to 
the intensive socio-economic stratification of Mountain Jewish society (Blady 2000).  
The restrictive religious policies of the Russian Empire coupled with traditional 
anti-Semitic attitudes of the Russian paramilitary units known as Cossaks, further 
alienated the Mountain Jews, and they found themselves particularly impoverished 
during the years of the civil war (Ikhilov 1996). Among other millions of Jews who had 
been settled down within the borders of the Russian Empire, the Mountain Jews 
remained within the limits of Soviet Russia and their status was to a large extent defined 
by the nationalities policies of the Soviet regime. Under the influence of assimilated 
Jews, who carried significant weight in the structures of the socialist leadership of 
Europe, the Soviet authorities regarded integration and assimilation as the only solution 
of the lingering Jewish problem. This solution was already sharpened during the bitter 
discussion at the early 1900s between the Bolsheviks (headed by Lenin) and the Bund 
(led by Kremer).
13
 Invoking K. Marx, K. Kautsky, and O. Bauer, Lenin stated that there 
was no basis for a separate Jewish nation and national Jewish culture—the slogan of the 
                                                             
13 The General Union of Jewish Workers in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia, known simply as the Bund, was founded 
in Vilna in October 1897 by a small group of Jews who were profoundly influenced by Marxism. Led by A.  Kremer 




rabbis and the bourgeoisie—this was the slogan of our enemies. (Lenin 1903) After 
Lenin’s death, Stalin further solidified official position on the Jewish question in his 
work “Marxism and the National Question” (1913). Stalin argued unambiguously that a 
nation was a stable community of men, which came into being by historic process and 
has developed on a basis of common language, territory, and economic life. Since the 
Jews lack this common basis they are only a “nation on paper,” and the evolution of 
human society must necessarily lead toward their assimilation within the surrounding 
nations (Stalin 1913).  After the October Revolution and in accordance with Leninist-
Stalinist nationalities policy, especially regarding the nationalities of the Caucasus, a 
number of policies were undertaken to rekindle Mountain Jewish culture and economic 
activities. To this end, a special set of measures for economic and cultural 
transformation was implemented (Ikhilov 1996).
14
 Within this context, subgroups were 
designated as working class, collective farmers, and intelligentsia (Ikhilov 1996).  
Khanin (2002) points out that “according to various estimates, between 600 000 
and 1.3 million Jews lived in the former Soviet Union in the early 2000s” (see also Tolts 
1996, Gidwitz 1999).  However, the overall population of Mountain Jews numbered 
only around 60 000 people (Chlenov 1984). By the end of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s more than half of Mountain Jews left for Israel, the United States, Canada, and 
Germany (Khanin 2003). They were driven away mainly by instability and lack of 
security in the North Caucasus. In general, despite waves of mass migration of Jews  
after the break-up of the Soviet Union, as well as negative demographic trends, the post-
                                                             
14 A writing system, a literature, a newspaper, theater, and schools were created in the Jewish Tat language. This Tat-
language literacy of the Mountain Jews replaced the Old Hebrew literacy of the past, which had existed until the shift 
to a Latin alphabet, and then to the Cyrillic alphabet in 1938. 
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Soviet political space still contains the second largest concentration of Russian-speaking 
Jewry (after Israel) in the world. At present, Mountain Jews are mainly concentrated in 
the so-called Caucasian Mineral Waters zone (Piatigorsk, Essentuki, Mineralnye Vody, 
and Kislovodsk). There are still around two thousand Mountain Jews living in Dagestan 
(Semenov 2003). 
Traditional Ethnic Identification 
Igor Semenov suggests that the Mountain Jews can be treated as a homogeneous 
sub-ethnic group the identification of which is based on the following elements: a 
common ethnic name—juhur (plural: juhuru)15; a common language—Juhuri; a 
common religion—Judaism, as well as many common features in religious rites and 
religious ideas (2003). As Semenov puts it, these identification criteria (the elements of 
the edah of Mountain Jews) helped the Jews scattered across the Caucasus from Shirvan 
to Kabarda to recognize their kinship in the 19th and 20th centuries. Despite certain 
cultural distinctions, Jewish ethnic groups were always prepared to recognize their 
kinship; even marriages with members of other Jewish sub-ethnic groups (Georgian, 
and Central Asian Jews) were rare. The greater part of mixed marriages was with 
Ashkenazim. In general, the Mountain Jews displayed obvious endogamy (Semenov 
2003:170). Semenov points out that it was the Russian military administration that 
coined the term “Mountain Jews” in the 19th century to distinguish between the East 
Caucasian and European Jews, while the Russian administrators applied the term 
“mountaineer” to all Caucasian peoples without discrimination and irrespective of the 
areas of their traditional settlement (2003:171).   
                                                             




The Mountain Jews, while connecting themselves to the world of Caucasian 
culture, are still aware of their Jewish roots. This strong connectedness to the Caucasus 
culture unites them with other Caucasian ethnic groups in front of non-Caucasian 
cultures. In Semenov’s view, when comparing the Caucasian and Russian cultural 
traditions, the Mountain Jews invariably prefer the former, referring themselves to the 
Caucasian world, and the Caucasian peoples among whom they live do the same 
(2003:171). The Caucasian peoples place them apart from the Ashkenazim and in all 
cases prefer Mountain Jews whose mentality is closer to their own and who respect their 
traditions. They share many customs and, though the Mountain Jews belong to a 
different confession, the indigenous ethnic groups look at them as one of the Caucasian 
peoples, speaking about the Ashkenazim as Russian Jews and about the Mountain Jews 
as “ours” thus emphasizing that they belong to the Caucasus (Semenov 2003:171).  
In the last decades of the 20th century Mountain Jews were moving out of the 
Caucasus in great numbers, yet they did not abandon certain traditions and preserved 
many traits of Caucasian mentality. This happens not only because they have preserved 
their ethnic self-awareness but also because everywhere everybody, Ashkenazim 
included, look at them as people from the Caucasus (Semenov 2003:172). Historically, 
close contacts between Mountain Jews and Ashkenazim were established soon after the 
Caucasian War. In the 1870s there was a great number of Ashkenazim living in 
Daghestan: in Temir-Khan-Shura (Buinaksk), Derbent, and later in Petrovsk 
(Makhachkala), as well as in Vladikavkaz, Grozny, Nalchik, and Baku (Semenov 
2003:172). From the outset, the two sub-ethnic groups had been treating one another 
with dislike of which philologist I. Anisimov wrote in his time (1888, 1932). In Baku, 
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Derbent, and Vladikavkaz the Ashkenazim deemed it necessary to build their own 
synagogues, though there were synagogues used by the Mountain Jews (Anisimov 
1932). Semenov believes that, apart from purely religious differences, the mutual desire 
to live separately was prompted by the difference in their mentalities and their ideas of 
what it meant to be a Jew (2003:172). Under the Soviet rule this division continued to 
grow as all Soviet Jews suffered implicit administrative, political, and societal anti-
Semitism for decades and the rich political tradition of the Ashkenazim Jewry had been 
almost lost. In the post-Soviet period, a Jewish institutional infrastructure began to 
develop, leading to the political advancement of Jewish communal elite (Ryvkina 1996, 
Chervyakov, Gitelman and Shapiro 1997, 2000). However, the political 
institutionalization of the Jewish movement has become somewhat controversial and 
there is still some unfinished business as to its ultimate character (Khanin 2002). 
Tatization of Mountain Jews in the Soviet Union 
Igor Semenov points out that since 1930s the Soviet authorities were imposing 
the “Tat” ethnonym on the Mountain Jews of the North Caucasus. However, it was not 
until the late 1970s when Mountain Jews began to describe themselves as Tats, not as a 
Mountain Jew or simply a Jew (2003). The word “Tat” is a blanket Turkic term applied 
to subjugated settled peoples, mainly Iranians, and carries not so much an ethnic as a 
social meaning (Miller V. 1963:196).  In particular, this word was applied the Iranians 
of the Eastern Caucasus whose ancestors had been moved away from Iran in the 6th 
century and later. They used to live in compact groups between the Apsheron peninsular 
in the south and Derbent in the north. Early in the 20th century there were several 
hundreds of thousands of them (Miller B. 1927:7). However, these ethnic groups based 
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their self-identity mainly on their religious confessions—either Muslim or Christian, 
and never called themselves Tats because the term sounded derogative to them and 
described their language as Parsi, Porsi or Forsi (Miller B. 1927:12-13). The term “the 
Tat language” was first used in the 19th century by scholars Boris Dorn, Nikolai 
Berezin, and Vsevolod Miller (Semenov 2003:172).  
In the early 20th century, those who lived in Tat villages were Christians and 
called themselves “Ermenis” (Armenians). It was late in the 19th century that the 
Turkization of the Tats started (Khanykov 1977). In the 1920s, B. Miller formulated an 
idea of a single Tat ethnos divided by three religions: Islam, Judaism and Christianity 
(Miller B. 1927:13). In Semenov’s view, this theory was absolutely unfounded and was 
very much in line with the atheism of the Soviet authorities; the fact that neither the 
Mountain Jews, nor the Muslim Tats, nor the Christian Tats ever called themselves Tats 
was ignored by the scholars of the time (2003). Even though B. Miller was aware of the 
physical and anthropological features that contradicted his theory about the ethnic 
kinship of the Mountain Jews and the Tats of the Caucasus, he continued to insist on its 
validity. Admittedly, under political pressure, philologist N. Anisimov also accepted the 
Miller’s view on the single religiously divided Tat ethnos, because this much 
questionable theory was rapidly adopted by Soviet activists and Communists party 
functionaries from among the Mountain Jews. On their initiative a congress of 
Mountain Jews held in Moscow in 1927 adopted a declaration that registered the term 
“Tat” as one of their self-names (Anisimov 1932). With the beginning of Jewish 
emigration from the Soviet Union and with an active anti-Israeli campaign in the Soviet 
press in the early 1970s, the Tat nationality was actively imposed on the Mountain Jews 
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of the North Caucasus (Semenov 2003:174). In the context even a formal acceptance or 
rejection of the myth was a sort of a loyalty test (Chlenov 2000:183-184). Semenov 
believes that four factors coincided negatively to further dilute the identity of the 
Mountain Jews.in time: a possibility (mainly theoretical) of emigration; Israel’s 
victories in the wars of 1967 and 1973 and the anti-Israeli campaign in the Soviet press 
that went together with them; stepped up campaign to impose the Tat ethnonym on the 
Mountain Jews; changing Soviet passports in the late 1970s (2003:174-176).  
Drawing on historical evidence, however, Mikhail Chlenov indicates that the 
fairly successful process of Tatization of the Mountain Jews was rooted in the sad 
experience of the World War II, when Nazis exterminated nearly all Mountain Jews in 
the Northern Caucasus (the villages of Bogdanovka and Menzhinsk); only those who 
lived in Nalchik avoided death because the local people presented them as Tats 
(Chlenov 2000:185-189). As Semenov argues, “the process of Tatization was rooted in 
the abandonment of religion that corroded the Mountain Jews’ traditional identity, and 
psychological discomfort caused by their association with Ashkenazim “ (2003:177).16 
Ibragimov believes that the process of Tatization caused “ethnic re-orientation” or 
“change of identity.” (Ibragimov 2000:9) This is not completely correct: the larger part 
of Mountain Jews is now living in Israel where the results of Tatization are not 
obvious.
17
 “There is a fairly large group of Mountain Jews from Azerbaijan who has 
settled in Moscow—they, too, remained unaffected by Tatization. There is another 
larger community (from 10 to 20 thousand) who stayed behind in Azerbaijan” 
                                                             
16 Since in the Russian language the term “Jew” is mainly associated with the Ashkenazim, many Mountain Jews 
tried to drop their ethnic name even though it was somewhat diluted with the term “mountaineer.”  
17 In Israel Mountain Jews are called “Caucasian Jews” while the Georgian Jews are called Georgians according to 
the country they came from.  
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(Semenov 2003:177). In March 2001 Moscow hosted an International Symposium 
“Mountain Jews: Past and Present” attended by academics and members of the largest 
communities. The latter rejected the term “Tat” as applied to their people while the 
former refused even to discuss the term as false and unsubstantiated. The same 
happened at other forums on the history and culture of the Mountain Jews.
18
 
Political Orientation in the post-Soviet Caucasus 
Ethnic identity that played an important if not a dominant role in post-Soviet 
politics, promoted the quick transformation of ethnic cultural organizations into political 
movements and parties (Khanin 2002). However, the Jewish community is an exception 
- no Jewish community of the former Soviet Union ever formed a “sectarian” political 
structure in order to get official recognition in government (Khanin 2002). In Khanin’s 
view, the realization of ideological, cultural, and social aspirations in the Jewish public 
square has had a predominantly elitist character (2002). Khanin argues that, in political 
life, Jewish leaders and activists are guided by a sophisticated combination of pragmatic 
and idealistic motivations for their activities, and the division of these interests became 
the basis for ideological, cultural, social, and other cleavages in the community of the 
Mountain Jews (2002). These cleavages naturally have a predominantly elitist character, 
and are seen through the confrontation of different political orientations, connected to 
the above mentioned ruling groups of the Mountain Jewish community, religious 
leadership, and business elite (Khanin 2002). In particular, Rabbis and Jewish 
businessmen provided a place and funds for advancement of the semi-formal power 
                                                             
18 International scientific and practical conference “Mountain Jews of the Caucasus,” Baku, April 2001; Scientific 
session dedicated to the 140th birth anniversary of ethnographer I.Sh. Anisimov, Moscow, Presidium of the Russian 




structures to leverage communal interests. For instance, Zaur Gilalov had emerged in 
recent years as one of the most active donors in the Mountain Jewish community both in 
Russia and Azerbaijan. Gilalov, who until his assassination on March 5, 2004,  was 
responsible for the construction of two synagogues serving Caucasus Jews, one in 
Moscow and one in the Israeli town of Tirat Carmel, near Haifa. In 2003, he helped to 
set up the World Congress of Mountain Jews, an umbrella organization representing an 
estimated 250,000 Jews living in Russia, Azerbaijan, Israel and North America 
(Krichevsky 2007). These power structures, to some extent, became channels for mutual 
adaptation and competitive cooperation of various post-Soviet Jewish elites in the North 
Caucasus.  
Khanin believes that many Jewish public figures see national and Jewish politics 
as mutually exclusive (2002). As a result, leaders of Jewish organizations carefully 
acknowledge the political neutrality of their institutions. In turn, public figures of 
Jewish origin, widely represented among city mayors, ministers, legislative deputies at 
all levels, those in the governing organs of the different parties, as well as among the 
bureaucratic and business elite, often distance themselves from the organized Jewish 
movement, and are not particularly interested in Jewish ethnic issues (Khanin 2002). An 
opinion poll conducted in Russia at the end of 1997 showed considerable opposition by 
the local non-Jewish population to an increase of Jewish participation in government 
(Krichevsky 1999). As a result, the use of personal connections by Jewish communal 
leaders became the basis of their political influence in the North Caucasus and far 
beyond. However, the political institutionalization of the Mountain Jews in the North 
Caucasus has never taken any organizational form because, as Khanin points out, the 
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political culture and historical experience of Soviet Jewry delegitimizes the very idea of 
ethnic mobilization in politics largely because of a traditional emigrationist orientation 
among Jews (2002).  
Conclusion 
The chapter examined ethnic groups in terms of historical perspective and 
highlighted the role of these groups in the process of the revival of national identities 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It particularly dealt with the geopolitical factors 
and cross-national linkages in regional and multinational interests in the formation of 
the ethnic identities and nationalistic elites in post-Soviet space. The findings support 
my argument that (1) ethno-nationalism is the outcome of this peculiar ethno-federalist 
administrative structure and bureaucratic hierarchy, where ethnic minorities struggle to 
consolidate their presence, and (2) decades of the Soviet monopoly on national 
questions caused pervasive alienation of ethnic groups from Soviet and later Russian 
ethno-cultural environment. As my analysis demonstrated how the large ethnic 
minorities were recognized and granted a de facto privileged status, while smaller ethnic 
minorities and those without formal recognition deprived of the same rights. However, 
my analysis shows that one ethnic group, the Mountain Jews, has never taken any 
organizational form because the political culture and historical experience of this group 
delegitimizes the very idea of ethnic mobilization in politics regardless of their official 
status within political regime due to the fact that Mountain Jews had never relinquished 




Chapter 4 - Chechnya 
“We are fighting very cruel people – beasts in the guise of human beings who do not and do not 
want to understand in what time and world they live. Our response must be equal to the threat they 
present to modern civilization.” 
Russian Federation President V. Putin at a news conference in Amsterdam, 2 November 200519 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 examines political and social transformation in post-war Chechnya, 
traditionally structured on polycentric elites, the nature of the nation-building policies 
and evaluates the main expalnations for the rise of the authoritarian regime of Ramzan 
Kadyrov (2003-present) that is often referred to as clan based and fully dependent on 
the federal center, which provides him with financial, administrative and military 
resources. In this chapter, I seek to explain why Kadyrov’s regime produced highly 
personalistic elites based on strong ties of kinship, personal loyalty, Islamic tariqa and 
identify the most significant stages in the dynamics of the political mobilization in 
Chechnya and offer an account of the key factors that were present in each stage. 
Section  Record of Violence and Ethnic Mobilization introduces relevant scholarship 
exploring the implications of the Russo-Chechen conflict in terms of Caucasian 
geopolitics, Islamic fundamentalism, and international terrorism, referring to the present 
conflict as the result of a centuries-old ethnic struggle between the Russian and Chechen 
peoples in a broad historical context. Section Religious Mobilization versus Cultural 
Norms and Traditions looks into the intricate interrelationship between Islam and 
traditional values of Chechen society, the existence of archaic social and religious 
institutions which have always mobilized and rallied together whenever some external 
                                                             
19 Hanuska, Karl. "Putin, Dutch PM Spar over War in Chechnya." The Moscow Times, 3 November 2005. 
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force posed a threat to this ethnic group, and the Chechen self-consciousness which is 
largely ignored by the international religious conservatives who continue to impose 
values formed outside the ethno-cultural space of the Caucasus on Chechen society. 
Section Russo-Chechen Wars: major causes and driving forces accounts for the most 
common propositions regarding causes and driving forces of the Russian – Chechen 
violence in the 1990s. The main argument here is that it was triggered not only by long-
held ethnic aspirations coupled with religious beliefs but the complete state failure that 
devolved into a crime-ridden and crime-exporting quasi-state plagued by permanent 
internal power struggles. 
Hstorical background 
The territory of the Chechen Republic is 15,677 square kilometers. 
Approximately, one-third of the territory is in the plains north of the Terek River that 
crosses Chechnya from west to east. Another third in the southern part is covered by 
intractable mountains. All major settlements (Argun, Gudermes, Urus-Martan, and 
Grozny) are in the middle part of Chechnya, between the mountains and northern 
lowlands. The total population of Chechnya in 1989 was close to 836,000 (73% or 
629,000 Chechens, 26% or 224,000 Russians). Chechnya along with neighboring 
Dagestan was always among the poorest regions of the Soviet Union and has been 
always subsidized by both Soviet and post-Soviet central authorities. Starting from the 
early 1980s, Chechnya had high unemployment, and in 1991, it was as high as 30% of 
the workforce (Vasileva 1994: 58). During the last months of the Soviet regime, the 
Congress of the Chechen people was founded under the leadership of its chairman, 
General Dzokhar Dudaev, the movement quickly evolved into a political organization 
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which started to demand reforms from the local Supreme Soviet and to advocate a more 
nationalist course. Already in June 1991, events developed into what was soon dubbed 
the “Chechen revolution.” The Congress renamed itself the National Congress of the 
Chechen People, declared Chechnya an independent state outside the Soviet Union and 
the Russian Federation, and announced that all power in Chechnya was temporarily 
taken over by its executive committee.  
As the revolutionary energy in Chechnya was further fuelled by crumbling 
central authority in August of 1991, Dudaev was quick to organize huge rallies in 
favour of Chechen independence. In a matter of a few days, the Soviet system was 
completely dismantled and in early September, Dudaev forced the Chechen-Ingush 
Supreme Soviet, the main bulwark of the Soviet political system, into self-dissolution. 
Dudaev and his followers took complete control of the local law-enforcement apparatus 
and the partial control of the military units stationed in Chechnya seizing a huge amount 
of the weapons and ammunition.  On October 27, Dudaev won presidential elections 
with 90% of the vote; his first presidential decree was to declare Chechnya a sovereign 
presidential republic. Due to the fact that Chechnya’s nationalist elites were not able to 
consolidate their regime and engage in the process of state-building, that period between 
Chechnya’s declaration of independence and the first Russian invasion in 1994 is still 
considered a time of lost opportunities. Within one year, Chechnya became chaotic and 
endemic elites’ power struggle became omnipresent. President Dudaev, far from 
succeeding in establishing statehood in Chechnya, engaged in a protracted power 
struggle with political rivals and the parliament, and became more and more dependent 
on his paramilitary groups. Chechnya had not only become a sort of safe haven for 
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criminal operations mainly targeting the oil sector, but also a crime exporter. In the 
summer of 1994, the North Caucasus saw a series of public transport hijackings by 
Chechens, overtly provoking the Russian authorities.  
Record of Violence and Ethnic Mobilization  
Almost two decades of violence in Chechnya gave rise to an extensive body of 
literature on the subject. Up until 2006, much of this material focused on the Russian 
actions against the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria with almost daily 
clashes with Chechen rebels (insurgents or terrorists), their international allies, and 
endless reports of international non-governmental organizations (Chesnov 1996, Gall 
and de Waal 1998, Smith 1998, Anand 2000, Tishkov 2004). Starting from 2006, there 
has been a qualitative shift in relevant scholarship exploring the implications of the 
conflict in terms of Caucasian geopolitics, Islamic fundamentalism, international 
terrorism, regional emulation and the repeated violation of basic human rights and 
freedoms (Russell 2007, Gannushkina 2007, Schaefer 2010, Furman 2011). Although 
this scholarship is primarily concerned with contemporary issues, much of it refers to 
the present conflict as the result of a centuries-old ethnic struggle between the Russian 
and Chechen peoples.  The most recent body of literature on the North Caucasus 
situates the protracted Russian Chechen stand-off within a broad historical narrative. 
Starting with the revolts under Sheikh Mansur (1785–1791) and the Imam Shamil 
(1834–1859), this literature argues that this struggle for national liberation links 18th- 
and 19th-century Chechen aspirations with upheaval in the 20th century with the 
wholesale deportation of the Chechen people to Central Asia in 1944 under pretext of 
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collaboration with the Nazi invaders.
20
 As Hitler’s armies neared the breakaway region, 
the Chechens revolted, seeking to break free from the Soviet Union. Stalin responded by 
deporting all the territory’s inhabitants to Central Asia; this included almost the entire 
Chechen nation. They began to return to Chechnya in 1956-1957, only after Khrushchev 
declared a general amnesty following Stalin’s death (Knezys and Sedlickas 1999). 
Historically, Chechnya’s goal was not to secede from Russia, but to be 
considered a federal republic by Moscow, a prestigious upgrade from that of 
“autonomous region.” “Moscow’s lack of response to [then-Chechen President] 
Dudaev’s demands had a radicalizing impact on the Chechen nationalist agenda” 
(Yemelianova 2002:177). Most importantly, this impact includes the shift of political 
agenda from ethnicity/nationalist based to religious-based. 
“Where any religion prevails over the secular constitutional organization of the state,  
either the Spanish Inquisition or Islamic fundamentalism will emerge.” 
Former Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev in an interview with Literaturnaya Gazeta, 12 August 
199321 
Henze argues that “though some journalists and political figures in Moscow 
raised the specter of an Islamic fundamentalist uprising in Chechnya and accused 
Dudaev and his supporters of planning creating of an Iranian-style Islamic Republic, 
there is little evidence of radical Islamic motivation or extremist Islamic content in the 
events of 1991 or their aftermath” (1995:31)  Dudaev himself initially showed no 
inclination toward Islamic militancy, and for the first two years after he came to power, 
he explicitly ruled out the creation of an “Islamic republic”(Lieven 1998: 363) Pre-
                                                             
20 Chechnya declared its sovereignty in 1918, shortly after the Russian Revolution, but this was short-lived, and by 
1920, Russia had forcibly occupied the territory. 




existing socio-economic conditions may in part explain how the Chechen aspirations for 
self-determination evolved into militant pro-Islamic society. For instance, just after the 
fall of the USSR, approximately 30 % of Chechnya’s population was unemployed and 
income for collective or state farm workers averaged only 74.8 % of the Russian 
Federation wage. Other factors contributing to discontent included poor health services, 
heavy environmental pollution, forced economic migration, and the fact that Russians 
dominated the lucrative oil industry (Lyon 2002:119). As I have already pointed out, 
Dudaev had come into power expecting to promote a secular republic, independent of 
Russia, which would respect Chechen traditions that had been subdued by the Soviet 
regime. His model was the independence movement of Estonia, where he had been 
stationed as a Soviet air force general before being drawn into Chechen politics. Yet the 
more Moscow resisted making concessions to Chechnya’s claims of sovereignty the 
more Dudaev fell back on Islamic forces –including some outside the country – for 
support.” (Evangelista 2002:72)  Moreover, the Chechen people are particularly 
resilient, having for centuries rejected the psychology of submission to the Russians. As 
Yemelianova points out, the intertwining of the Chechens’ struggle for freedom with 
their Islamicization loomed larger and more influential the longer Moscow ignored 
Chechnya’s assertions (2002:177).  Dudaev increasingly incorporated Islam into his 
politics, whereas previously he had stressed the national character of the Chechen 
movement for independence. “Dudaev’s appeal to Islam had an important propaganda 
function: it sought to attract international Islamic support for the Chechen cause.” 
(Yemelianova 2002:181). Thus, as Islam was co-opted for political gains, it is important 
to note that “Islamic radicalism in the Northern Caucasus is of a pseudo- religious 
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character and is…a manifestation of nationalist and strategic aspirations by specific 
political groups – as a rule, remote from Islam.” (Dobaev 2000:84) Few Chechen 
leaders “turned to Wahhabism in the mid-1990s when they realized that support for 
their secessionist goals was not forthcoming from western states and international 
institutions such as the U.N.”(Giuliani 2005:211)  Although effectively bringing much-
needed finances to Chechnya to conduct the conflict, Wahhabism did not prove to be 
the decisive factor the Chechens had hoped. The turn to Wahhabism gave an 
opportunity for extremist Islamic leaders with ties to groups in Yemen, Afghanistan and 
other centers of radical Islam to hijack the Chechen conflict (Fredholm 2000:315). 
“Wahhabism primarily has attracted nonreligious young men, many of whom were 
unemployed after the end of the first war. They embraced its ideology of armed jihad 
rather than its Islamic doctrines.” (Giuliano 2005:210) “Youth centers were established 
in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, packed with state-of-the-art printing and 
computer equipment which provided spiritual education, computer training; they also 
published literature.” (Akaev 2000:139) The strict monotheism of this doctrine objects 
to the more mystical aspects of Sufism that include rituals, veneration of saints and 
claims to hidden knowledge. The Wahhabis’ vision of a fundamentalist Islamic society 
was quite extraneous to most Chechens, who tend to be quite secular and typically 
follow no more than a few basic religious norms. Although Islam is a vital block of 
Chechen identity, “the eruption of armed Wahhabi gangs attempting to force women to 
wear the veil or erecting roadblocks to search for alcohol in cars provided a serious 
shock.” (Smith 1998:xxxiii, xxxiv) As Miller put it, “although Wahhabi intervention 
became a principal reason why the Chechens garnered support from neighbouring 
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regions and countries, their infiltration into Chechnya led to considerable internal chaos 
and confusion…Toward the conclusion of the first war in Chechnya, however, relations 
between the Wahhabis and Chechen Sufis abruptly deteriorated, as the Arab mujahideen 
continued their jihad against Russia and nonbelievers.” (2002:149) 
Most scholarship on the subject carries on to the “perestroika” years, when 
regional tensions again flared in response to the disintegration of Soviet regime and the 
subsequent resurrection of Chechen aspirations for self-determination., linking the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’s declaration of independence under Dudaev in 1991 to 
what is colloquially referred to as a 200-year war. The quite narrow take on the 
contemporary ethno-religious aspects has tended to offer only a cursory reference to the 
history of the region at a time when unrest and the inaccessibility of local archives have 
hampered more thorough historical investigations. Even the most scrupulous scholars 
have been led to found their work on surprisingly perfunctory and problematic sources. 
Thus, much of the developing English-language material on the historical background to 
the contemporary Russo-Chechen relations can be attributed to Abdurakhman 
Avtorkhanov, a Chechen immigrant whose almost unquestioned authority stems from 
the fact that he was present in Chechnya in the late 1930s. From the late 1940s until his 
death in 1997, Avtorkhanov wrote extensively about his people, whom he routinely 
conflated with the neighboring Ingush in view of these ethnicities’ common 
administrative borders and similar historical experience. His seminal Genocide in the 
USSR, a long manuscript originally drafted in 1948 for the United Nations and 
published repeatedly in different languages, opens with a brief excursus on the pre-
revolutionary history of the North Caucasus before focusing on the period following 
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1917. According to Avtorkhanov, Soviet rule was established in this restive region 
during the Civil War through guarantees of local autonomy—agreements that were 
subsequently abrogated as Soviet authorities consolidated power during the early 1920s. 
Forced collectivization in Chechen territory sparked widespread rebellions that raged 
for over a decade before finally being quelled in 1944, when Stalin ordered the 
deportation of every Chechen to the barren steppe of Central Asia. According to 
Avtorkhanov, Chechen resistance from the 19th century onward should be seen within 
the context of a broader “national liberation movement.” Although the early 1920s were 
marked by a major rebellion led by Said Bek, a descendant of the Imam Shamil, it was 
violent collectivization and that caused the region to revolt. Such circumstances make it 
critical to approach the literature on this troubled region with considerable caution, 
differentiating between coverage of the contemporary crisis and the historical 
framework within which it is frequently situated. Many of the most problematic 
accounts require little refutation, as in the case of allegations of two centuries of 
uninterrupted ethnic strife or facile comparisons of the present power balance with 
Russian colonial rule. Subsequently, many scholars rely on accounts of Chechen 
nationalism during the 1920s and the 1930s to link the current conflict to the Caucasian 
wars of the 19th century, basing their analysis on either Soviet-era archival 
documentation or memoirs by dissidents such as Avtorkhanov. 
From a Western perspective, Chechnya—whether as an autonomous federal unit, 
a potentially sovereign state, or a conflict zone—has never drawn much attention on its 
own. It has always been no more than just another case within Russia to strife for self-
rule and self-determination.  However, after the dramatic events of September 11, 2001 
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and given the role of Chechen separatist groups in a number of brutal attacks on 
civilians (bombings of Russian multi-story buildings in 1999 that killed more than 300) 
and the hostage-taking of a Russian theater in 2002 that resulted in the deaths of 130 
Russians and 30 rebels), the belligerent rhetoric of Islamic fundamentalism and the 
terminology of international terrorism has brought the Chechen question to the forefront 
of international concern (Trenin and Malashenko 2004:45).  I argue that roots of the 
conflict in Chechnya, which have produced two bloody wars with the Russian 
Federation over the past two decades, are defined neither by terrorist activities or the 
Islamists who have recently come to typify the most virulent of the separatist rebels; 
rather, the origin is in the centuries long forging of a group identity that has suffered 
continual persecution from the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian 
Federation.  Ethnicity coupled with a fundamentalist religious ideology has greatly 
complicated a struggle that has benefited the economic and political interests of groups 
as disparate as elected officials, crime bosses, business leaders, and international 
governments (Politkovskaya 2003).  In fact, devastating war has not only  resulted in the  
economic and social collapse of Chechnya but energized radicals rebels, mobilized 
moderates to further distance themselves from the pro-Russian regime, and is 
increasingly brought to the realization that Chechen Russia cannot exist in this modern 
Russia (Tishkov 2004, Oliker 2001).  Even though any solutions to end this conflict and 
determine the final status of Chechnya was avoided by both sides up until 2007 (Trenin 




 in Chechnya 
                                                             
22 Sufi Islam in the Northeast Caucasus functions through the Naqshbandiya, Qadiriya, and Shazaliya Tariqahs, 
which are broken down into smaller religious fraternities—wirds. The principle of religious-political organization of 
the wird fraternities is not based on affiliation with only one teyp.  
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was being analyzed more astutely by scholars in Rostov-on-Don, Moscow, and St. 
Petersburg to understand the social structure and religious situation in Chechen society. 
However, these vigorous efforts reduced the subject to horizontal teyp relations, 
ignoring the fact that the Chechens, as many other nations of the former Soviet Union, 
went through different stages of Soviet transformation, and elements of democratic and 
civil origin are traditionally strongly developed in their society. Despite the centuries-
long fragmentation among wirds, Islam in Chechnya is nevertheless united.  
Religious Mobilization versus Cultural Norms and Traditions  
The Chechen Muslims are Sunnis, who adhere to the theological-legal school 
founded by Muhammad ash-Shafi‘i, which rejects the Sufi traditions recognized by 
most of Chechnya’s Muslims. Obviously, for many Chechens, the spiritual-cultural 
traditions remain primarily homogeneous, although the diversity of the teyps and wirds 
often gives rise to contradictory situations in which inter-religious unity is temporarily 
violated. However, despite the existence of archaic social and religious institutions 
Chechen society has always mobilized and rallied together whenever some outside 
influence posed a threat to the ethnos. As indicated by A. Salamov (1964), S. Umarov 
(1985), and V. Gadaev (1987), the common principle of religious-political organization 
of the wird fraternities is not based on affiliation with only one teyp.  These scholars 
identified the total number of wird fraternities (or murid communities), revealed the 
forms of their activity, described the holy places (ziarats) in Checheno-Ingushetia, and 
showed their political and spiritual role in the life of believers. Despite their inevitable 
                                                                                                                                                                                  





ideological bias, these studies contain valuable information and still retain their 
empirical significance today. According to M. Mamakaev (1973), Chechen society 
comprises 135 teyps, and the number of wirds amounts to 30. According to some expert 
evaluations, wirds encompass approximately 80% of the believers, 60% of which 
belong to the Qadiriya wirds, among which followers of Kunta-Haji’s wird are the most 
numerous, and 20% are followers of the wirds of Naqshbandiya. However, 15% of all 
believers do not belong to wird fraternities, and 5% are indifferent in the religious 
attitude. The procedure for establishing interaction between the teyps and wirds, 
particularly recognizing their coincidence, is in our view a largely artificial and 
incorrectly treated problem. Most researchers think that the Chechen kin and teyp are 
identical concepts. In fact, a teyp is not a kinship and not a tribal structure, it is a union 
consisting of different families living on the same territory and entering into certain 
sociocultural relations. Wirds play a very perceptible role in the social and political 
mobilization of the Chechens. As I noted above, certain political figures during political 
campaigns, including elections at different levels, were at times compelled to turn to 
authoritative wird leaders in search of support, who often mobilized their flock to 
achieve these goals. In addition, wird authorities play a key role in reconciling hostile 
sides, particularly those involved in blood feuds. The descendants of the sheikhs or wird 
authorities often wield greater weight in Chechen society than teyp authorities. 
Sociocultural traditions imbibe valuable universal features, but neither are they deprived 
of conservative aspects. Religious traditions have played a significant role in 
contemporary Chechen society, which was accompanied by opposition to extremist 
manifestations. With the passage of time, the ethnic component has become more firmly 
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embedded than the religious. The believer often faces an identity dilemma: is he a 
Muslim or a representative of the ethnos?  
This problem was raised in particular during the confrontation between the 
supporters of neo-Wahhabism and the representatives of traditional Islam. The former 
believed that religious affiliation, particularly to Jamaat groups with their sights set on 
creating a caliphate, was higher that kinship and ethnic relations, while the latter 
preferred the ethnic component, seeing a threat to spiritual and cultural traditions in the 
ideology and practice of the radicals. Although ethnicity predominates in the Chechen 
self-consciousness, which is also characteristic of many other peoples of the Northern 
Caucasus, this was largely ignored by the international religious conservatives who 
continue to impose values formed outside the ethno-cultural space of the Caucasus on 
Chechen society. As I have already mentioned, since the first face-to-face conflict 
between Russians and Chechens four centuries ago, the common identity of Chechens 
has been centered on an opposition to the hostile rule of Russians and their political 
descendants.  During the First Gazavat in 1785 Chechen forces were able to repel the 
imperial forces and defend the core principles of their society: freedom and equality 
(Gammer 2006:6).  Lacking traditional social organization, the notion of a hierarchy of 
governance is alien to Chechen society and is an element that obstructs attempts to 
resolve conflict through carefully negotiated bargain until today (Gammer 2006, 
Tishkov 2004).  Independence and a lack of social cohesiveness were short lived: a 
fifty-year war that stretched throughout the Caucuses and lasted until 1867 resulted in 
the complete subjugation of Chechnya to Russian imperial control (Nikolaev 1996:8).  
Complete domination over Chechnya by Russians (regardless of their ideological 
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imperatives) gradually contributed to the transformation of Chechen ethnicity into a 
nationalist desire that continues to fuel the modern drive for autonomy. 
According to Tishkov, Lenin’s policy of indigenization, that created state 
institutions within Chechnya, nourished autonomous rule, provided for the merger of 
Chechnya and Ingushetia into Chechno-Ingushetia, and the artificial creation of a 
Chechen language apart from the reliance on Arabic via the widespread practice of 
Islam, further developed a Chechen national identity (2004:21-22).  Started in the early 
1930s, indiscriminate institutionalization resulted in the deaths of up to 200,000 
Chechens and, alone along with the forced deportation of nearly one million Chechens 
in February 1944, is widely considered to be the most salient to the common sense of 
distrust held by Chechens of Moscow’s rule (Nikolaev and Malashenko 2004; Tishkov 
2004; Jaimoukha 2005; Gammer 2006). Thousands are thought to have died during the 
forced deportation to the Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) and the 
eventual repatriation to Chechnya from 1957 to 1960 resulted in even further 
confrontation as ethnic Russians who had taken control of the homesteads and farms of 
Chechen deportees resisted their return violently (Tishkov 2004).  Tishkov explains  
“the theme of deportation and its untold suffering dominated Chechen political 
discourse…and later [was the topic of] youth pop songs….People believed that to end 
any continuing discrimination against them, the Chechens had to regain control over the 
republic” (2004:32).  The culmination of hundreds of years of common suffering, the 
forced deportation and repatriation resonates today as primary source of Chechen 
defiance of Russian rule. The Gorbachev’s political and economic liberalization allowed 
“ethnic nationalism” to emerge as “a great mobilizing power…[while] the granting 
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every Soviet ethno-nation its own state was viewed as natural, desirable, and 
democratic” in the eyes radical democrats in Moscow at the moment of the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution (Tishkov 2004:57). 
While religion has played a significant role in recent years, it is Chechen 
nationalism within the collective experiences that has shaped its ethnic identity is 
broadly supported within the literature on the conflict (Henze 1995; Trenin and 
Malashenko 2004; Tishkov 2004; Meier 2005; Gammer 2006).  Thus, the First Chechen 
War (1993-1997) was fought “under the slogan of ethnic separatism...[Leading] to the 
emergence of a new and potentially even more serious threat to Russian security” 
(Trenin and Malashenko 2004:2).  This threat, sooner or later, would necessitate the 
institution of religious precepts into the state antithetical to the makeup of the 
federation) and would question the fragile stability of federal governance in a post-
Soviet Russia.  As pointed out by Gammer (2006), while radical democrats supported 
the development of quasi-states within the Russian polity, actually allowing a former 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic such as Checheno-Ingushetia to realize popular 
calls for independence might precipitate a domino effect  nationwide calling for more 
authority, autonomy, or even outright succession.  Thus transition to democracy during 
the final years of the Soviet Union collided with a Chechen long-held aspiration for 
ethnic separatism and national independence.   
The rise of Dhozkhar Dudayev defies all reasonable explanation given the 
traditional abhorrence by Chechens over hierarchy and the rule of written law.  A major 
general in the Soviet Army (and as the only Chechen to ever achieve such military 
rank), Dudayev was asked to chair the Second National Chechen People’s Congress in 
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July 1991.  The result of the session was that the Chechnya would remain neither part of 
the Soviet Union nor join with the Russian Federation, thus proclaiming de facto 
independence from Moscow, and that elections would be held for a president and a 
parliament (Tishkov 2004:61; Trenin and Malashenko 2004:9).  In the coming months, 
Dudayev would manage to consolidate power through dissolving parliament, closing the 
constitutional court, threatening members of opposition parties, and directing personal 
purges of Russian officials operating on behalf of the federal government within 
Chechnya (Trenin and Malashenko 2004). From 1991 to 1994, Russia relied 
increasingly on the unrecognized government of Dudayev to govern Chechnya, going so 
far as to withdraw federal troops in 1992 under threat of siege, thus providing the 
separatist government with a considerable amount of modern guns, ammunition, and 
supplies (Trenin and Malashenko 2004:10).  Even though Dudayev’s separatist 
conducted continuous raids against federal institutions, military, and objects of critical 
infrastructure within Chechnya, Moscow limited its policy tools to two failed 
assassination attempts against Dudayev and sporadic reliance by Moscow on the 
repressed internal opposition parties (Trenin and Malashenko 2004:21).  On the eve of 
the outbreak of war in 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin authorized negotiations 
with a high-level delegation of Chechen representatives on the delimitation and mutual 
sharing of powers, but talks were dismissed by Dudayev prior to their completion 
(Tishkov 2004:66).  Dudayev’s reluctance to engage in a political solution has largely 
been attributed to the refusal by successive Russian presidents to meet with him, which 
would signify on their part his legitimacy as the elected head of Chechnya (Trenin and 
Malashenko 2004). Negotiations with Dudayev failed for two critical reasons: first, “the 
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Chechen political culture resists in principle the granting a monopoly of power to any 
single individual.  Dudayev’s authoritarian style was therefore particularly at odds with 
this tradition in Chechen society” (Trenin & Malashenko 2004:19).  Second, Dudayev, 
like many involved with the Chechen war, was becoming fabulously rich off of the 
continuation of the conflict—so much so that the Chechen Wars have often been called 
commercial wars for their effect on the sale of oil and the liquidation of Russian 
reconstruction aid (Trenin 2004:66).  Dudayev was known to have personally insulted 
Russian leaders, called for a holy war against Russians, and threatened terrorist action in 
order to prevent negotiations from occurring (Nikolaev 1996:74).  However, Dudayev’s 
interests in personal wealth and authority are not wholly to blame for the lack of a 
political solution to the issue of Chechen sovereignty.  If Russia was to treat Chechnya 
as sovereign and allowed it membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States, it 
“would have created a dangerous precedent for the other regions of the Russian 
Federation” (Trenin and Malashenko 2004:22).  Thus allowing it a measure of 
independence demanded in order to stop hostilities would have been far greater than the 
level of autonomy granted in the landmark agreements with other republics. Thus, after 
three years of Chechen de facto independence, federal troops invaded Chechnya in 
December 1994. According to Tracy German, given Russia’s desire to end the war, “the 
death of Dudayev made it far more probable that a negotiated, political settlement 
would be achieved” (2003:145).  As such, resolution of the First Chechen War was 
reached at the first formal negotiations following Dudayev’s death in August of 1996.  
Moshe Gammer notes that this agreement and the resulting Moscow peace accord of 
May 1997 “symbolize the Chechen victory, especially as [it] symbolized the Chechen 
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victory [and] came close to recognizing Chechen independence de facto” (2006: 209).  
However, a decision on the final status of Chechen autonomy was delayed until 
presidential and parliamentary elections could be held in 1997, thus leaving the de jure 
status of Chechnya in the same precarious and ambiguous position as had existed since 
1991. 
Russo-Chechen Wars: major causes and driving forces 
The most common proposition regarding causes and driving forces of the 
Russian – Chechen violence in the 1990s is that it was triggered not only by long-held 
ethnic aspirations coupled with religious beliefs but the complete state failure that 
devolved into a crime-ridden and crime-exporting quasi-state plagued by permanent 
internal power struggles. It is estimated that the decline in industrial production in 
Chechnya in 1992 was 30% (Hill 1995:3). Consequently, after 1991, Chechnya’s 
dependence on the profits made from locally extracted oil dramatically increased, and 
between 1991 and 1994 oil profits made up for about one-third of the state budgets 
(Gall 1997:127).  Oil reserves as a causal factor of violence were of little importance in 
Dudaev’s struggle for independence. As the “subjects” of the Russian Federation gained 
greater sovereignty after 1990, local elites experienced little trouble in legally 
appropriating the profits from the mineral wealth of their territories. The costly and 
risky construction of an independent state was not necessary for this goal. Oil profits 
cannot thus count as a motive for the Chechen rebellion. Likewise, oil cannot serve as a 
causal explanation for the Russian intervention. The oil yield comprised 2.6 million tons 
in 1993 (less than one percent of Russia’s entire production) and is thus far too little to 
be of strategic interest to Russia. It has also been alleged that Chechnya is of 
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considerable importance to Russia as an oil transit country between the oil fields of the 
Caspian basin and the Russian export port of Novorossiysk. This argument does not 
hold either: Chechnya is easy to replace as a transit territory. A pipeline circumventing 
the republic was planned in 1996 (as transit negotiations were conducted) and was built 
in 2000-2001 without great difficulties. Geography as a causal factor for the outbreak of 
violence did not have a significant impact either. During the first war, all the heavy 
fighting that occurred was aimed at controlling the few larger cities. The decisive battle 
that ended the first round of the war was the recapturing of Grozny by Chechen rebels in 
August 1996. However, the existence of mountainous and forest-covered terrain plays 
an important role in explaining the durability of the Chechen resistance because  a large 
part of their supplies were delivered via mountain paths, and Chechen units encounter 
little difficulty crossing the borders into neighboring Georgia, Dagestan and Ingushetia, 
where they can supply, regroup, and rest. Neither can ethnic division serve as a causal 
factor in explaining the organization of violence. However, the clear ethnic dominance 
of the Chechens (74%) versus the Russian minority (22%) significantly reduced the cost 
for the Chechen rebellion. The Russian minority never appeared to be a political actor, 
even though the history of violent colonization by the Russian Empire and brutal 
deportation under Stalin was inextricably linked to Russian nationalism. It should be 
noted, however, that the Chechens and Russians had lived after World War II without 
major clashes in the same state, and that the level of inter-communal violence remained 
low. The outbreak of the second Chechen war is a textbook example of the hypothesis 
that violence is likely when the cost of organizing violence is low, because the war 
stocks and the organizational structures for waging war are still functional. It was the 
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opportunity of an inexpensive war that tempted Chechen warlords to carry the war to 
Dagestan.  
Obviously, the single most important factor that actually triggered the Chechen 
rebellion was the rapid demise of the Soviet state. It was the breakdown of central 
hierarchies that went hand-in-hand with this collapse which dramatically reduced the 
costs of the Chechen revolution. Only the implosion of the Soviet state cleared 
Dudaev’s way to a very swift takeover of power. The minor resistance he met came 
only from the Soviet parliament (in Chechnya), which was still controlled by the 
Communist leader Doku Zavgaev. The police, the security forces of the ministry of the 
Interior, the KGB and the decaying Soviet army, lacking leadership and having lost the 
state they served, did not resist. Most of them even handed over their weapons. The 
Chechen revolution and de facto independence came at a very low cost. The internal 
fragmentation and state-building failure in Chechnya can be explained by a somewhat 
different set of factors. First, regime transition in Chechnya occurred through 
revolution, rather than through evolution. In neighboring Dagestan regime transition 
was managed by old soviet and communist party’s elites, which managed to use the 
political institutions of the Soviet Union as pillars around which to reconstruct their 
statehood. In Chechnya, the military-minded Dudaev radically dismantled the old Soviet 
structures and tried to build a new state from scratch. As a result, Dudaev was 
dependent on the muscle of his proxy gunmen, who were therefore more interested in 
short term economic gains than in state-building. Second, the Dudaev regime was 
mainly financed by semi-legal or criminal operations, such as the trade of non-taxed 
goods or the profits made from exporting Russian commodities to international markets. 
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As I already noted, entrepreneurs of the Soviet shadow economy made huge profits, 
using de facto independent Chechnya as a hub for their transactions. These 
entrepreneurs had a vested interest in a weak Chechen state, out of the reach of the 
Russian state, but with access to the international markets. 
Although the financial flows seem to have declined dramatically since 2000, 
there still seems to be enough investment for sustained violence. Diaspora support, 
donations from mainly Islamic donor organizations and locally extracted oil (which is 
then refined in hundreds of so-called household refineries) seem to be the main financial 
sources for the rebels. It is noteworthy that Chechen leaders after 1996 were unable to 
centralize the oil profits from the illegal extraction, from the illegal refinement, and 
from the tapping of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. The so-called household refineries 
became, after 1996, a branch of the economy, in which a number of groups and single 
households participated. After the second Russian invasion and the occupation of most 
parts of Chechnya by the Russian army, Russian commanders also shared in the profits 
from the illegally-extracted and refined oil. This increased the army’s incentive to 
prolong the war, and decreased its incentives for winning it. Third, competition over the 
considerable oil profits was a major contributory factor to the permanent power 
struggles and frequent changes of alliances by the entrepreneurs of violence, which 
further promoted fragmentation and state failure.  
My argument is that it was primarily Russian domestic politics that constantly 
nurtured military action. Internal struggles in the Kremlin were hurting the ailing 
president’s popularity. Yeltsin and his inner circle hoped for domestic political 
dividends from a short and successful military campaign. In addition, by advocating for 
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a successful war, the hardliners in the Kremlin hoped to boost their position in the 
permanent power struggle versus their soft-line opponents. The fact that the de facto 
independent Chechnya had turned into a safe haven for organized criminal activities 
(mainly in the realm of the lucrative shadow economy) became a source of real concern 
for the Kremlin. Finally, Yeltsin and the political elite of Russia were also afraid of the 
precedent that the de facto independence of Chechnya would set for other mainly 
Muslim regions in the Russian Federation. However, the notion of fighting Islamic 
fundamentalism did not play any role, either in the public statements of the Yeltsin 
administration or in the actual decision-making. Following a February 1995 agreement 
with Tatarstan on the extent of autonomy granted to the autonomous oblast, Yeltsin 
authorized continued negotiations, including direct consultation with Dudayev (an 
implicit recognition of his role as legitimate) (Trenin and Malashenko 2004:70).  
However, continued assaults on Russian garrisons by Chechen forces (as directed by 
Dudayev’s government and other rebel groups) resulted in the January 15, 1996 order 
by Yeltsin of a full ground invasion of Chechen territory and the assassination of 
Dudayev by guided missile in April 1996.  In total, 11 separate offers of negotiation 
were made by Russia to Dudayev’s government (Nikolaev 1996:67). 
When a former police officer and successful dealer of the shadow economy, 
Bislan Gantemirov, organized the first paramilitary group in Chechnya, it became the 
core of Dudaev’s “National Guard,” which in August and September 1991 added 
muscle to the Chechen revolution. In 1994, just before the Russian attack, this National 
Guard numbered barely more than 500 men. According to Maskhadov, the Chief of 
Staff of the rebels, the total number of trained fighters under his command did not 
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exceed 1,000 when the war started. Only 200 of them, the so-called Abkhazian battalion 
of Shamil Basaev, had gained combat experience from fighting with the Abkhazians 
against Georgia (Gall 1997:207). However, once the war had started, volunteers from 
every village and every extended family filled the ranks of the rebels. When the Russian 
army started their assault on Grozny in January 1995, the rebels already had around 
7000 fighters in town (Gall 1997:208).  In a completely decentralized environment, each 
field commander had to recruit his own unit and to take care of its financing and 
training. As far as combat units were formed mainly on the basis of village communities 
and extended families, most Chechen fighters know their comrades and their teyps 
beforehand. The Chechen combat units can be broken down into three main categories. 
First, there were the well-equipped, disciplined and experienced fighters, who belong to 
one of the well-known field commanders. Some of these units also provided extensive 
protection to organized crime beyond the North Caucasus in return for financial 
entitlements. Thus, these units disposed of sufficient financial resources to fund a long-
term guerrilla war. A second category of combat units consisted of occasional fighters, 
who joined a group for a period of time or warfare necessity. A third category included 
the self-defense militias that have been formed in almost every village to protect the 
inhabitants. In some cases such militias have forbidden the rebels from quartering 
themselves in their village, lest they provoke Russian retaliatory strikes (Smith 1998, 
Torbakov 2005, Russell 2007, 2009).  
The weaponry and military ammunition of the Chechen rebels originated 
primarily from the inventory of the Soviet army. In June 1992 the Russian authorities 
withdrew their military forces from Chechnya, unexplainably leaving behind all major 
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arsenals that they had piled in Chechnya for decades. Moreover, the porous borders with 
Georgia and via Dagestan to Azerbaijan provided easy access to the post-Soviet arms 
markets in those countries. In addition, significant quantities of military supplies were 
acquired from the Russian army, either from the Russian garrisons in Georgia and 
Armenia, or directly from the Russian army in Chechnya, whose corrupted servicemen 
regularly traded in weapons with Chechens. For good reasons it is impossible to obtain 
figures on the financing of the Chechen rebellion. The data disseminated from time to 
time by the Russian security service (FSB) must be treated with much caution. Since 
9/11, it has made continuous attempts to link the Chechen rebels with international 
terrorism, thus downplaying the core element of the conflict, namely the Chechen fight 
for national self-determination. Despite these difficulties, some observations concerning 
the financial background of the Chechen resistance can still be made.  
From 1991, Chechnya, which had de facto independence, possessed an 
international airport and international border with Georgia, but was still fully integrated 
in the Russian economic zone. This meant that Chechnya had access to cheap and 
exportable Russian natural resources; and to the Russian consumer markets, eager for 
consumer goods. Obviously, such a precarious situation made Chechnya a “dream land” 
for the shadow economy generated financial flows for Dudaev’s regime and, later, the 
protracted war. The position as a semi legal hub between international and Russian 
markets proved to be extremely lucrative. Consumer goods were imported duty free via 
Chechnya, while natural resources and weapons were exported to world markets 
without any regulation. Not surprisingly, Dudaev’s independent Chechnya was 
supported and used by entrepreneurs in the shadow economy, who exploited the de 
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facto free trade zone of Chechnya. Subsequently, they had a vital interest in ensuring 
state weakness in Chechnya in order to maintain their freedom of activity. The oil 
business in Chechnya was also profitable. Conservative estimates put the share of the oil 
profit in this period at 300 million USD. In 1993, the yield of locally extracted oil was 
still 2.6 million tons, which at world market prices commanded a value of 250 million 
USD. The income from the illegal re-export of cheap Russian oil was even higher. 
Despite the economic blockade, which Russia imposed on Chechnya after 1991, oil 
continued to flow from Siberia to Chechnya. Officially, 23 million tons were exported 
via Grozny between 1991 and 1994 (Gall 1997:127). One can safely assume that the 
actual exports were many times higher. Even though the profits from the illegally 
exported oil ceased to flow due to mounting pressure of the Russian military, the local 
oil production was never completely halted and easily  started up again after the main 
fights were over in 1996. The wells had suffered relatively little damage, since both 
sides had left the infrastructure intact, in expectation of future profits. Although the 
amount of oil extracted may have been smaller than before the war, locally extracted oil 
became the single most important source of income in inter-war Chechnya, and we can 
safely assume that the most important warlords enjoyed a large share of the profits. A 
further source of income was the systematic tapping of the pipeline which carried oil 
through Chechnya to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Another common 
source of income was kidnapping, especially in the interwar period devoid of any law-
enforcement activity. In fact, since 1996, hundreds of people in Chechnya and in the 
neighbouring republics, especially in Dagestan, have been kidnapped. According to the 
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Russian Interior Ministry, from 1994 until 2000 there were 1,811 persons kidnapped in 
the North Caucasus, most of them in Chechnya.  
It is worth noting that the Russian army was also involved in this trade. It is 
common practice for the Russian army to sell the bodies of dead Chechens to their 
relatives and to obtain ransom for the return of Chechen detainees. The most important 
source of funding for Chechen rebels is both legal and illegal economic activity inside 
Russia. According to statistics of the Main Directorate for the Struggle against 
Organized Crime, in the year 2000, up to 4,000 enterprises in Russia were under the 
control of so-called ethnic mafias. Chechen diaspora groups, donating part of their 
profits to the rebels, controlled a substantial number of these businesses (Borisov 
2001:7). The 350 000-strong Chechen diaspora in Russia, at least in part, supports the 
struggle for independence with voluntary donations. These donations were coupled with 
international contributions. In this regard, Russian law-enforcement and intelligence 
agencies regularly point to a number of countries: the Arab Emirates, Egypt, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, and especially Turkey and Azerbaijan.  
The first engagement turned into a humiliating disaster for the badly-trained and 
poorly-motivated Russian army. The Russian invasion had unified the various Chechen 
factions, and the overwhelming majority of the population supported the war (Hughes 
2001). On August 6, 1996, the Chechen forces recaptured Grozny. Estimates of human 
casualties in 1994-1996 war vary  from 4379 military and 20 000 civilian dead, with no 
accounting of wounded (Lieven 1998:108), to 80 000 dead and 240 000 wounded, 
announced by Aleksandr Lebed in Izvestia newspapaer (September 4, 1996). The 
official Russian numbers are just over 3000 military killed. The amount of Chechen 
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military and civilian casualties is unknown (Hughes 2001). On August 25, 1996, 
Yeltsin’s envoy Aleksandr Lebed, secretary of the Russian Security Council, and the 
Chechen military commander Aslan Maskhadov signed the Khasavyurt agreement. The 
parties agreed to cease hostilities and to achieve a solution to the question of the future 
status of Chechnya prior to 31 December 2001. The Russian Army completely 
withdrew its forces. After the Russian ignominious military and political retreat, 
parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Chechnya on 27 January 1997. 
The Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) provided organizational 
and financial aid and sent election observers. Aslan Maskhadov won with 59.3% of the 
vote in the first round, coming in well in front of the most popular field commander 
Shamil Basaev (25.3%) and the incumbent president Yandarbiev (10.1%). However, 
this internationally-applauded democratic ritual did not conceal for long the fact that 
Chechen statehood was literately absent. In reality, the state in Chechnya was a fragile 
coalition of field commanders who had organized the resistance extremely effectively 
during the war, but proved utterly unable to establish state institutions. Moreover, the 
coalition proved itself to be short-lived and unstable. Armed clashes between the 
various groups were soon a common feature. Few attempts to integrate these armed 
groups into state institutions, and thus subordinate them to a common command and 
bring them under civil control, failed.  As a result, different governmental and 
administrative branches had control of their own troops: the President had the National 
Guard and an anti-terrorist unit at his disposal; the ministry of State Security 
commanded the Sharia Guard and the so-called Islamic regiment. The National Security 
Service took control of the border check-points. In fact, these armed units continued to 
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remain the proxy troops of their respective field commanders, who increasingly 
exploited the market of violence that had emerged in Chechnya during the war. Profits 
from the extracted oil were supplemented by proceeds from the kidnapping “business” 
and racketeering, as well as funds which flowed from the diaspora.  In post-war 
Chechnya, the rationale choices of the key players were increasingly dominated by 
short-term economic gains; therefore weak statehood was not only a result of the war, 
but it became an objective of the warlords. Few charismatic warlords also gained access 
to international Islamic donors, spreading Islamic fundamentalism among layers of 
society and moderate warlords. Radical Islamism led to a further fragmentation of 
Chechen society and was used as a tool in the power struggle between a coalition of 
warlords and President Maskhadov. Trenin and Malashenko describe the interwar 
period (1997-1999) as a vacuum of leadership within Chechnya (2004).   
In December 1998, a coalition of radical warlords opposed to President 
Maskhadov decided to form a so-called state Shura - a consultative body to which the 
president and the parliament should transfer their powers (Isayev 1998). President 
Maskhadov swiftly responded by stripping the parliament of its legislative power, 
calling for his own Shura, and working on an “Islamic” constitution. Thus in the spring 
of 1999, the dismantling of the Chechen state was complete: there was a president 
without real power, a parliament that had been stripped of its legislative powers, there 
was no constitution and no constitutional court, and two opposing Shuras, one 
belonging to president and one belonging to the warlord coalition. It turned out that 
field commanders had not only won the battle against the Russian army, but they had 
also won the battle against a weak president trying to build a state. Thus, the internal 
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fragmentation of the Chechen rebels has dramatically increased the possibility of 
another war, as Russia had no negotiating partner and faced a serious commitment 
problem on the Chechen side. The internal fragmentation along with overt disobedience 
led to complete state failure and established the market of violence. The strategic 
actions of the entrepreneurs of violence became therefore more and more driven by 
short-term gains and economic activities that characteristically combined legal business 
activities, organized crime, and small-scale warfare. 
As a result, in August 1999, a few hundred fighters under the leadership of 
radical field commanders Basaev and Khattab invaded the neighboring republic of 
Dagestan with the declared aim of liberating it and uniting it with Chechnya to form an 
Islamic republic. The Chechen Islamists encountered fierce resistance from the local 
population of Dagestan, who rapidly received support from the Russian security forces 
and army. Not without difficulty did the Russian army drive the Islamists back into 
Chechnya, but this action quickly escalated into a large-scale war against Chechnya. 
The humiliated Russian army, which had clearly been waiting for an opportunity to 
strike back, attacked positions within Chechnya with air strikes and heavy artillery and 
invaded Chechnya in October 1999. According to Jaimoukha, the Russian response - a 
military bombing campaign that redressed the error of the First Chechen War by 
completely destroying Chechen cities, leaving no hiding space for urban warfare—
“already drawn up, was set into motion” (2005:70).  Beginning October 1999, federal 
forces recaptured lowlands, eventually controlling 80% of its territory, where it installed 
a new federal government to divide separatist opposition and proceeded to drive the 
remaining separatist forces into the Chechen highlands to the north and south of 
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Grozny, the Chechen capital (Trenin and Malashenko 2004: 35-41). Whatever the 
motives of Basaev and Khattab for undertaking the raid into Russian territory were, it is 
clear is that the Chechen warlords dramatically overestimated the strength of the Islamic 
movement in Dagestan. Instead of broad support, they met with fierce resistance from 
local security forces, backed by the overwhelming majority of Dagestan’s population. 
The Chechen warlords also underestimated the willingness of the Russian army to 
launch such a rapid and massive counter- offensive. Apart from miscalculations, the 
most plausible motivations for this suicidal raid are twofold. First, the position of 
warlords is threatened if there is no war. The gradual attempts of the Chechen President 
Maskhadov to cut back the influence of the most radical warlords posed a real threat to 
Basaev and Khattab, so they decided to carry the war to Dagestan. Second, after 1996, 
Basaev and Khattab had been receiving generous donations from Islamist fund-raisers 
outside Chechnya. It is reasonable to suggest that the raid into Dagestan, labeled as 
glorious “Islamic liberation,” was meant as a return on the investment of these 
donations.  
Since 1994, between 75,000 and 150,000 of the republic’s one million 
inhabitants have died from conflict-related causes, and more than 300,000 have fled 
Chechen territory (Gordadze and Thornike 2004). Pervasive human rights abuses and 
violations of international humanitarian law – rape, summary executions, arbitrary 
detention and torture, and kidnappings have been committed virtually with impunity by 
both Chechen and Russian forces. At first glance, this type of violence appears to be a 
textbook demonstration of Samuel Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” thesis: 
Muslim Chechnya against mainly Christian Russia (1996). “The warlords’ cynical use 
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of Islamic symbols and rhetoric, as well as their use of funding from international 
Islamist groups, has convinced many Russians that the war in Chechnya is a religious 
rebellion rather than a nationalist one.” (Giuliano 2005)  While Huntington’s thesis and 
fault line theory seem to be relevant to the conflict, it is critical to understand that 
ethnicity, and not religion, is the root of the current conflict in Chechnya. Although 
there have been severe tensions between Chechens and the Russian Empire, the USSR, 
or the Russian Federation for centuries, there is little evidence that any significant 
popular mobilization along Islamic lines had occurred before the violence broke out in 
1994. The Chechen resistance concerned the right of the Chechen people to establish an 
independent nation-state, though not an Islamic one. Chechen leaders, ignored by 
Moscow, simply co-opted Islam to achieve their political goals. It is also important to 
note that while religion was not the cause of the Chechen resistance, it was certainly a 
main factor in the continuation of bloodshed, and a main ideological tenet (Malashenko 
and Trenin 2004).  Islamic fundamentalism, like a seed dormant in the black Caucasian 
soil, was cultivated and nurtured by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya’s 
ensuing political frustrations with Moscow, and most recently, the spread of Wahhabis 
doctrine from neighboring Muslim states (Giuliani 2005). 
Due to the traditional lack of respect for hierarchy and unitary rule, 
administration of Chechnya not imposed by force (either by Dudayev’s voluntaristic 
presidency or the Russian federal army) has failed to produce a functioning government.  
For example, in 1999 president Aslan Maskhadov, a moderate Sufi Muslim, was unable 
to stop the more radical Basayev from venturing into Dagestan (thus provoking the 
Second Chechen War) and was forced by more radical elements within his government 
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to declare a limited form of shari’a law (with Islamic courts included) (Tishkov 
2004:34).  The result has largely been a diarchy of governance, of secularists versus the 
radical militia commanders, thus preventing the process of negotiation with Russian 
forces from beginning (Trenin and Malasehnko 2004: 33).  Anna Politkovskaya, a 
Russian author and harsh critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin who was murdered 
in Moscow in 2006, notes in her 2002 survey A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from 
Chechnya, “Maskhadov is no longer commander-in-chief…All of his former field 
commanders are on different pages now; each has his own view…[and] they all 
viciously hate each other” (178).  In discussions with Akhmed Zakayev, an envoy of 
Maskhadov, concerning the failed negotiations of November 2001, she notes that even 
Putin cannot control the situation; that the Russian military is completely in control of 
the Second Chechen War (2003:205). The Russian Ministry of Defense was 
unanimously supported by Russian public opinion following the school massacre in 
Beslan in 2004, the hostage-taking in a Moscow theater in 2002, and apartment 
bombings in 1999. As Trenin and Malashenko state, “at the beginning of the second 
campaign the public would settle for nothing short of total victory” [2004:50], which 
further demonstrate how the rhetoric of “Caucasophobia” and “Islamophobia” have 
been successful in ensuring that the second war ends in a better position for Russia than 
the first [2004:58-63].) If neither Maskhadov (who was finally ambushed and shot dead 
in 2004) nor Putin could have the authority to stop the violence and guarantee the safety 
of the Chechen people, there was little reliable expectation that the final status of 
Chechnya’s autonomy can be settled on paper. 
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For Russia, the threat posed by radical Islam is so great that no solution besides 
complete eradication is acceptable (Trenin and Malashenko 2004:74).  The Russian 
position, then, remains that “the Federation’s territorial integrity is non-negotiable and 
therefore Chechnya will remain a constituent part of the Federation” (German 
2003:160).  German finds this an impossible position, given that Chechnya has been 
ungovernable and reconstruction of “the republic which [Russia] helped destroy” has 
been less than complete (2003:160).  For Chechens, whose lives have been defined by 
post-war economic stagnation and continued dependence on conditional Russian 
subsidies, the struggle for independence is still seen as the only viable solution to ensure 
the long-term security of the Chechen people in light of a struggle in common for nearly 
four hundred years (Trenin and Malashenko 2004; Politkovskaya 2003:212).  Moreover, 
as “the demand for Chechnya’s independence has become coupled with the cause of 
creating an Islamic state,” which is especially salient in the eyes of the separatist 
militias that continue the war today, the interests of the Chechen people are often 
mischaracterized and a single negotiating position to satisfy all active parties is non-
existent (Trenin, Malashenko and Lieven 2004:101, German 2003, Tishkov 2004).  The 
resolution of the protracted Chechen War and a final determination of the level of 
autonomy of Chechnya have considerable impact on several groups not involved 
directly in hostilities.  Given the dispersion of separatist fighters throughout the 
Chechen highlands following the Russian invasion in 2002 and the rise of demands for 
the creation of an Islamic state that would encompass the entire North Caucuses, the 
Dagestan peoples are especially interested in maintaining stability over the region.  
However, for other ethnic minorities living in largely homogenous regions with some 
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autonomy elsewhere in Russia, a Chechen victory or acquiescence to additional 
Chechen sovereignty by Russia would signal that taking up arms against the Russian 
government could have a positive outcome, thus possibly resulting in extensions of 
ethnically-based warfare throughout the federation.  Moreover, given that Chechen 
separatists have been radicalized via the rhetoric of Islamic terrorism by the world 
media and Western governments alike, the West is interested in ensuring that a Chechen 
victory is not realized, nor that it becomes an impetus for the further spread of 
fundamental Islam to the South Caucasus.  However, in the view of Western nations, 
such repression of Chechen separatism must also be equated with the assurance of 
human rights given the repressive nature and “escalating brutality” of conflict, 
especially in light of Russia’s recent move towards more consolidated (if not more 
authoritarian) governance (Trenin and Malashenko 2004:42).  
Several obstacles stand in the way of any long-term solution to the Russian – 
Chechen stand-off in the North Caucasus. The main obstacle is Russia’s fear that 
Chechen secession would be the final drop to unravel the Caucasus, and then the 
Russian state. “From Russia’s standpoint maintaining political control over the territory 
was very important to prevent the new Russian Federation from falling apart.” (Lyon 
2002:119)  Russia is home to “at least 89 ethnic minorities with some kind of pretension 
to autonomy,” and thus successful Chechen secession could “trigger additional 
declarations of independence and plunge into the chaos of civil war a vast area 
stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea and from Kaliningrad to the North 
Pacific.” (Skurbaty 2000:128, O'Loughlin et al 2004:12) The ethnic Russians, many of 
whom had lived in the region for centuries, began leaving Chechnya on the eve of the 
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so-called “Chechen rebellion,” connected with the spike of Chechen nationalism in the 
early 1990s.
24
 Around that time, the Chechens began to look for arms, and their 
relations with the Russian-speaking population changed dramatically. According to 
official statistics, over 20 000 ethnic Russians were killed over this period. The 
Chechens were primarily interested in taking over property and assets by forcing the 
Russians to leave. While many Chechens easily robbed and humiliated the Russian-
speaking population of Chechnya, they did not generally seek to kill them unless they 
tried to put up resistance. The younger generation of Chechens has known nothing but 
war. “Its only image of Russia is of troops raping, killing, kidnapping, torturing. The 
brutality of the federal soldiers has convinced it beyond the shadow of a doubt that 
Russia is the eternal enemy and that its soldiers respect nothing, not women, not 
children, not the elderly, not the dead.” (Gordadze 2004:194, 195) Likewise, this 
generation of Russians has only ever been told that Chechens are terrorists who likewise 
have no regard for human life – who do not even bat an eye to take children hostage or 
blow up commercial airliners. “For many Russians, a bearded man holding a 
Kalashnikov automatic rifle and wearing a green headband has become the symbol of 
Chechen separatism and the stereotypical image of a Chechen.” (Trenin and 
Malashenko 2004:71) 
Since the early 1990s Russian authorities have employed a number of strategies 
in desperate attempts to clamp down on Chechen belligerent separatism. These 
strategies include economic blockades, the use of proxies, alienation and exclusion, 
coercion and control, compromise and negotiation.  It turned out that none of these 
                                                             




strategies managed to subdue the long-held aspirations of the Chechen people to self-
rule and making it a stable unit of the Russian federation in the future. Instead, this set 
of chaotic strategies resulted in massive loss of life and complete destruction of the 
infrastructure of Chechnya.  In addition, protracted conflict with Chechnya has also 
been immensely damaging to transition to democracy in post-Soviet Russia, 
undermining its further institutionalization, eroding the rule of law and abandoning 
fundamental constitutional freedoms, and fuelling racist attitudes not only against 
Chechens but all peoples of the North Caucasus. The deleterious long-term effect of this 
protracted stand-off has radicalized positions on both sides. As a result, the ethnic 
bargaining, institutionalized in an asymmetric federal system under Boris Yeltsin that 
effectively contained ethnic and religious challenges in other potentially secessionist 
federal units is now under mounting pressure of civic nationalism inextricably linked to 
Russian nationalism and Christian Orthodoxy. Since 2005 legal autonomization and 
broad political accommodation of local ethnic aspirations seem to be increasingly 
viewed as unnecessary appeasement and a betrayal of the Russian national interests. If 
Yeltsin’s asymmetric federalist model was not easily reconcilable with the claims for 
self-rule made by Chechens, more symmetrical federation gradually crafted by Putin-
Medvedev regime on the principles of resurrected vertical command system will be 
nothing but return to the Soviet era. 
The arguments presented here suggest that no single factor can be valuably 
employed to explain one of the most viral internal conflicts in history of the North 
Caucasus. The causes of this conflict lie in a multi-level combination of historical and 
contingent factors, where political leaders, war lords, sectional and corporate interests 
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with Russia and within the Caucasus have acted as conflict detonators, haphazardly 
instrumental zing it for political and economic ends. One of the most salient reasons that 
gave rise to this conflict was the way Russian elites adjusted to a post-Soviet reality. All 
across the political spectrum, the conflict-prone Russian elites under Yeltsin, tended to 
see Russian national identity as being legitimately congruent with the Russian 
Federation’s inherited territorial boundaries of the Soviet Union.  The Chechen society 
under the leadership of Dudaev was equally committed to the secession with very small 
leeway for any compromise on independence. The only fact that Chechen separatist 
aspirations are taking place within the official borders of the Russian Federation must in 
part account for indiscriminate use of military power tacitly tolerated by Western 
governments in return for a number of political and economic concessions. In 
Chechnya, the Kremlin continued to rely on handpicked former field commanders, 
providing them with abundant funding and turning a blind eye to the egregious 
embezzlement and pervasive corruption in the region as well as those leaders' heavy-
handed governance. In return, the puppet politicians pledge loyalty to Moscow and 
provide an overwhelming pro-Moscow vote during elections. By neglecting its own 
responsibility for law and order in Chechnya, federal center seems to be much more 
concerned about security in Russia at large, as security priority for Chechnya has been 
simply to contain violence so it would not spill outside the region. 
Maskhadov was elected president of Chechnya in January 1997 in a vote 
monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Even though he 
was officially congratulated by Boris Yeltsin, Chechnya’s status remained 
undetermined. This period in modern history of Chechnya is often described as a long 
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chain of failures of Maskhadov to deliver on the mandate he was given. Within months 
Chechnya slid into chaos. As Akhmadov (2010) writes, Maskhadov was unable either to 
get any Russian funds for the reconstruction of Chechnya or to get approval to seek 
them. In July 1999, on the eve of the next war with Russia, when Chechnya was 
plunged into internal violence between field commanders who had won the first 
campaign, Akhmadov accepted Maskhadov’s offer to be foreign minister of the 
unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Quite unexpectedly for Maskhadov, 
Western countries recognized him as Chechnya’s democratically elected leader but then 
offered no practical help of any kind for the next two years. Indeed, the majority of the 
Chechen population, the 60 % of them who voted for Maskhadov, almost certainly 
cared more about stable jobs and reconstruction than about achieving absolute 
independence. While well-organised insurgent fighters turned their skills into 
profiteering through kidnapping and racketeering, ordinary Chechens suffered most of 
all. After war broke out again in 1999, the ferocious battle inside Chechnya itself had 
intensified between those who saw it as a sovereign Islamic state and those willing to 
pact with Moscow and reach out to the Western democracies. Western critics of Russian 
strategy in the North Caucasus accuse Moscow of disproportionate use of military force. 
I am convinced that the problem is that here is no independent civil control over this 
strategy that allowed for inconsistencies and voluntarism to dictate available policy 
options. For example, in 1997, Boris Yeltsin met Maskhadov in the Kremlin, called him 
the “president of Ichkeria” in public, and signed a treaty banning the Russian use of 
force against Chechnya. In 2000, Yeltsin’s successor Putin refused even to 
communicate with Maskhadov and labeled him the most wanted terrorist. Subsequently, 
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major Maskhadov’s envoys, Akhmadov and Zakayev were also excluded from 
legitimate negotiators, even though they explicitly condemned terrorist attacks. 
Obviously, there is no any consensus among central authorities on what to do 
with Chechnya. On one hand, the direct application of force is no longer effective 
because federal military presence in the region fuels hostility among local people and 
only further escalates tensions. On the other hand, it is unrealistic and even dangerous to 
give full authority to local bureaucracy, given the widespread lack of respect they have 
among the people. Even as the Kremlin keeps on regularly allocating multi-billion 
transfers from the federal budget to finance Chechnya in spite of its own poor economic 
situation, Kadyrov nips in the bud every possible real or imaginable opposition to his 
rule. As an absolute dictator, Kadyrov commands a personal army that primarily 
consists of former insurgents that carry out official reprisal missions in the North 
Caucasus and far beyond it. Chechnya is gradually transforming from a de facto 
independent territory associated with Russia into a de jure independent state that could 
request and receive recognition of its independence from other countries (with Georgia 
in the first place). At present, Kadyrov seems to have opted for informal international 
recognition, pointing to his uniqueness and his nominal demonstration of loyalty to 
federation to gain additional concessions from Moscow. That is essentially what has 
been resulting in the broadening of geographical reach of Kadyrov’s authority and in 
obliterating all competition and obstacles in the way. How far is too far? Sooner or later, 
the Putin-Medvedev’s tandem will inevitably be forced to reconsider worn-out policy of 
appeasing Chechnya, largely because of its own near-sighted policies, especially in 
relation to the Caucasus. Present-day Chechnya confounds many previously made 
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assumptions. First of all, the violence in the North Caucasus is no longer about Chechen 
independence. Many Chechens became disillusioned with the idea of full secession after 
the bitter experience of de facto self-rule from 1991 to 1994 and 1997 to 1999. The core 
component of Moscow’s agenda here is no longer colonial domination or suppressing 
militant Islam; it is about keeping control of the region at any cost. Armed resistance is 
now a region-wide phenomenon: radical Islam is the main ideological driver, pitting 
itself against not only mainstream Islam but also Russian rule. In his new, scrupulously 
researched book, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert Schaefer (2010), a U.S. Army Special Forces officer, reports that 
Chechnya’s neighbors, Ingushetia and Dagestan, are becoming now more violent than 
Chechnya itself. In 2009, according to Schaefer (2010), at least 332 pro-Russian 
combatants were killed and at least 636 were wounded in the North Caucasus—numbers 
he believes to be an underestimation but which, as they stand, exceed U.S. casualties in 
either Afghanistan or Iraq in the same period. 
Official Russian propaganda continuous to stigmatize, though implicitly, 
Chechens as being “bandits” and “terrorists” with a natural inclination to savagery who 
somehow missed out on the modernization. However, memoirs by former Foreign 
Minister Ilyas Akhmadov (2010) provide necessary information to understand this 
complex situation. In Akhmatov’s view, a modern Chechen identity began to form 
among intellectuals that inevitably drew on Russian sources and education. It was 
centered on the capital city Grozny, the largest infrastructural hub in the North 
Caucasus. National self-esteem had its internal tensions from the beginning, between 
city and village, highland and lowland, cultural adaptation to Russia and the 
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proclamation of something entirely opposite to it. Dudaev, the strong man who emerged 
spontaneously as national leader, was himself an outsider who had a very Soviet 
identity, a Russian wife and a passion for the poetry of Lermontov. A child of the 
deported, he grew up in desperate poverty in Kazakhstan and was schooled in the brutal 
Soviet military, eventually becoming the first Soviet Chechen general. Dudaev never 
lived in Chechnya full-time before he returned to head the national movement in 1991. 
Most of the initial cohort of intellectuals who formed that first Chechen National 
Congress was quickly ousted by poorly educated people residing in the villages, 
descendants of the Stalinist deportees who felt an instant pride in a strongman with a 
military background. This segment of the Chechen population propelled him to become 
the first president of the breakaway Soviet republic and would-be independent 
Chechnya in 1991. Following the killing of Dudayev by a Russian guided air-to-surface 
missile in early 1996, Maskhadov became Chechnya’s next strongman, who gained 
wide public support because he did not just protect the population from the ravages of 
the Russian army, but negotiated agreements with various Russian counterparts 
(especially with Alexander Lebed, Moscow’s security chief at the time and a former 
general) that ended the first Chechen war. In late 1996, Russian troops pulled out of 
Chechnya. 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows that Moscow’s policy continues to be near-sighted to 
primarily driven by personal political ambitions, not to mention personal loyalty to 
those who occupy higher political positions. The creation of the so-called “North 
Caucasus Federal District” by president  Dmitri Medvedev in 2010, and led by 
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Aleksandr Khloponin, a man who simultaneously holds the position of Vice-Prime 
Minister of Russia, runs counter against Putin’s Chechen appeasement strategy, whose 
only pillar is  multi-billion support for  Kadyrov’s regime. Due to this influx of federal 
money coupled with overwhelming war weariness, violence in Chechnya dwindled but 
not disappeared. This type of shaky arrangement has been built and polished by myths 
of a stable and federalist Chechnya on three highly volatile substances: federal money, 
immunity, and the loyalty of men, many of whom fought against Moscow, including 
Kadyrov himself. Kadyrov’s increasingly provocative behavior defying traditional 
Chechen values based on his vision of a new Chechnya is becoming a long way from 
being supported by ordinary Chechens. For example, construction of huge mosques in a 
predominantly Sufi society or imposition of a head-scarf obligation on Chechen women 
along with other elements of Sharia law (that is completely incompatible with Russian 
legal system, not to mention other much more consolidated democracies), inevitably 
alienates many. Armed insurgency is not a mainstream movement and the “Caucasian 
emirate” has no record of building schools or mosques, as do Hamas and Hezbollah. 
Furthermore, the relationship to al-Qaeda and the international jihad is far-fetched, even 
though both sides have a vested interest in bulging it up. Instead, there are relatively 
small groups ideologically influenced by the global Islamists but still getting most of 
their recruits, weapons and money from local sources. At the same time, my findings 
show that Schaefer’s (2010) argument that the current insurgency is the heir of the 
Islamist resistance campaigns of the Russian Empire, led by Shamil Basayev’s 
namesake Imam Shamil and his allies in the 19th century is groundless, as modern 
insurgents’ radical Islamic rhetoric is in conflict with much of the Chechen society and 
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can be held at bay effectively by dictatorial methods of Ramzan Kadyrov under tacit 
approval from the Kremlin. My point is that, even though Chechen state under Kadyrov 
is now functioning more efficiently than ever in its modern history, financial schemes of 
reconstruction are completely non-transparent, and corruption is pervasive. Thus, in the 
absence of any institutional checks and balances, full impunity combined with high 
level of violence against political opponents, created a regime that could be hardly more 
personalized and more based on kinship and personal loyalty. Short-term political 
expediency and personal ambitions are only driving Russians and Chechens further 
apart because neither ethnic identity nor religious identity of Chechen people is taken 




Chapter 5 -  Dagestan 
Introduction 
Judging by the composition of its population and its ethno-cultural diversity and 
cultural and religious history, scholars usually describe Dagestan as a unique case study 
of politics of collective identities in the former Soviet Union. This chapter focuses on 
Dagestan and provides insight into the three major causes of conflict in the republic: (1) 
inter-ethnic tensions; (2) electoral politics, and (3) the home-grown indigenous religious 
movements. These major causes feed on particular grievances, as different ethnic elites 
employ their own tools of mobilization to maximize profitability of relations with 
Moscow and retain power with corresponding entitlements. The central argument of this 
chapter is that Moscow’s attempts to enforce constitutional compliance, while ignoring 
rent-seeking clan system, will result in further weakening Dagestan’s institutional 
ability to channel grievances and maintain order, widening the cleavages between ethnic 
clans, and further consolidation of supra-ethnic pan-Islamic identity as the main 
mobilizing ideology of future conflicts.  
Politics of Collective Identities in Historical Perspective 
The Republic of Dagestan borders Azerbaijan to the south, Georgia and 
Chechnya to the west and the Caspian Sea to the east. Dagestan is also one of the oldest 
Islamized territories in the North Caucasus (Roshin 2011). Its diverse population 
includes many indigenous ethnic groups as well as Turkic- and Farsi-speaking peoples. 
Dagestan is still unique in that no one ethnic group dominates: Avars - 29.4 %, Dargins 
– 16.5 %, and Kumyks – 14.2 %.   It is rather a complex fusion of ethnicities, competing 
Islamic groups, and a unique political system that has traditionally brought stability to 
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what could otherwise be a very ungovernable polity given the considerable ethnic 
diversity. Given the severe economic deprivations and extreme ethnic pluralism, 
Dagestan has remained remarkably stable and has avoided protracted ethnic conflict 
(Roshin 2011).  Dagestan is not organized as a titular system, meaning that no one 
ethnic group has been accorded privileges purely on ethnic criteria, a Soviet legacy that 
still characterizes the ethno-federal policies in other subnational administrations. Rather 
than elevating and institutionalizing ethnic identities, both Soviet and post-Soviet 
policies were markedly inclusive, particularly of the 14 largest groups in a political 
system that could best be described as quasi-consociational, a model that is 
accommodative, designed to bridge the chasms between the constituencies (Ware and 
Kisriev 2001a). Despite early nationalist movements during the transformation in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, Dagestan has achieved a degree of solidarity, much of 
which is attributable to the development of a political system based on ethnic 
partisanship through a system of proportional representation. Therefore, although 
ethnicity is certainly salient in politics, the structure has been one designed to mitigate 
cleavages and foster accommodation, a system now seriously threatened by religious 
radicalism that would most likely politicize and heighten ethnic cleavages and 
exacerbate conflict, the growth of religious radicalism as a response to abject poverty, 
rampant unemployment, political corruption, and disillusionment with traditional Islam 
and the excesses of modernization pose a serious threat to the government’s legitimacy 
and long-term stability in the region.  
Scarce scholarship on Dagestan in the post-Soviet period has noted that the 
republican leadership has had to “walk a tightrope between nationalism and Islam” 
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(Gammer 2002:139) in order to maintain political stability. Discussions of nationalism 
are commonly contrasted against institutionalist studies of the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, which emphasize the role of the Soviet federal structure in cultivating distinct 
identities resulting from the geographical partition of political space (Roeder 1991, 
Suny 1993, Kaiser 1994, Brubaker 1996). In particular, this institutional model was 
closely examined by Bremmer (1993) using the concept of the so-called “matreshka” 
nationalism that summarized the layering of multiple identities, associated with Soviet 
federalism, and explained how ethnicities asserted their political autonomy. Activists 
representing their titular groups with their own union republics positioned their political 
actions against Moscow, while those on the lower three tiers, the autonomous republics, 
autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs, positioned themselves against the union 
republics and their titular nationalities (Holland and O’Loughlin 2010). Dagestan’s 
noted ethnic diversity, with 34 ethno-linguistic groups, made the assignment of a 
singular titular nationality to the area impossible. Thus, territorial fragmentation was not 
in place to spur nationalist opposition; rather, identities in the republic were 
overlapping, territorialized at multiple scales, and associated with various social and 
political communities (Walker 2001). Political instability in Dagestan during the post-
Soviet period is therefore most frequently attributed to the rise of Islamism, linked to 
the radicalization of the most marginalized elements in Muslim communities in the 
region as a result of the two Chechen wars (Yemelianova 2007, Russell 2007). An 
Islamist state has been viewed as a potential solution to the social and economic 
problems, including high unemployment, endemic poverty, and corruption, suffocating 
the republic (Yemelianova 1999, Gammer 2007). Therefore, while nationalism is rarely 
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perceived as a threat to Dagestan’s political integrity, Islamism and the violence 
associated with it are interpreted as an imminent threat to the republic’s stability 
(Gammer 2002, Hahn 2007). This general distinction between nationalism and 
Islamism, however, downplays group-specific positions towards Dagestan’s political 
system, specifically on questions of political power and institutional control, and, most 
importantly, the potential consequences of the rise of radical Islam in the republic 
(Holland and O’Loughlin 2010). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of movements for national 
independence also emerged in Dagestan. Unlike Chechnya, these movements utilized 
existing Soviet political institutions, primarily the regional parliaments (Soviets), as a 
means for mass mobilization. In April 1991, 39 out of 54 regional Soviets supported a 
resolution to create a sovereign Dagestan Republic, independent from the Russian 
Federation (Tsagolov 1998). National groups that wished to secede from Dagestan 
dominated the 15 Soviets that opposed this resolution. The political leadership of 
Dagestan was quickly led to understand that the price of secession from the Russian 
Federation would be the secession of some of the ethno-national groups with 
devastating consequences for the entire region. From that time on, Dagestan’s secession 
from the Russian Federation was no longer on the political agenda. As in most other 
regions of the Russian Federation, the political leadership in Dagestan is largely made 
up of the former communist functionaries, affiliated with successful entrepreneurs 
(Memorial Human Rights Center 2011a). Whereas power struggles for influence and 
power between clans are common, violent clashes between incumbent elites and 
contenders have been generally avoided. Another factor contributing to stability is the 
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fact that the old communist elites traditionally represent all of the key clans and ethnic 
groups. Particular ethnic interests are thus already represented at the government level. 
However, the multinational political elites of Dagestan are aware of the importance of 
the ethnic balance and fair representation of ethnic groups both in the parliament and in 
the executive.  
Dagestan has generally avoided large-scale violence despite its proximity to 
Chechnya. However, a few hundred republican and federal bureaucrats, law-
enforcement and security personnel, politicians, ministers and journalists have been 
killed since 2003 (Memorial Human Rights Center 2009). The militant Islamist 
organization “Shariat Jamaat” claims responsible for much of the violence. Some of its 
leaders fought in Chechnya, but its extremist propaganda has found propitious soil 
among unemployed youth. This home-grown extremism, espousing jihadi theology and 
employing terrorist methods, is being on the rise since the early 2000s. Mounting 
counter-terrorist efforts to end the street war have been ineffective and often counter-
productive due to the fact that Moscow, while supporting vigorously loyal local elites, 
has very a feeble record of implementing a comprehensive anti-corruption policy and 
reintegrating youth into the economic and political spheres. The so-called “street 
warfare” has dramatically spiked since early 2003 and has now by far eclipsed inter-
ethnic conflict over land, resources and employment as the main source of violence. In 
reply, the republic’s security apparatus, reinforced by federal units, are conducting 
special mopping-up operations against allegedly Islamic militants that result in yet more 
indiscriminate violence. The cycle of attacks and reprisals has rapidly evolved into a 
spiral of violence, which has taken life on its own. 
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Even though secession and self-rule have no support among Dagestan’s peoples 
and its Islamist movements have historically had different agendas, the porous border 
with Chechnya allowed for convergence of Dagestan and Chechen Islamists, 
culminating in joint attack on Dagestan and declaration of a unified Chechen-Dagestan 
Islamic State in August of 1999 (International Crisis Group 2008). After a short disarray 
and consternation, federal authorities responded by massive military campaign 
throughout the North Caucasus and resumed full-fledged war with Chechnya. Under 
Moscow’s pressure, Dagestan adopted an “anti-Wahhabism” law that has in effect 
criminalized unequivocally even many moderate young Muslims, rather than deprived 
radical Islamists of operational capabilities, as they have little difficulty recruiting 
young people who are chronically unemployed, traumatized by social injustice, and 
therefore predisposed to universal Islamic slogans.
25
 The law granted new 
administrative powers to the republic’s traditionalist Muslim organization, the Spiritual 
Directorate of the Muslims of Dagestan that was empowered with regulating activities 
in order to obstruct the proliferation of Wahhabism. Pervasive corruption and nepotism 
feed their grievances and drive them into radical Islamist movements with militant 
tunes. Indeed, indiscriminate repressions against moderate Islamists, high youth 
unemployment and a long-held sense of disempowerment and resentment against self-
sufficient elites, have been very helpful to reach out to younger generation which now 
embraces radical militant ideology and joins extremist groups like Shariat Jamaat. 
Although corruption is widespread in many regions of the North Caucasus, in Dagestan, 
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Territory of the Republic of Dagestan” was adopted on 16 September 1999. Article 14 prohibited all Wahhabi activities 




being coupled with a flourishing illegal markets and clan-based economic system, it has 
been unquestionably intertwined with society. According to the Memorial Human 
Rights Center (2009, 2011a), violence in Dagestan is mainly caused by militant Islamist 
groups, not inter-ethnic tensions. Although competition for land and political 
appointments always goes along ethnic lines, Dagestan’s ethnic complexity has 
mitigated tensions by encouraging allegiances between groups and has prevented the 
emergence of a dominant one. However, protected conflict between Avars and Dargins 
has been rekindled after an Avar, Mukhu Aliyev, became president. According to the 
International Crisis Group, electoral reforms in 2006 sought to “de-ethnicise” politics by 
ending ethnic electoral districts and introducing a general voting list (2008). As a result, 
the March 2007 parliamentary elections appeared to be a relative success: the elections 
were less an inter-ethnic competition then a personal duel between Aliyev and Said 
Amirov, a Dargin, for political and economic power (International Crisis Group 2008). 
There is a common yet unexplained tendency to analyze Dagestan in reference 
to Chechnya (Memorial Human Rights Center 2009, 2011a, 2011b; International Crisis 
Group 2008). Although these republics share a history of struggle against the Russian 
Empire’s expansion (most importantly during the fierce resistance organized by Imam 
Shamil in the 19 century that was defeated in Dagestan in 1859) many historical 
commonalities end there. Dagestan became an “autonomous” Soviet republic in the 
early 1920s. Russia, first under the Tsarist rule and later in the Soviet era, exerted 
tighter control over it by haphazardly playing on the balance between the many ethnic 
groups and creating both allegiances and cross-cutting cleavages. In the meantime, 
Chechnya endured territorial divisions and massive repression of its population that fed 
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a cycle of revolts and sustained secessionist aspirations. Unlike during the first war 
(1994-1996), when Dagestan welcomed and supported internally displaced persons, 
Chechens did not receive any kind of similar treatment during the second war, which 
started after field commanders Ibn al-Khattab and Shamil Basaev invaded Dagestan in 
August 1999. As I have already mentioned, separatism never had great appeal in 
Dagestan due to its ethnic complexity and centuries-long traditions of accommodating 
different ethno-linguistic groups. Likewise, proliferation of radical religious views had 
predominantly theological character without any secessionist tints. However, 
widespread poverty and resentment against indiscriminate governmental attacks on 
Islamic values continue to nurture connections between extremist Islamist movements 
throughout the North Caucasus regardless of their original ethnic propinquity. By 
default, all militant Islamists are associated with the Shariat Jamaat formed in 1999 by 
Rasul Makasharipov from his followers. Later, Chechen warlord Dokka Umarov 
employed pure Islamist ideology to promote an international concept of jihad and to 
reach out to younger generation to join local Islamist movements and to adopt the 
universal goal of establishing a North Caucasian Emirate through the so-called “Unified 
North Caucasian Front” (Memorial Human Rights Center 2009). 
Ethnic Representation and Electoral Politics 
Dagestan is the largest republic in the North Caucasus and the most ethnically 
diverse territory in the Russian Federation. Its predominantly Muslim population of 
2,576,531 includes indigenous Caucasians, who can be divided into those belonging to 
the Dagestani linguistic family, whose largest groups are the Avars, Dargins, Laks and 
Lezgins, and the Nakh linguistic family represented by the Chechen-Akkins. There are 
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also Turkic speakers (the Nogais and Kumyks), Persian and Russian speakers. 
Traditionally, each clan, or tukhum, unites a group of families related to each other by a 
common mythological male ancestor. Each clan has its historical area of habitation” 
(Yemelianova 1999:608), and these clans form villages or groups of villages known as 
jamaat, which make up the 34 ethnic groups (Ware and Kisriev 2000:5, 8).  The internal 
life of the clan is regulated by strict patriarchal norms, customary law (adat) and 
Shariat (Yemelianova 1999: 608).  According to Ware and Kisriev (2000), the political, 
kinship, and ethnic systems overlap and interlock, and people generally respect the 
customs and traditions of their neighbors despite occasional tensions, nationalist or 
separatist movements never attracted much interest. Avars are the largest ethnic group 
in the republic (29 %, 758,438 people); Dargins are second (17 %, 425,526); Kumyks 
are third (14 %, 365,804); Lezgins are fourth (13 %, 336,698).
26
 The smallest ethnic 
groups are the Laks, Chechen-Akkins, Tabasarians, Aguls, Rutuls, Tsakhurs and Azeris. 
The proportion of Russians in the population has dropped from 9 % in 1989 to 5 % in 
2002 (Alieva 2005). Historically, none of these ethnic groups has ever had its own state, 
but Avar and Kumyk principalities existed before colonization by the Russian imperial 
army. Traditionally, major ethnic groups populated certain parts of the republic. For 
example, Lezgins are mainly concentrated in the south, on the border with Azerbaijan, 
as are Tsakhurs, Rutuls and Aguls; Nogais inhabit the northern steppes; Kumyks have 
historically lived in the central plains; Avars and Dargins live in the mountainous 
regions, with strong concentrations of the former in the west and south west and of the 
latter to the south west of the republican capital city of Makhachkala. At the same time, 
                                                             
26 www.perepis2002.ru, the official source of the 2002 census. 
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many administrative districts include villages inhabited by entirely different ethnic 
groups than their majority population. Even though such an ethnic diversity has never 
meant large-scale inter-ethnic conflict, tensions between groups emerge at regular 
intervals. Obviously, the neutralising effect of several ethnic groups, none of which has 
a demographic majority or economic dominance, is one reason why Dagestan’s post-
Soviet transformation has taken less violent forms compared to its neighbors. Unlike the 
majority of Chechens who always see Russia as colonial empire, many Dagestanis 
chose to pledge allegiance to it and formed alliances among ethnic groups (Baev, 
Koehler and Zurcher 2002).   Thus, inter-ethnic tensions and ethnic politics frequently 
arise over administrative positions and land. For instance, when Dagestan was ruled 
from 1990 to 2006 by a Dargin, Magomedali Magomedov,
27
 the Avars, the largest 
group in the republic, made increasingly spirited demands. October 2006 changes in the 
electoral law and a new president, an Avar Mukhu Aliyev, have again shifted the 
balance. In Soviet Dagestan, formal and informal mechanisms for distributing political 
positions and respecting ethnic plurality for other important jobs (at universities, state 
enterprises and in public administration) were carefully crafted to satisfy the largest 
ethnic groups. That is why the three key positions (first secretary of the Communist 
Party, president of the Supreme Soviet and president of the Council of Ministers) were 
assigned to persons from the three largest national groups: Avars, Dargins and Kumyks.  
Moreover,   there was an unwritten law that the most important political position would 
                                                             
27 After a career in the Communist Party institutions of his district (Levachinski), Magomedov presided over the 
republic’s Council of Ministers from 1983. In 1987 he was elected president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 
Dagestan; in 1990 he was elected president of the Supreme Soviet of Dagestan, and in 1994 he became president of the 
republic’s collegial executive body. 
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be filled by a national and the second in rank by an ethnic Russian (or a Ukrainian) to 
channel unofficially information directly to Moscow.  
As Walker (2001) noted, Soviet authorities classified the mountain populations 
of Dagestan into nine distinct ethnic groups. The Avars and Dargins were the largest 
ones, in part because have have capitalized on their large numbers to become the two 
most influential ethnic groups in the political institutions of the republic, both during the 
Soviet period and following the breakup of the Union. The Avars have viewed 
themselves as the leading ethnicity in Dagestan, because of their numeric superiority 
and because the republican ruling elite has traditionally hailed from this ethnic group
28
. 
However, Dagestan’s most important leadership position, as Chairman of the State 
Council, was held by Magomedali Magomedov, a Dargin. Despite the guarantees 
provided in the republic’s 1994 Constitution stipulating that the Chairmanship would 
rotate between ethnicities, Magomedov was consistently able to split the Avar bloc to 
extend his tenure as Chairman (Ware and Kisriev 2001; Blandy 2006; Holland and 
O’Loughlin 2010). Said Amirov, also an ethnic Dargin, was elected mayor of the 
republic’s capital Makhachkala in February 1998. This gave the Dargins control of 
Dagestan’s two most important political positions, a monopoly they maintained until 
Aliyev, an Avar, replaced Magomedov in February 2006. Cornell (2001) has argued 
that the rivalry between the Avars and the Dargins has led to the increased 
marginalization of other, smaller ethnic minorities within the republic’s political 
structure and nascent interethnic tensions. In response to the pre-eminence of the Avars 
and Dargins in the Dagestani political system, other ethnic groups in the republic have 
                                                             
28 This prominence also has an historical basis; Imam Shamil, the leader of the Caucasian resistance in the 19th century, 
was an ethnic Avar. 
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at times reacted to their marginalization with increased political mobilization. Through 
their national movements, some Kumyks, Lezgins, Laks, and Nogays pushed for 
secession from the Russian Federation during the transition period of 1989–1991.  
Ibragimov and Matsuzato point out that “the nationalist movements in Dagestan during 
1990–1992 were characterized by a tendency to demand that Dagestan as a multiethnic 
republic be dismantled in order to create mono-ethnic republics.” (2005:238) A Lak 
national movement “Tzubars” in an attempt to force new elections and the resignation 
of certain government ministers organized the attack on the State Council building in 
Makhachkala in May 1998. At the same time, the Nogay national movement “Birlik” 
vowed for the creation of a Nogay autonomous region in the north of the republic, 
which would unite Nogays in Dagestan with kin groups in neighbouring Chechnya and 
Stavropol krai (Ware 1998). Likewise, “Sadval” advocated for the political unification 
of Lezgins living in Dagestan with those across the now-internationalized border in the 
south with Azerbaijan, either within Dagestan proper or as a distinct territory (Matveeva 
and McCartney 1998, Holland and O’Loughlin 2010). There is another salient example 
of ethno-political mobilization during the Soviet period. The Kumyks were uprooted 
from their traditional homeland in the lowland around Makhachkala and they composed 
less than a quarter of the total population in their historical areas of habitation by 1991 
(Kisriev 2004). The most radical elements in their national movement “Tenglik” were 
eager to go as far as to establish ethno-territorial self-governed unit and to resettle ethnic 
Laks, who had been previously moved to the western border of Dagestan after the large-
scale deportation of Chechens to Central Asia, in the outskirts of Makhachkala (Holland 
and O’Loughlin 2010). 
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With Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms and subsequent repeal of Article 6 of the 
Soviet Constitution in 1990 to remove the single party principle hit Avars, who 
traditionally held the post of first secretary of the Dagestan Communist Party. Soon 
afterwards, they felt consequences of being deprived of this exclusively important 
administrative leverage, as other ethnic groups rapidly turned it to their advantage. The 
peculiarities of this transitional period were reflected in the constitution that Dagestan 
ratified on July 26, 1994. That constitution established a system of consociational 
democratic political institutions that was unique in the world (Ware and Kisriev 2001a). 
Quite surprisingly, Dagestan’s system conformed to standard descriptions of 
consociational democracy, such as the one provided by Arend Lijphart (1977), that 
occur in ethnically and/or religiously segmented societies when political elites from 
various social segments cooperate through distinctive political institutions. The 
Dagestan’s system was consociational in the sense that it responded to the challenges of 
an ethnically segmented society in four main ways: (1) an executive body that was 
designed to promote interchange, consensus, and mutual trust among major groups; (2) 
ministerial appointments and legislative elections that ensured proportional 
representation; (3) a veto power that was meant to prevent any damage to the group’s 
interests; (4) regional autonomy for traditional ethnic territories. Indeed, Dagestan’s 
State Council (121 deputies), consisting of one representative from each of its 14 major 
ethnic groups, was the only collegial executive in the Russian Federation. Members of 
the State Council were chosen every four years by the republic’s Constitutional 
Assembly through a sophisticated process that tended to avoid ethnic tensions by 
encouraging candidates with interethnic appeal. This made the State Council not just the 
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only collegial executive in the Russian Federation, but also the only executive that was 
not chosen by popular vote. This system functioned quite successfully and addressed the 
following key challenges: (1) suppression of separatism and prevention of the republic’s 
partition; (2) mitigation of the inter-ethnic tensions through public discourse; (3) 
encouragement of political participation across ethnic and religious lines; (4) prevention 
of any secessionist movements or radical religious ideologies from gaining political 
weight and influence on political decision-making. 
Proportional representation was guaranteed in the legislature by an ethnic 
electoral system that reflected a group’s size and by system of “packet replacement” 
that filled multiple high administrative positions, whenever the replacement of a single 
minister was required in order to preserve ethnic proportionality. However, this 
consociational system had some inherent inconsistencies and procedural flaws. For 
example, the Chair of the State Council never rotated, as was required, among the 
Council’s 14 ethnic representatives. Instead it was usurped by the ethnic Dargin, 
Magomedali Magomedov, who resorted repeatedly to complex political bargains and 
constitutional manipulations in order to retain the position. 
29
 On the one hand, a 
collegial executive body was well suited to Dagestan’s ethnic heterogeneity and to its 
traditions of ethnic toleration and accommodation, which prohibit the exclusion of any 
group regardless of its size. Yet on the other hand, the collegial nature was inevitably a 
source of frustration for Dagestan’s larger ethnic groups, and particularly for the leaders 
of those groups who competed for a dominant position in the republic. Nevertheless, 
                                                             
29 After 1996, when Magomedov once again managed to secure his position as the chair of the State Council beyond his 





Dagestan is among the few territories in the North Caucasus region that have not fallen 
to protracted ethnic conflict or religious conflicts despite being the most ethnically 
heterogeneous republic the poorest republic in the Russian Federation. 
In 2000, President Putin created seven super districts overseen by 
plenipotentiary representatives. Beyond Dagestan, the South Federal district (YFO) also 
included Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetiya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, 
Kalmykia, and Adyghea, along with Krasnodar and Stavropol krays, and the Rostov and 
Astrakhan oblasts. The primary role of the Moscow-appointed representatives was to 
ensure that local constitutions and legal norms conformed to the federal ones and to 
enforce all federal policies in the region. Furthermore, Moscow also passed a law 
granting the Russian president authority to discharge executive heads of the federated 
entities and to ask the federal Duma to dissolve their legislative bodies. These drastic 
measures have significantly curtailed regional autonomy to the extent that local politics 
is now largely supervised by the plenipotentiary representatives and the Russian 
president. Although Dimitri Kozak, who was appointed in 2000 the plenipotentiary 
representative in the South Federal district, might be aware that corruption and 
criminality were feeding the spiral of violence and both could appear in a variety of 
forms at all levels in a society where the rule of law was subordinated to the use of force 
or intimidation, his analysis of the situation in Dagestan went so far as to consider the 
risk of the republic’s violent dissolution due to the  clan-based  local elites and the 
widespread corruption. Kozak also cited Dagestan’s growing potential as a breeding 
ground for extremism. To bound vested interests of local clans and stop the republic’s 
sliding into chaos, Kozak came forward with the plan to introduce of a direct 
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presidential rule (2007). Under populist slogans of national self-identification and self-
rule, this plan was rapidly wrapped up because of its vital threat to both local and 
central rent-seeking corrupt bureaucracy. However, Moscow managed to establish a 
military base in Botlikh and to limit the autonomy of the republics based on the size of 
their subsidies. Before he left his plenipotentiary position in September 2007 to become 
minister of regions, Kozak participated in a Makhachkala conference on combating 
extremism at which he heavily criticized Dagestan’s “ineffective” law enforcement 
agencies.
30
 Despite his vigorous efforts and the republic’s much anticipated 
anticorruption legislation, bribery and racketeering continue to stifle its society. 
Violent clashes between Chechen-Akkins and Laks in the district of Novolakski 
on 24-25 May 2007 is another textbook example that dates back to the 1944 deportation 
of the Chechen-Akkins (Issaev 2007). As soon as the victims of political repressions 
were officially rehabilitated and allowed to return to their homeland, a number of fierce 
conflicts with the Laks erupted in 1958. Despite the fact that Dagestani authorities 
pledged to implement a program on rehabilitation of Chechen-Akkins,
31
 nothing was 
done and all campaign was softly wrapped up in the next few years. Other ethnic groups 
that have clashed over land and natural resources include: Kumyks and Avars in 1991 
and 1995-1996; Kumyks and Laks; Azeris and Lezgins; Avars and Chechens in the 
district of Khasavyurt in August 2007 (Markedonov 2008). Between 1994 and 2006, 
Dagestan’s ethnic diversity was successfully dealt through an inter-ethnic cohabitation 
                                                             
30 In his speech at the Makhachkala conference, D. Kozak called into question the effectiveness of the authorities in the 
fight against extremism, UFO administration, 6 June 2007, at www.ufo.gov.ru/news/1414.html 
31 In particular the Dagestan Decree, Council of Ministers, 18 February 1992 and the 17 January 1997 decree of the 
Dagestan republic on the deadlines for implementing the federal law on rehabilitation of victims of political repression. 
The acts adopted are reproduced in R. Kurbanov and J.M. Kurbanov, Dagestan: deportation and repression. 
Makhachkala, 2001, pp. 248-258.  
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system, including representation of the fourteen largest ethnic groups in an executive 
body, the State Council. Magomedov was both the State council’s president and head of 
the republic. The whole system of governance was crafted to counterbalance centrifugal 
forces, as much as clashes, by appeasing the aspirations of ethnic groups. As the 
International Crisis Group’s Report (2008) points out, “between 1994 and 2006, 
Dagestan’s diversity was managed through an inter-ethnic cohabitation system, 
including representation of the fourteen most important ethnic groups in an executive 
body, the Gossovet  (State Council)”. Thus, Magomedov, as head of the republic, 
presided over the State Council. Even though the introduction of the office of president 
of Dagestan was repeatedly rejected in referendums in 1992, 1993 and 1999, it was 
finally set up in 2003.
32
 Even when this cohabitation system was still in place and the 
most important economic clans in the republic, regardless of ethnicity, were able to 
adapt to the changing rules of the game, the 2006 nomination
33
 of an Avar, Mukhu 
Aliyev, as president alienated the Dargin economic elite and exacerbated their 
grievances.
34
 The ethnic clashes that erupted in March 2007 in the Karabudakhkent 
district highlighted the significance of ethnic alliances and negotiated political 
appointments. These clashes took place between Kumyks majority (who believe they 
have been consistently deprived of administrative positions) and Dargins (who are only 
23.1 % of the district population) over the 25 March 2007 replacement by a Dargin of 
the local chief of police, a Kumyk. Kumyks grievances culminated in protest marches, 
while the inhabitants of the Dargin villages of Gubden and Gurbuki vowed to support 
                                                             
32 After the 2004 terrorist attack on Beslan’s school, which resulted in more than 300 deaths,  President Vladimir Putin 
abolished elections for heads of local government throughout the Russian Federation. 
33 In 2004 Vladimir Putin replaced free elections of local presidents by direct nomination through puppet parliaments. 
34 Since November 2004, Russia’s federal units only vote in federal parliamentary and presidential elections, local 
parliamentary elections and referendums. 
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the new chief of police, Magomed Isaev (International Crisis Group 2008). The Dargins 
viewed his appointment as recognition of their political weight and partial compensation 
for the loss of the republic presidency in 2006. The Kumyks, who enjoyed significant 
prestige and status before the 1917 revolution, appealed to their “historic right”, arguing 
that the Dargins had arrived after them. As demonstrations (estimated to be around 8000 
men armed with small weapons) seemed to devolve inevitably into bloodshed, riot 
police had to intervene to avoid further escalation and slipovers to neighboring 
administrative districts. Dargins responded quickly by demanding to redraw the 
Karabudakhkent district to include their villages. Dagestan’s authorities were left no 
choice but to reinstate that the internal republican administrative borders were 
permanent and not negotiable. However, fearful that outspoken demands for creation of 
a new ethnic district would set a dangerous precedent of internal separatism, the 
Dagestan interior minister’s revoked appointment of Isaev. Despite the fact that the new 
police chief was an ethnic Russian, this nomination only reinforced the Kumyks’ feeling 
of defeat (Caucasian Knot 2007).
35
 
As soon as the Congress of the Peoples of Dagestan, at its first meeting in 
October 1992, called for the creation of a federative structure in Dagestan with the 
guarantee of the right to political self-determination for its constitutive ethnic groups, 
Dagestan’s government has taken vigorous steps to muffle such calls for autonomy by 
drafting of the republic’s constitution, which formally inscribed a consociational 
political system that built on the historical legacy of the territorially- and historically-
based political communities (Ware and Kisriev 2001). Even though overtly secessionist 
                                                             




national movements have been marginalized and in some cases disbanded, the political 
undercurrents in the region, however, remained salient, with continued political 
posturing by ethnic elites (Tsapieva and Muslimov 2007). These omnipresent fears of 
fragmentation along ethnic lines arose in response to the transition to a presidential 
system in the republic in 2006. The “quasi-consociational” (Ware and Kisriev 
2001:110) system was significantly altered in 2003, specifically in response to the 
centralizing policies of President Vladimir Putin’s shake-up of the republic’s political 
institutions, as structured in the constitutional document, away from the fourteen-
member State Council, in which each of the eleven titular ethnic groups as well as the 
Russians, Azeris and Chechens was represented, to a directly appointed (with formal 
parliamentary improvement though) executive (Holland and O’Loughlin 2010).  
As Kisriev and Ware point out, Dagestan’s officials  evaded and resisted federal 
pressures for more fundamental changes that would have significantly affected its 
legislative and executive branches, and the 2002 election of Dagestan’s third State 
Council conducted in accordance with the provisions of the 1994 constitution (2005). 
However, in 2003 Dagestan was forced to yield to federal pressures for the fundamental 
transformation of its political system that included three stages: (1) the alteration of 
Dagestan’s ethnic electoral system prior to the election of its National Assembly in 
March 2003; (2) the acceptance of a new constitution in July 2003; (3) the change of 
regional electoral rules pushed forward by Vladimir Putin in 2004. On September 13, 
2004, President Vladimir Putin announced drastic electoral changes in Russia’s 89 
regions. Putin’s argument was based on the assumption that this reform would 
strengthen federal control by giving the Russian president power to nominate regional 
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executives (both governors and presidents) with the formal consent of regional 
legislatures (Kisriev and Ware 2005). Putin immediately used his power to appoint a 
regional executive to topple Magomedali Magomedov, a Dargin, and replace him with 
the Chair of the People’s Assembly, Mukhu Aliev, an Avar, in February 2006. As soon 
as Aliev was declared Dagestan’s first president, there was an attempt to downplay the 
role of ethnic identification in regional politics through greater emphasis on political 
parties; the system was first implemented in the March 2007 parliamentary elections. 
While this did not result in an increase in interethnic tensions, there was fierce 
competition between the republic’s political elites and reports of election-related 
violence (International Crisis Group 2008). President Aliev further consolidated the 
policies of the Dagestan’s government with regard to inter-ethnic relations: improved 
relations with Azerbaijan (in spite of vehement protests of radical elements among the 
Lezgins who continued to call for the redrawing of borders between the two states), as 
well as increased funding from the federal center, regarding the issue of Chechen 
repatriation in Novolakskiy administrative district (Shvedov 2009). Aliyev even called 
the issue of Chechen-Lak resettlement “the most difficult and most complex of all 
issues in the field of interethnic relations in Dagestan” (Shvedov 2009:67). Although the 
2006 Moscow-imposed change in executive leadership was initially viewed as a step 
towards combating the republic’s endemic corruption and preventing the Islamist 
insurgency from gaining more strength, the Aliyev strategies experienced mixed results 
in achieving these two goals (Smirnov 2006).  
Furthermore, in 2004 Putin eliminated the single mandate constituencies that 
accounted for half of the seats in the Russian State Duma, thereafter requiring that all 
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Duma representatives be seated from compiled federal party lists. Such a radical move 
effectively eliminated independent deputies in the Duma, reduced the number of federal 
parties to the pro-Kremlin ones, and allowed to alter the Constitution. Although a 
plethora of pro-Putin’s functionaries have vehemently argued that new electoral rules 
would reduce local corruption, simplify decision-making, and consolidate government 
response to national security threats, Dagestan’s ethnically segmented and traditionally 
pluralistic political system any appointment was tacitly sabotaged by local elites. 
Whereas local elites were previously bound by their need for a local political base, the 
Kremlin’s expanded influence has increasingly become the basis for their power and has 
contributed much to their insulation from local accountability. As a result, this vertical 
centralization has led to resentment among village leaders and municipal activists who 
previously constituted the core of local political bases, but who are now finding their 
roles to be increasingly irrelevant. It rapidly turned out that central appointments 
eventually increased local corruption because local bureaucracy was no longer 
accountable to local constituencies, which might otherwise have continued to exert 
some pressures to find common grounds for conflict-free relationship. In other words, 
centralized appointments inevitably reduce political access, so that if a corrupt official is 
in power position there will be fewer opportunities for local contenders to appeal it.  
Whereas opposition figures in Dagestan have previously looked to Moscow for support 
and advice, a system of centralized appointments leads to anti-federal sentiments among 
opposition as it resents the imposed forms of exclusion or suppression. Obviously, if 
there is greater corruption and abuse within a smaller circle of elites coupled with fewer 
channels for local political expression, more young men may feel humiliated, angry, and 
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pre-disposed toward radical views. Indeed, the North Caucasus is already full of young 
men who see no prospects other than those afforded by radicalism and violence. After 
decades of social and economic collapse, the only growth industries in the region now 
are law enforcement, drug-trafficking, and terror, each of which is inextricably linked to 
the others. 
Contrary to Putin’s slogans of counter-terrorist response to a series of blatant 
attacks in Russia, the sweeping electoral changes that he introduced voluntarily only 
increased insurgency in Dagestan and elsewhere in the Caucasus. These changes along 
with further implementation of federal party lists in the Duma elections proved 
counterproductive because such common electoral irregularities as vote-buying and pre-
election violence were no longer identified, protested, and investigated. Indeed, if 
Dagestan’s federal elections have regularly been characterized by fraud, and the above-
mentioned massive irregularities have usually favored the party in power, it would be 
irresponsible to suppose that such practices have occurred simply on orders from 
Moscow.
36
 Rather, it appears that federal election manipulation has always served the 
interests of the local elites in the first place. Put it simply, federal electoral fraud in 
Dagestan seems to benefit primarily Dagestani ruling elites. Kisrieve and Ware argue 
that for many Dagestanis, it makes no difference as to who is running Russia so long as 
enormous budgetary subsidies are received on time with few strings attached (2005).  
While Dagestanis are unlikely to manipulate single mandate district races among local 
candidates, they are more likely to manipulate party list elections to the Duma in a way 
that satisfies the tacit expectations of Moscow ideologists and maximizes the number of 
                                                             




representatives from Dagestan. As a result, Putin’s move to sway federal elections 
entirely away from single-mandate districts in favour of party lists is likely to increase 
the degree of federal electoral fraud in Dagestan as well as in other regions of the North 
Caucasus. It appears that the central appointment of regional governors is likely to 
exacerbate current Dagestan’s trends including the contraction of political elites, 
increasing corruption and economic disparity, and a growing sense of alienation, 
frustration, resentment, and anger. All of this seems likely to help sustain if not increase 
radicalism and terrorism in Dagestan. However, a shift toward greater dependence upon 
national party lists in future Dumas lists is likely to increase electoral fraud in favour the 
party of power, leading to increasing corruption along with the alienation and 
radicalization of the broader population (Ware 2008).  
The March 2007 parliamentary elections were the first to be held under the new 
law that aimed to “de-ethicize” local politics. Rather than replicating  inter-ethnic 
cleavages (as true inter-party rivalry is non-existent in contemporary Russian politics), 
the polls became a highly personalized struggle between President Aliyev and the 
mayor of Makhachkala, Said Amirov, for control of the local branch of President 
Vladimir Putin’s “United Russia” party and numerous economic entitlements. The new 
electoral law did not eliminate lingering ethnic cleavages, but it also did not stimulate 
greater inter-ethnic tensions. During the 2007 electoral campaign electoral abuses 
generally did not targeted people on the grounds of ethnicity. Under the 2006 electoral 
code, which created significant obstacles to participation for smaller parties, state 
control of political parties shifted balance in favor of the pro-Kremlin United Russia’s 
with vast migration from the Communist Party, which had always maintained broad 
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support in Dagestan. President Aliyev, a former first secretary of the local Communist 
Party, joined United Russia without reservation. Within days, entire local 
administrations that had been identified as communist or worked for a communist 
mayor or member of parliament defected to United Russia, something which as recently 
as the 2003 elections had seemed impossible (Glukhova et al 2003). To be on the ballot 
a party needed to have at least one candidate in each of the republic’s 53 districts. These 
deliberately crafted provisions made electoral campaign utterly chaotic and unfair as it 
was very difficult to find so many candidates in such a short time span, and those 
succeeded were physically pressured to withdraw.  Finally, five parties contested the 
March 2007 polls: United Russia, Patriots of Russia, the Communist Party, Fair 
Russia
37
 and the Agrarian Party. Although such abuses as vote-buying and ballot 
manipulations are also common in the North Caucasus,
38
 the fever that gripped 
Dagestan before, during and after the polls showed that the electoral changes had indeed 
increased tensions (Aliev, Magomedova and Dzutsev 2004). The struggle for 
parliamentary seats, which guarantee immunity, was fierce. Unlike in Russia’s thirteen 
other federal units, ten days elapsed between voting and the announcement of results, 
due to complete recounts in seven polling stations. United Russia gained 47 of the new 
assembly’s 72 seats (63.67 %), Fair Russia eight seats (10.68 %), the Agrarian Party 
seven seats (9.12 %), the Communist Party five seats (7.22 %) and Patriots of Russia 
five seats (7.07 %). This electoral campaign served as a clear demonstration of 
                                                             
37 This party, created on a federal scale in the autumn of 2006, claims to be the centre-left opposition, though it always 
supports Putin. 
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Dagestan’s fragile political fabric, hidden ethnic animosities, and the weakness of its 
rule of law. 
Religious Affiliation and Political Mobilization 
In religious context Dagestan also shows certain peculiarities that differentiate it 
from the Islam found in the rest of the former Soviet Union. These include peculiarities 
first and foremost an Arabic-influenced tradition more developed than anywhere else in 
the ex-Soviet Orient and one that continued until the Soviet era. Muslims in Dagestan 
also stand out in terms of their affiliation to the Shafi'i legal school, whereas other post-
Soviet Muslim communities adhere to the Hanafi legal school. From early times, the 
Islamic scholars were highly influential and had a great deal of contact with the Arabic 
world. Prior to the 1917 Soviet Socialist Revolution, there were more than 2,500 
mosques and some 2,000 religious schools where more than 40,000 pupils studied 
Arabic language, literature and theology. Even under the early Soviet rule, thousands of 
Islamic scholars formed a broad and well-educated class (5% of the population in 1917). 
In Dagestan, Islam was deeply rooted in written tradition – in contrast to Muslim 
regions of Eurasia and old Arabic manuscripts were carefully preserved as sources of 
religious traditions. The study of Arabic literature and religious texts contributed to the 
endurance of Islam under the Soviet rule. Arabic culture along with deep-rooted Sufi 
traditions with their forms of worship and a network of holy places shaped particular 
character of the local Muslim community. The anti-colonial resistance supported by 
Sufi brotherhoods continued into the 20 century. Notwithstanding the defeat of the last 
Muslim stronghold in the early 1920's by the Red Army and the creation of the 
Dagestan Soviet Socialist Republic in In January of 1921, tribal traditions and religious 
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rites continued to play a decisive role in spite of fierce persecution of the Sufi clergy 
who chose to not cooperate with the Soviet regime. 
Over 90% of the Dagestan people are Sunni Muslims of the Shafii legal school, 
making Dagestan the most heavily Islamic subject in the federation (Yemelianova 1999: 
626). Majority of practicing are under the direction of the traditional Spiritual Board of 
the Muslims of Dagestan, which is closely tied to the political elite and now has broad-
based quasi-governmental responsibilities over Islam and Islamic education in Dagestan 
(Yemelianova 1999, 619). The second largest group belongs to the Sufi Tariqat order 
with 15 brotherhoods all across the republic. This group is mainly focused on the 
development of many educational programs for schools and universities. They are not 
as political, emphasize toleration, and maintain high moral principles (Ware 1999). The 
Sufi Tariqat crystalized during the 19th century into a radical political force that resisted 
Czarist Russia under the heroic leadership of Sheik Mansur and Imam Shamil but was 
forced underground when the mosques were closed during the Soviet rule (Ware and 
Kisriev 2002: 3). By August  2000, there were 1,585 mosques, a remarkable increase 
from the 27 mosques that survived the Soviet Union. In addition, there were “12 Islamic 
institutions of higher education … 33 branch institutions of higher education, 136, and 
203 maktabi, elementary schools operated by mosques” (Ware and Kisriev 2002:4). 
Since 1994, there has been one officially recognized spiritual board (Mufiyat), in 
Dagestan: the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan (dominated by the Avar elite) 
and was designated the official dominant Islamic spiritual organization in Dagestan 
under a 1999 law outlawing Wahhabism (Ware and Kisriev 2002). Moreover, it has 
been given considerable quasi-governmental powers, is the “only recipient of 
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government and foreign Islamic funding and has been put in charge of the rapidly 
growing Islamic infrastructure: mosques, madrassas (Islamic schools), and Islamic 
colleges and universities” (Yemelianova 1999:619). Whereas there was a clear 
separation of Islam and the state, the Islamification of the political process resulted in 
increasing tension between the Avar-dominated SBMD and the Dargin-dominated 
government (Ware and Kisriev 2002), although the Muftiyat has worked with the 
government and has taken a pro-official position. In particular, it has advocated making 
Friday an official holiday, the gradual Islamization of education, and the introduction of 
some elements of the Sharia into the legal system (Yemelianova 1999).  
Disillusionment with traditional Islam gave a way to the Wahhabite critique of moral 
degradation, social irresponsibility and the corruption of the religious and political 
establishment consequently found an eager audience among the least fortunate mountain 
villages. Although only 2 to 3 % of the population of Dagestan expressed solidarity with 
Wahhabis, the actual percentage is probably closer to 7% of the population and is 
rapidly increasing (Ware and Kisriev 2002:9).  
Dagestan is largely characterized by conflicts between self-interested ruling 
elites (descendants of the Soviet legacy), impoverished population, and “Islamic 
renaissance” with its strong supranational appeal. As noted by Bobrovnikov (1995), 
clerics and Islamic scholars once again have an influential role in local government and 
parliamentary elections. Yet Islam has not managed to melt the various peoples in 
Dagestan into a religious society (umma). Nor does it seem to resolve lingering ethno-
political and ethno-territorial conflicts due the considerable ethnic differences in the 
various parts of Dagestan and ideological fragmentation of local clergy. However, all 
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ethnic movements always return to Islam as the founding block of their cultural identity. 
As a result, Islam has become a common denominator for the Dagestan’s multi-ethnic 
system, just as it did centuries ago when Arabic was the language widely spoken. All 
this makes Dagestan an interesting subject of study in the ethno-religious aspect of 
Islam in the former Soviet Union. Its multi-ethnic structure prevents both a monolithic 
Islamic movement and a dominant titular nationalism (Murray 1994).  
Relations between Dagestan and Chechnya have never been simple, as 
divergences between their political, ethnic and religious agendas attest. Dagestan’s 
political elite, unlike its Chechen counterpart, has traditionally been loyal to Moscow. 
The first war in Chechnya only reinforced this trend and weakened separatist aspirations 
in Dagestan. The August 1999 incursion of Chechen insurgents into the Kadar zone 
increased popular support for the local elite’s policy of maintaining relations with 
Moscow. Obviously, Islam has facilitated grassroots activities between Chechnya and 
Dagestan, but only to a certain degree. In the early 1990s separatist Chechen warlords 
turned to Dagestan’s religious community for theological assistance to reinforce their 
own credentials and to rekindle a sense of pan-Islamic solidarity. From time to time, 
Dagestani Islamists sought refuge in Chechnya during numerous counter-terrorist 
operations, and ultimately the migration of Islamists between the republics destabilized 
Dagestan and forged links between rebels committed to spreading jihadi Islam (Ware 
and Kisriev 2000). In 2005, according to the Government Committee for the Religious 
Affairs of Dagestan, there were already 1,766 mosques (including 1,107 cathedral and 
621 neighborhood mosques) and 15 Islamic institutes and universities. These numbers, 
however, differ from the official statistics, provided by the Dagestani Ministry of 
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national politics, religious affairs and external relations in 2010: 1276 Sunni mosques, 
827 neighborhood mosques, and 243 preying houses. There are also 13 Islamic 
institutes, 76 medrese, 2 cultural centers, one Union of the Islamic Youth, аnd 19 Shia 
organizations. The total number of students in institutions, medreses, and maktabas 
(primary religious school) is 8872 чел.39  
The establishment of Sufism – first by Sufi sheikhs in the eleventh century, 
which led to Derbent becoming famous Sufi center – was consolidated during the 
nineteenth century Caucasus War and is crucial to religious identity in Dagestan.
40
 
Throughout the Soviet era, Sufism was banned, and the authorities controlled religious 
practice through an official body, the Spiritual Board of Muslims in the North Caucasus. 
However, a post-Soviet religious revival, leading to profound changes in Dagestan’s 
religious fabric not only made it possible to practice Sufi traditions freely but also 
enabled Sufi clerics to ask for reconsideration of the role of religion in everyday life.   
At the same time, younger generation of Dagestanis who had been previously sent to 
major Islamic centers began to contest the way of praying of Sufis, whom they called 
“pagans” and “polytheists”. The Sufi clerics, supported by official propagandistic 
apparatus) responded vehemently by labeling these young radical Muslims “Wahhabis”, 
even though they considered themselves Salafis.
41
 
From the mid-1990s, two conflicted theological streams crystalized. The first 
stream was promoted by the moderate Salafi Akhmad-Kadi Akhtaev, who founded an 
                                                             
39Data provided by the Dagestani Ministry of national politics, religious affairs and external relations 
http://www.minnaz.ru/news_open.php?id=126  (accessed January 10, 2012). 
40 There are four brotherhoods in Dagestan: Naqshbandiya, which played a very important role in the resistance led 
by the Imam Shamil during the Caucasus War in the nineteenth century, Shaziliya, Dzhazuliya and Qadyriya. 
41 Wahhabis, unlike Salafis, look to the Hanbali legal school for guidance. The term “Wahhabi” has been used in the 
former Soviet Union to designate dissident Islamic trends, however, and is generally mistakenly applied to all Salafis. 
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organization to spread his teachings, Al Islamiya, which advocated the peaceful spread 
of Islam and its complementarity with Christianity, and the second one was led by the 
radical Bagauddin Kebedov, who adopted a confrontational approach, establishing a 
religious school in Kizilyurt to advance a Sharia society. Kebedov also used the Islamic 
Jamaat of Dagestan in 1989,
42
 as a platform to spread his jihadi teachings, and agitated 
residents of the villages of Chabanmakhi and Karamakhi in the Buynaksk district
43
 to 
refuse to recognise secular Russian law in 1997. After a number of encounters with law-
enforcement agencies, Bagauddin was forced into exile and took refuge in Gudermes 
(Chechnya), to where he moved his Jamaat and continued his teachings. Thus, 
Chechnya became a primary breeding ground for Islamists, who set up training camps, 
as Islamists from far abroad were generous in providing financial support and 
ideological moorings. Reportedly, in 1997 and 1998, Chechen and Dagestan political 
leaders and Islamists clerics who sought to establish a Chechen-Dagestan Sharia state 
met several times. It turned out, however, that their ideology and goals were quite 
different. At that time, secession of Chechnya from Russia was the main goal for 
Chechen insurgents and Islam was meant to galvanize the movement and prevent 
support for any projects conciliatory towards Russia (Malashenko 2001), while severing 
Dagestan from the Russian federation was not viewed by Bagauddin and alike as a 
viable resolution of their aspirations.  
                                                             
42
 The term jamaat (community) has had different meanings in Dagestan. Historically, it referred to the village 
communities that managed local defence and subsistence. In the post-Soviet era, the Arabic term was reinstated in 
religious language, first with reference to the Islamic organisation created by Bagauddin Kebedov and subsequently 
to groups of rebels in Chechnya and throughout the North Caucasus attached to the separatist Chechen military 
leadership.  
43 In June and July 1996, the chiefs of the Karamakhi and the Kadar administrations were killed by Wahhabis. In May 
1997, Wahhabis attacked Sufis in those villages. 
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In Dagestan the anti-Wahhabis discourse became official policy, executed by 
local authorities backed by federal resources. Despite the fact that Salafism had spread 
through Dagestan, this anti-extremist discourse was shared by large parts of the 
population because of the highly traumatic Chechen incursion in August 1999 and 
subsequent murderous attacks on local targets. As a result, numerous mosques were 
closed; Islamist literature outlawed and the most visible religious leaders were arrested 
or forced into exile. However, it is increasingly clear that such groups as Shariat Jamaat 
not only persist but are taking active roles in the escalating street war. Although a 
number of multiple Islamist organizations operate underground in Dagestan, Shariat 
Jamaat is the only one clearly affiliated with the Unified North Caucasian to spread 
armed resistance throughout the entire North Caucasus. Its videos, statements and press 
releases reproach the authorities of being “under Moscow’s thumb” and vow to 
eliminate “these munafiks” (hypocrites) and kafirs (infidels) – all terms applied to the 
representatives of law enforcement agencies. For example, according to a 30 March 
2007 interview given by its press secretary to Radio Svoboda, Shariat Jamaat seeks to 
create an Islamic state in the Caucasus. With no room for political negotiations Shariat 
Jamaat’s main goal is to free Muslim lands from Russian occupation and build a Sharia-
complying state. Accordingly, it is legitimate to target even unarmed members of the 
police, the ministry of internal affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and 




                                                             
44  I am reffering here to a number of consequitive statements of the so-called Shariat Jamaat’s activists posted 
regularly on http://kavkaz-jihad.blogspot.ca/  
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An independent survey conducted by the Institute for Studies of Ethnicity and 
Religion in Dagestan in 2001 found that 20 percent of the republic’s youth consider 
themselves moderate Salafis. Only 10 percent of the respondents referred to themselves 
as Sufis – traditionally the main Muslim branch in Dagestan. The survey also found that 
12 percent of the respondents favor the radical methods of struggle adopted by the 
North Caucasus militants. This survey was carried out in Dagestan’s largest cities – 
Makhachkala, Kaspiisk, Khasavyurt, Derbent, Izberbash and Kizilyurt – among 6,000 
respondents, including high school teens and university students.
45
 All of those 
surveyed described themselves as religious believers. Gereyev told the Kavkazsky Uzel 
(Caucasian Knot) website that a widening gap between rich and poor, rampant official 
corruption and discrimination against Muslims leave radicalization as the only attractive 
option for some young people (Dzutsev 2011a). If two years ago the insurgency 
consisted mainly of people aged 25 to 40, today the insurgents range in age from 18 to 
30 years old. One can understand why the government is losing this battle for young 
people’s minds if all it is doing is trying to scare them into submission without 
providing career and other life opportunities. An expert with the Russian Muftis’ 
council, Rinat Mukhametov, pointed to the paradox that better religious education was 
likely to prevent the radicalization of young people. According to Mukhametov, 
although there is no direct link between education and radicalization, there are no 
people highly educated in Islam among the militants (Dzutsev 2011a). Support for 
                                                             
45 According to a Dagestani expert on Islam, Ruslan Gereyev, the survey was conducted only in cities, and support 
for the rebels would have been even higher had the interviews been conducted in rural areas. (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, 
December 9, 2011). 
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Salafist groups in Dagestan among the local population is now at all-time high and that 
this republic is now the epicenter of a regional insurgency. 
According to Vatchagaev (2007), insurgents are mainly recruited from the Avar, 
Lak, Kumyk and Dargin ethnic groups in Makhachkala, Khasavyurt, Izberbash and 
Buynaksk, and the districts of Tsuntinski and Botlikh. The most conflict-ridden areas 
are Buynaksk, Khasavyurt and the capital, Makhachkala, where groups like Seifullah 
(the Sword of Allah) and Dzhundullah (the warriors of Allah) have the strongest support 
base (Vatchagaev 2007). Even though these groups operate with limited funds and 
scarce training, weapons (especially guns) are not in short supply as a flourishing 
underground market also meets local demand. With a major restructuring of the 
separatist underground underway, the current situation in Dagestan strongly resembles 
the Chechen, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkarian cases, where jihadi 
ideology has been taking root, causing violence to spread. Taken together, the cases 
demonstrate a shift from the 1990s, when separatist movements in the North Caucasus 
were predominantly secular and nationalist; now Islamist militants are increasingly 
adopting separatist rhetoric and violence (Sagramoso 2007, McGregor 2006, Hahn 
2007). With appointment of Kadyrov president of Chechnya in March 2007, relations 
between Chechnya and Dagestan have become more contentious, mainly because of 
Kadyrov’s unmasked ambitions to extend his power beyond Chechen borders. The level 
of mutual trust is dwindling from meeting to meeting as Aliyev and Kadyrov regularly 
trade recriminations, both refusing to accept responsibility for proliferation of violence 
in the region. Kadyrov’s repeated arguments assert that the “anti-terrorist campaign” in 
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Chechnya is over and the challenge to Chechen stability now comes from neighboring 
republics, including Dagestan in the first place. 
In return, Dagestan authorities accuse Chechen administration of involvement in 
forced disappearances near the border. During an October 2006 meeting in 
Makhachkala at which the disappearances were raised, Aliyev claimed that 47 men had 
been kidnapped since 2003. Indeed, Forced disappearances have become a serious 
problem in Dagestan. A conference organized on 25 June 2007 in Moscow by human 
rights groups produced alarming figures. According to the Moscow Helsinki Group, 68 
people were kidnapped in 2006 in Dagestan (Gannushkina 2007). The Dagestan law 
enforcement officials continue to blame the Kadyrov’s personal militias for conducting 
illegal operations that undermine law and order in Dagestan. In the meantime, Shariat 
Jamaat, that has taken responsibility for much of the violence, shows growing 
recruitment capabilities among young people motivated by an explosive mixture of 
frustration due to widespread corruption, economic exclusion and anger at the impunity 
police gets when carrying out raids against suspected religious extremists. Young 
people seek revenge against local law enforcement for arbitrary arrests, detention abuses 
and fabrication of evidence.  
Already present in the Caucasus during the Soviet period, black market, 
corruption and nepotism have become inextricably linked all aspects of everyday life in 
post-Soviet Dagestan to such an extent that president Aliyev himself acknowledged that 
the black market economy was at least 70 % of the republic’s GDP with a loss of tax 
revenues of approximately 6 billion roubles or around 290 million USD (Markedonov 
2007
 
). During a July 2006 speech at a regional meeting on criminal processes and 
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Dagestan’s financial market, Aliev admitted that: “Nearly 40 per cent of the active 
population works in the unregulated part of the economy, meaning a very large loss of 
earnings in fiscal terms and a large section of income stemming from illegal activities”. 
(Bobrovnikov and Roshchin 2006) In public perception, corruption is usually associated 
with the high levels of federal subsidy: 92 % in 2005, 87 % in 2006. In 2008, the 
Dagestan’s budget was 37.7 billion roubles (roughly 1.5 million USD), of which 30.3 
billion will come from the federal budget (80.37 %). The 2008 figures are expected to 
double in 2011. Despite the lowest gross domestic product, economic wealth is mainly 
concentrated in the hands of a few ethnic clans with powerful positions both inside and 
outside Dagestan. Pervasive corruption and exclusion push young people into radical 
Islamist groups, where they tend to  switch rapidly  from moderate Suni beliefs to 
Salafism because it challenges both  the omnipresent, corrupt political elite and 
submissive pro-official religious functionaries. The armed resistance has become the 
only receptacle for younger generation who is excluded from an economic and political 
system controlled by Dagestan’s 200 richest clans. (Smirnov 2008) Gerber and 
Mendelson (2009) report low levels of trust among young Dagestan’s males in the local 
government and the region’s courts. More recently, events in the republic have further 
undermined the credibility of the local political leadership. The October 2009 mayoral 
election in Derbent, Dagestan’s second-largest city, was widely viewed as indisputably 
fraudulent. A municipal court invalidated the results, a decision that was upheld by 
Dagestan’s Supreme Court and further supported by Moscow. This was seen as one of 
setbacks for Aliyev, who was viewed as a mentor to the improperly elected candidate, 
and opposition to the appointment by Moscow of an ethnic Russian to the post of 
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Dagestan’s Chief Tax Inspector (Leahy 2010). This resulted in Aliev being replaced in 
February 2010 by Magomedsalam Magomedov, the son of Dagestan’s former president, 
Magomedali Magomedov (Holland and O’Loughlin 2010). 
Conclusion 
Although Moscow’s support of the “traditional” elite, with which it has worked 
since the Soviet period, has prevented the Chechen conflict from spreading into 
Dagestan, it has not resolved decades-long problems. Federal policy (primarily based on 
personnel relationships between high-ranking officials) has only increased the gap 
between Dagestan’s society and its politicians and consolidated the ownership of the 
republic’s wealth by a small percentage of its population. By ignoring egregious 
violations of social justice in return for a certain degree of stability, Moscow has 
facilitated the continued exclusion of those on the fringes of society who now exhibit 
their dissatisfaction through violence. Along with the challenges from Moscow to bring 
the Dagestan constitution into closer compliance with the Russian Federation 
constitution, Putin has enacted measures to bring power back to the center. This was 
power that Yeltsin relinquished in the early years of the federation to appease the rent-
seeking local elites and prevent further separatist movements from gaining strength. The 
reforms have not agitated much negative response from the Dagestanis “who would 
welcome external control if it were sufficiently comprehensive and consistent to root 
out political corruption, institute the rule of law, and stimulate economic development” 
(Ware and Kisriev 2001b:8). However, Moscow’s attempts to enforce constitutional 
compliance, while ignoring rent-seeking clan system, might well result in further 
weakening Dagestan’s institutional ability to channel grievances and maintain order, 
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widening the cleavages between ethnic clans, and further consolidation of supra-ethnic 
pan-Islamic identity as the main mobilizing ideology of future conflicts. Moscow’s 
greatest limitation in Dagestan is that it cannot afford to employ comprehensive political 
reforms because this would mean essentially introducing participatory politics and 
democratization. This is impossible for two reasons: (1) it would require that Moscow 
allows the same reforms in Russia’s inner regions as well and (2) it would create 
conditions under which the North Caucasus starts questioning its status within the 




Chapter 6 -  Karachay-Cherkessia 
“We see the Sochi Olympic Games as a chance to reconcile the past atrocities perpetrated 
against the Circassian people. We believe that recognition of this historical tragedy will be a step 
towards peace in the Northern Caucassus.” 
  Cihan Candemir, President of the Federation of Caucasian Associations in Turkey, November 6, 2011. 
Introduction 
This chapter will explore ethno-religious composition and similarities between 
the use of religion and ethnicity as mobilising identities in Karachay-Cherkessia. I start 
by describing the socio-political context which preceded the mobilization, namely the 
emergence of mass political protest which transformed into a separatist movement, and 
resulted in deep societal cleavages between two titular ethnic groups. Then, in the 
section  Ethnic Nationalism as Mobilizing Ideology I proceed to the analysis of the most 
explosive issues of concern to contemporary Cherkessian political activism and explain 
why the ethnic consolidation of the Circassian peoples within the boundaries of distinct 
administrative and territorial formations becomes a powerfully destabilizing factor 
when the current political order in the Northern Caucasus breaks down further. I 
conclude that t is no longer the armed resistance that is pressing for the separation of the 
region from the Russian Federation: the Russian authorities’ actions and policies are 
essentially advancing the same cause by tacitly encouraging hostilities between two 
titular ethnic groups  in the North West Caucasus. 
Historical Background 
The Karachay-Cherkessian Autonomous Region was formed on April 12, 1922. 
By a law of the Russian Federal Socialist Republic (SFSR) of July 3, 1991, it was 
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transformed into the Karachay-Cherkessia Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the 
RSFSR. For the purposes of upgrading constitutional legislation, the words Karachay-
Cherkessia Soviet Socialist Republic were replaced with the words Karachay-
Cherkessia Republic in December 1992. The administrative Center of the republic is 
Cherkessk. The republic is situated in the foothills of the Northwest Caucasus. It is 
bounded on the west by Krasnodar Territory, on the north and northeast by Stavropol 
Territory, and on the east by the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic. The southern boundary 
runs along the Main Caucasus range with Georgia and Abkhazia. Karachay-Cherkessia 
occupies an area of 14 300 sq. km. Its population is about 500 700 people, 44% of them 
live in urban areas and 56% in rural areas. The population density is 29.9 people per sq. 
km (FSSS 2011).  
Ethno-Religious Composition and Historical Grievances  
The original inhabitants make up 40.9% of the population of the republic; they 
include Karachays (31.2% or 129 400 people) and Cherkessians (9.7% or 40 200 
people; also known historically as Circassians). (FSSS 2011) Altogether, there are 155 
900 Karachays in Russia, 83% of whom live in their native republic and 8.5% in 
Stavropol krai. The Karachays were among the so-called "punished peoples" exiled to 
Central Asia in 1944 and only returned to the region in 1957. The trauma of unjustified 
repression remains with them. As a result, Cherkessians, although smaller in number, 
controlled many of the privileged positions in the old Soviet system. As a result, a 
Karachay nationalist movement “Djamagha” has been actively pushing for an 
autonomous Karachay province since the late 1950s. Public support for this has waned, 
however, since higher Karachay birthrates look to push them above 50% of the 
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population in a few years and give them the ability to exercise “Karachay power”. This 
perspective frightens both Cherkessians and Russians, who are currently more allied 
than confronted. Large communities remain in their places of deportation in Kyrgyzstan 
(2500 people) and Kazakhstan (2000 people). There are 52 300 Cherkessians in Russia, 
76.9% of whom live in their native republic and 5% in Stavropol Territory. The rest are 
dispersed in small groups in the Caucasus and former Soviet republics. About 150 000 
Cherkessians live in Turkey (in Turkey, this ethnic designation also includes 
Abkhazians, Adygheans, Ossetians, and others). Russians make up 42.4% of the 
population of the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic, Abazians, 6.6%, and Nogais, 3.2% 
(FSSS 2011). There are also members of other ethnic groups, including Ukrainians, 
Ossetians, Tatars, Armenians, Greeks, and Kabardins. 
The Cherkessians are one of the indigenous peoples of the North West Caucasus. 
Their self-appellation is Adyge and they are titular nations in the republics of Adyghea, 
Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Smaller numbers of them are also found 
in adjacent Russian regions. Cherkessian, as much dispersed in their homeland as in 
diaspora worldwide, live in several constituent units of the Russian Federation that are 
cut off from each other both geographically and administratively. According to the 2002 
Russian population census, there were a total of 730 000 Cherkessians living in the 
Russian Federation at the time. Henze (1992) describes the Circassians as a people with 
a common language, common pride in their history and fierce adherence to traditions, 
but without a written language or recorded laws, and with an absence of administrative 
structure and of organisation to provide for their own defence. Even though Circassians 
and several other steppe and mountain peoples have interacted and mixed, some 
217 
 
Kabardin princes traced their ancestry back to an ancient leader named Inal, believed to 
have returned from Mamluk service in Egypt. The country was divided among several 
local princes. Like the ancient Greek cities, Circassian tribes were never united 
politically and raided each other and took prisoners and hostages and then met in 
councils on neutral ground to regulate relations between tribes and clans, debate 
political issues, and then hold games and festivals, but their feeling of common 
nationality was not institutionalised beyond this level (Henze 1992). In both the Soviet 
and post-Soviet periods, the terminology used in Russian academia and the 
administrative structures to define the Cherkessian was somewhat inconsistent. The 
official Soviet bureaucracy defined them as Adyghean, Cherkess, Kabardian and 
Shapsough depending on their place of residence and the dialect of the Cherkessian 
language spoken. The first Russians to come into regular contact with Cherkessians 
were paramilitary Cossacks, who established their settlements in the plains north of the 
Kuban River in the 16 century to patrol the Russian Empire’s southern frontiers.  
Cossacks, who included men of very diverse origins, struck up alliances with these 
leaders and married and intermingled with both Cherkessian and Nogay Tatars, 
adopting to a large extent their customs and style of life which was in many respects of 
a higher quality than the Russians had attained at the time (Henze 2007). 
The Cherkessian diaspora came about as a result of the Russian Empire’s 
conquest of the Northwest Caucasus in the1860s, when approximately a million people 
were forcibly removed from their land and deported to the Ottoman Empire. Up to a 
third perished from hunger and disease in the Russian controlled coastal areas before 
their departure, on overcrowded ships or in refugee camps on their arrival in Anatolia 
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and the Balkans. The descendants of those who survived the deportation, which 
Cherkessians and an increasing number of scholars and journalists call the “Cherkessian 
Genocide,” currently number around 3 million in Turkey and 400,000 elsewhere in 
Syria, Jordan, Israel, the USA and Western Europe. It is important to note that to the 
extent that disputes have arisen they are not inherently ethnic, but rather are social and 
economic with an ethnic component. In the early Soviet period ethnic disputes were 
subdued and practically nonexistent due to a well-functioning system of the social and 
economic incentives. The course of events in Karachay-Cherkessia demonstrate that, 
even in a multinational society where there are many prerequisites for ethnic tensions, 
responsible government attempting to provide a decent niche for successful economic 
development may be able to prevent conflict, because people who have some prospects 
of economic prosperity are not willing to sacrifice that perspective to the selfish interest 
of nationalist politicians. Ethnic divisions are also suppressed as a result of cross-cutting 
cleavages within ethnic groups in Karachay-Cherkessia. Among the Karachays, the pre-
revolution social classes included Bii (barons), Uzden (yeomen) and Kul (serfs). The 
Soviet regime led to the extermination or exile of the Biis, the dispossession of 
the Uzden, and the usurpation of power by Kuls. Despite representing only 40% of 
Karachays today, Kuls continue to hold most important social and political positions. 
Traditionally, Russians and Cherkessians tend to live in the lowlands, while Karachays 
populate the highlands, terrain suitable for root vegetables and sheep breeding.  
Even though ethnic tensions in Karachay-Cherkessia have calmed down after an 
intense conflict erupted in 1999-2001 over disputed elections, the risks of their 
conflagration still come from three sources: traditional Karachay-Cherkessian tensions; 
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animosity between these ethnic groups and the Cossacks, who are widely perceived to 
be a part of Moscow’s control system; and growing Islamic supranational groups 
drawing on local Muslims who have been marginalized by their respective ethnicities 
and often implicated in a series of attacks on local police and civilians. The potential 
source of conflict with the Cossacks has been overshadowed by the rift between the 
Karachay and the Cherkess since the election of Semenov as president (a retired general 
and a paternal descendant of one of the Karachay’s clan) in 1999. Unlike in Chechnya, 
Moscow always demonstrated a willingness to mediate, demonstrating a proactive 
attitude rather than the reactive Under Moscow’s pressure Semenov did not dispute the 
results of the 2001 parliamentary elections, suggesting that no one in the region is 
willing to replicate the fate of the Chechens. However, the growing power of radical 
Islamic groups associated mainly with ethnic Karachay and the response to this by 
federal authorities are becoming now of greater concern. 
The Karachays are a Sunni Muslim Turkic people who closely related to the 
Balkars and Abkhaz, and less closely to the Nogai and Kumyk of Dagestan. The 
Karachays group identity and cohesion, although relatively low compared to other 
ethnic groups due to strong tribal (rather than communal) identification, is in the process 
of crystalizing and solidifying due to the inferior socio-economic status coupled with 
enticing slogans of pan-Turkic and Islamic solidarity. They have lived in their native 
land for centuries, and, like many of the Muslim groups of the region, suffered 
tremendously under both Russian Imperial and Soviet regimes. In the 19th century, 
imperial Russia after decades of fierce battles conquered the peoples of this 
mountainous region, forcing thousands to flee to Turkey. Further displacement occurred 
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in 1943, when particularly the Karachays were accused of collaborating with the Nazis 
and deported by Stalin to unpopulated areas of Siberia and arid lands of Central Asia. 
Those who survived and returned from exile were not allowed to return to all of their 
traditional lands, creating tensions and disputes that carry on to the present. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Cherkess and Kabardins are closely related 
Cherkessian peoples living in the north of these republics, and the Karachay and Balkars 
are Turkic people living in the south, two ethnically divided republics, Karachay-
Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria, were created as part of the “divide and rule” policy 
of the Soviet regime. Thus, instead of two ethnically homogenous republics, Stalin 
created two mutually contemptuous (if not hostile) units laying the foundations for 
ethnic strife that began to reassert itself with the first presidential elections in Karachay-
Cherkessia in 1999.  
In 1999, Vladimir Semenov, an ethnic Karachay, won a run-off against Stanislav 
Derev, a Cherkess. Accusations of electoral fraud led to demonstrations and scattered 
acts of violence, as the Cherkess and another kin minority, the Abazins, began to vow 
for secession from Karachay-Cherkessia. Only Moscow’s intervention with 
unprecedented resources deployed to the region prevented violence. Semenov retained 
power until the 2003 presidential elections when, in contrast to 1999, only ethnic 
Karachay candidates ran for office; Semenov was narrowly defeated by Mustafa 
Batdyev. From time to time, Karachay-Cherkessia experiences waves of terrorist attacks 
associated with ethnic Karachay involvement in Islamic extremist organizations, such as 
Hizbu at-Tauhid, aiming to establish an Islamic state in the Caucasus. These type of 
attacks involves small car-bombs killing police and some ambushes targeting pro-
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governmental civilians on trains and in towns and lead to a series of reprisal arrests 
(Vatchagaev 2011). These attacks are also viewed by authorities and regional experts to 
be part of a wider Islamic campaign involving Chechens and other ethnic groups. While 
there are no official policies of discrimination against Islam, there have been an 
increasing number of radical Islamic groups in the region that are associated primarily 
with the ethnic Karachays (Vatchagaev 2007). Already grievances have been expressed 
by Karachay over some official policies, such as the refusal to open a Muslim Institute 
and the denial of permission to build more mosques. This remains a disturbing trend 
especially with the continuation of series of attacks committed against Cherkessian 
leaders in Karachay-Cherkessia, Adyghea and Kabardino-Balkaria.   
Ethnic Nationalism as Mobilizing Ideology 
Since 2005, the Cherkessian nationalist movement has been moving in a new 
direction as Cherkessians around the world have begun to mobilize demanding 
international recognition of the 19th century atrocities committed by the Russian 
Empire in its conquest of the Northwest Caucasus. However, numerous appeals for 
recognition of their brutal deportation as genocide have been rejected twice by the 
Russian Duma in 2006
46
 and in 2011 (Dzutsev 2011). Unlike the Chechens, who at least 
received an apology from the Soviet regime, the Circassians remain the only ethnic 
group in the North Caucasus omitted from any sort of apology from Soviet or Russian 
authorities for the historical injustices they experienced in the 19th century. In the 
international arena, however, the Cherkessian diaspora has been much more successful 
in approaching this goal. Thus, on March 19-21, 2010, representative Cherkessian from 
                                                             




six different countries participated in an international conference organized in Tbilisi, 
Georgia: “Hidden Nations, Enduring Crimes: The Cherkessians and the Peoples of the 
Caucasus Between Past and Future.” The conference offered an unprecedented 
opportunity to examine the problem as the Georgian parliament had begun to examine 
evidence from historians and scholars as to whether the above-mentioned deportation 
committed against the Cherkessian constitute genocide. After some deliberations, on 20 
May 2011 Georgia’s parliament formally recognised the Cherkessian Genocide which 
took place towards the end of the Russian Empire’s conquest of the region, culminating 
in 1864. Georgia became the first country to recognize 19 century forced deportations of 
Cherkessians by the Tsarist Russia in the northwest Caucasus as “genocide”.47 Such 
conferences attended by US, Turkish, and European scholars (out of curiosity rather 
than professional interest) are held in the countries where Adig communities influence 
local politics and able to provide favourable media coverage. The Adig nationalist 
ideology is also diffused particularly among the younger Adig generation through a 
number ethnic organizations (the Cherkessian Congress in Adyghea; the Kabardin 
Congress, The Independent Public Research Center, and the Public Human Rights 
Center in Kabardino-Balkaria).  Karachay and Balkar activists are also actively 
engaging into interpretations of myths about the history of their kin, being convinced 
that the Karachay and Balkar peoples who are actually of the Turkic origin are Alans 
and thus are somehow entitled to the territories formerly owned by the latter. Beyond 
                                                             
47 The Georgian Parliament passed it with 90 votes to 0 a resolution saying that “pre-planned” mass killings of the 
Circassians by the Tsarist Russia in second half of 19 century, accompanied by "deliberate famine and epidemics", 





the abundance in mass media of materials espousing religious extremism and 
intolerance, the teaching of history in republican educational institutions also 
contributes to inter-ethnic tensions in Karachay-Cherkessia as the proliferation of 
history textbooks presenting the past from narrow ethnic perspectives found propitious 
ground for perpetuating hostilities between various ethnic groups. 
Many experts believe, however, that Georgia took obviously a political decision 
(de Waal 2011, Dzutsev 2011). Apart from the fact that it is clearly a result of Georgia’s 
current post-war rhetoric with Russia, if Georgia really aspires to the moral leadership 
of the Caucasus, it may also recognise the Armenian genocide, something Armenian 
groups have requested on several occasions. Moreover, as Thomas de Waal (2011) 
rightly points out, it is striking that Georgia has only recognised as genocide the Tsarist 
murder of Cherkessians and not the very similar murder of Abkhaz in 1867 and 1877. If 
it would also recognise deported Abkhaz as refugees, it would be hard to disagree with 
Abkhazian efforts to bring about the return of its diaspora. It would also undermine 
Georgia’s claim that Abkhazia’s independence project is rejected by a majority of the 
people who have a right to live there. It seems unilateral for the parliament of Georgia 
to be contemplating a resolution declaring the 1864 deportations of the Cherkessians to 
be genocide. Cherkessians and Abkhaz are ethnically and linguistically related and the 
1867 deportations were a continuation of what the Russian imperial government had 
done in Circassia just to the north only three years before (de Waal 2011). Any outbreak 
of fighting between the two groups would not quickly end before the international 
community could understand what was happening. Clashes between the two ethnic 
groups would likely force Russia to militarily intervene on behalf of peace and stability 
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creating ethnic repercussions in Kabardino-Balkaria and Adyghea. Shebzukhov’s 
assassination is only the most recent in a series of attacks committed against 
Cherkessian (Adige) leaders in Karachay-Cherkessia. In the two other Cherkessian 
republics of Adyghea and Kabardino-Balkaria, political leaders have been assaulted and 
hospitalized, but rarely has a murder taken place so openly and demonstratively.
48
 With 
the 2014 Sochi Olympics on the horizon, the Kremlin could be gambling that a low-
intensity conflict in Karachay-Cherkessia would dampen the activity of the Cherkessian 
nationalist movement (both in the Caucasus and among its 7 million strong overseas 
diaspora) by diverting the attention of Cherkessian nationalists away from their plans of 
opposing the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Thousands of Cherkessians around the world are 
mobilized annually to protest against the Sochi Olympics as they prepare to mark 
Cherkessians Memorial Day on May 21. The eruption of inter-ethnic strife in Karachay-
Cherkessia in effect could neutralize the Cherkessians movement and be Moscow’s first 
step to redrawing the map of the Northwest Caucasus. 
The first wave of Cherkessians nationalist activism crystalized in the early 1990s 
during Boris Yeltsin’s period. Within a few years, it gained popular support and became 
a key player in the struggle for power in the North Caucasus.  Even though most of the 
demands of the nationalists were heard and acted upon by the federal authorities
49
, in 
Karachay-Cherkessia they found themselves locked in a secondary position under the 
Karachay majority. After Putin became President, the International Cherkessian 
Association was gradually taken over by the pro-Moscow functionaries of the ruling 
                                                             
48 Fral Shebzukhov, an adviser to Karachaevo-Cherkessia’s President Boris Ebzeyev who was in line to become Prime 
Minister, was murdered on May 12, 2010 in Cherkessk. 
49 For instance, Adygheya’s status was upgraded to a republic. 
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Kabardin elites.  By 2000 some of the leading members who refused to be co-opted, 
including Ibragim Yaganov and Valery Khatazhukov, had been excluded from the 
political scene, leaving no functioning independent nationalist organisations. Thus, post-
Soviet local bureaucratic elites, who had already adapted to post-Soviet political 
realities firmly restored themselves to positions of influence and integrated these 
nationalist movements into the pro-Kremlin organizations (Tlisova 2008, Light 
2008).  Various religious movements began to fill the social vacuum that had been 
created first by the collapse of the Soviet Union and then by the subsiding appeal of 
nationalism. This vacuum has been rapidly filled by radical Islamists indiscriminate law 
enforcement brutalities and political marginalization radicalized those, who were 
already alienated youngsters affected by social vices such as alcohol and drug abuse, a 
breakdown of moral values and lack of employment. In spite of the fact that the 
Cherkessian nationalist movement are still run by veterans of early 1990s, the situation 
has been changing. A younger generation of activists, unlike the veterans, has no 
experiences of the war in Abkhazia and is not bounded by the traditionally unquestioned 
authority of the elders in Cherkessian society. At present, Cherkessian politics in the 
Northwest Caucasus is shaped by two major approaches: 
The International Cherkessian Association (ICA): the ICA, which was founded 
in 1991, is actually an umbrella organisation comprising the main Cherkessian 
organisations of the time in the Caucasus and in the diaspora in Turkey, Europe, the 
USA, Syria and Jordan. It was very influential during the war in Abkhazia in 1992-93 
and then in Karachay-Cherkessia during the political power struggle in 1998-99 
between the Karachay and Cherkessians. However, after falling under the full control of 
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the pro-Moscow Kabardin elites in the early 2000s, the ICA leaders have repeatedly 
stated that they no longer intend to engage in ethnic politics and are merely concerned 
with the cultural and linguistic needs of the Cherkessian community. Nevertheless, the 
Adige Khases in Adyghea and Karachay-Cherkessia, under the respective leaderships of 
Arambi Khapai and Mukhammed Cherkesov, have begun actively engaging in ethnic 
politics.  Their position on political issues such as the unification of Cherkessian 
peoples or the Cherkessian Genocide thus differs significantly from the official position 
of the ICA, of which both organisations are members though.  
The non-aligned groups of Cherkessian activists that have a different support 
base pursue different recruitment strategies and are very keen to engage with 
international political actors for their cause, all of which distinguishes them from the 
ICA. “The Cherkessian Congress”, “Youth Khase” and “Khase” in Adyghea, Karachay-
Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria come into this category as all of them have come 
into being in the late 2000s. As a common reason, they were born out of frustration with 
established organisations and their perceived political inactivity and rent-seeking. The 
leading figures are Ruslan Keshev, Ibragim Yaganov, Murat Berzegov and Fatima 
Tlisova.  The last two have been hiding in the US after being repeatedly subjected to 
threats and physical attacks for their political and journalistic activities.  
There has been another surge of activity of various Adig organizations (Adyghe-
Khasa, the Cherkessian Congress, the International Cherkessian Association ) in the late 
2000s (Tlisova 2008, Besleney 2010). The radical wings of these groups – in many 
cases based outside of Russia – advocate for  a narrow-minded historical vision and 
assessments of historical events and the latest developments without recourse to 
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scientifically-substantiated  facts and artefacts , and vehemently vow for “restoring the 
historical justice” for the Adygs. From this perspective, the inevitable amalgamation of 
Russian and worldwide Adyg groups  pursue the following objectives: 
- Russia is to be compelled to recognize the genocide of the Cherkessian people 
that took place during the 19 century Caucasian War; 
- Ethnic Cherkessians who are descendants of emigrants and reside abroad are to 
be granted Russian citizenship through a simplified procedure; 
- A new subject of the Russian Federation is to be established that would unite 
the territories historically inhabited by the Cherkessians (Adyghea, Kabardino-Balkaria, 
and Karachay-Cherkessia, and Krasnodar krai) with possibility of self-rule. The latest 
objective was already articulated in public through unanimous endorsement by a 
conference that convened at the University of Columbia in April, 2009. A number of 
leaders of the Adyg community went as far as to call on delegates to form an Adyg 
government in exile.  
Mr. Cihan Candemir, President of the Federation of Caucasian Associations in 
Turkey, delivered a speech to European deputies on 6 November 2011 detailing the 
history of conflict in the Caucasus and the current struggle of the Circassian people to 
maintain their language and cultural identity listed the following actions that must be 
taken to ensure the survival of their national identity: 
“1. A new constitution respecting human rights must be established: A new civil 
and modern constitution based on basic human rights and freedoms, in accordance with 
universal norms, should be established. Any restrictions on languages, religions, and 
cultures of citizens must be removed. All international conventions guaranteeing human 
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rights and the development of language and cultural rights must be ratified and applied 
without reservation. 
2. Identity and cultural rights must be guaranteed: All obstacles to the 
declaration and preservation of Circassian identity must be removed and the existence 
of Circassians as a community and culture must be recognized. Circassians must be able 
to give Circassian names to their children and the places they inhabit.  There must be an 
active fight against discrimination and any kind of racism, and a particular focus on 
eradicating all expressions encouraging discrimination and hatred on the basis of 
language, religion, ethnicity and gender in school books. 
3. Education is native languages must be guaranteed: The government must be 
supportive, not only permissive, of preservation of the language and culture of its 
citizens. In this regard, there must be Circassian language classes starting from primary 
school and all the restrictions impeding language teaching in kindergartens and 
associations must be removed.  Language courses must be started by public training 
centres and similar institutions and language teachers must be trained.  In addition, we 
call for academic research in any language to be allowed and for graduate and under-
graduate programmes to be opened. 
4. Circassian TV and radio broadcasting must be established: Full-time radio and 
television broadcasts must be aired solely in Circassian languages and private 
publication/broadcasting agencies must be supported. 
5. Non-governmental organizations pertaining to Circassian culture must be 
supported: All non-governmental organizations working for preservation and 
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development of Circassian culture must be given active support by the Turkish 
government. 
6. Right to repatriation must be given: 21 May must be adopted as the symbolic 
date for the genocide and the exile of Circassians.  In addition, Circassians should also 
be given the right to return to their homeland.  To ensure this ability, transfer of social 
rights must be guaranteed for those Circassians who would like to return to Caucasia 
and agreements on the transfer of these rights must be entered into immediately. 
7. Relations with Northern Caucasian Republics must be strengthened: 
Economic relations with Northern Caucasian Republics, where the relatives of the 
Circassians in Turkey live, especially the Republics of Adyghey, Karachay-Circassian, 
and Kabardino-Balkaria must be strengthened.   Citizens who settle in Northern 
Caucasia or those who enter business relations with this region must be supported, and 
scholarships must be granted to the students studying at universities in these countries. 
8. Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be recognized: Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
must be recognized as sovereign states.  Transport between Trabzon, Istanbul and 
Sokhum must be re-established immediately. Military aid to Georgia must be 
suspended. Economic, cultural, and educational cooperation among institutions and 
organizations in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Turkey must be developed.”50 
Thus, the most explosive issues of concern to contemporary Cherkessian 
political activism are: 
                                                             
50 Cited from Cihan Candemir’s  Speech Addressing Participants in Circassian Day at the European 
Parliament, http://www.unpo.org/article/13522 (accessed December 20, 2011). 
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The 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi
51
 
Skakov and Silaev  argue that one factor behind the intensification of interest in 
the historical grievances of the Cherkessians is the  2014 Winter Olympics in Krasnaya 
Polyana, a settlement that was created on the site of the Cherkessian mountain village of 
Kbaade (2010:3). There is a broadly accepted perception amongst the Cherkessian 
peoples that Sochi was the last bulwark in their resistance to the Russian Empire’s 
conquest of Chircassian lands. As such it holds a significant place in the collective 
Cherkessian consciousness. For this reason there was indignation at President Putin’s 
speech to the International Olympics Committee in July 2007 when he listed the ancient 
Greeks, Kolkhi and Cossacks amongst the former inhabitants of Sochi, but did not make 
any mention at all of the indigenous peoples – Cherkessians. To make thing worse, the 
Russian Olympic Committee invited a Cossack dance troupe to the Vancouver 
Olympics to represent the culture of the region.
52
 As Skakov and Silaev point out 
(2010), several Cherkessian activists, however, speak of an allegedly joint Russian-
Abkhazian position in favour of holding the games in Sochi. The reason for these 
differences can be found not only in the traditional arguments between the Cherkessian 
and the Abkhazians national movements, but also in considerations of the very 
materialistic nature. The Olympic Games in Sochi are expected to bring significant 
                                                             
51 An additional factor behind the tension between the Russian authorities and the Cherkessians in the run-up to the 
Olympics is the creation in 2010 of the Northern Caucasus Federal District (NCFO), which officially divided Adygea 
(and Shapsugia) from the other administrative subdivisions containing a Cherkessian ethnic element, (the KBR and the 
KChR), and created a bureaucratic obstacle to the inclusion of Cherkessians of the NCFO in activities connected to the 
Olympics. 
52 Historically, the paramilitary Cossacks units were primary combat forces who played a pivotal role in the demise of 
historical Circassia, so this was just adding insult to injury. 
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profits for quasi-sovereign Abkhazia from tourism, supplying construction materials, 
and smuggling, while the elite of the Cherkessian community remains marginalized.
53
 
In his assessment of  Cherkessian position on the issue of holding the Winter 
Olympics in Sochi, declared by President Medvedev to be another “Russian National 
Project”, Besleney points out three distinct attitudes (2010). First, few organisations, 
such as the Cherkess Congress, want the Games to be cancelled.  They insist that the 
Olympics cannot be held on land where thousands of Cherkessians were murdered in 
the Russo- Cherkessian War and that 2014 is the 150
th
 anniversary of what they call 
“the Cherkessian Genocide”. Second, other groups, including the Adige Khase of 
Adyghea and many intellectuals and academics in the Cherkessian world, want 
increased and visible Cherkessian participation, similar to the role of North American 
and Australian natives in past Olympics. The third attitude was that of the ICA and 
reflected the official Russian position that there should be no special Cherkessian 
dimension at all (Besleney 2010:2). However, a vigorous campaign of increased public 
attention mounted by the other groups in recent months has somehow forced the ICA 
and its member organisations towards a gradual acceptance of the second approach. In 
addition, the Adyghea Parliament made an appeal to the Russian Government for the 
inclusion of what they called a “Cherkessian cultural element” in the Olympics. Even 
Alexander Khloponin, the first appointed head of the newly-created North Caucasus 
Federal District, keeps saying that the Games should have a Caucasian flavour, given 
that there has been none at all in the preparatory discussions over the past three years 
                                                             
53 Nonetheless, the most important source of mounting tensions in the run-up to the 2014 Olympics is not the over the 
provenance of the Sochi region, but the problem of relations between the Russian authorities and Cherkessian/Abkhazian 




(Besleney 2010). Under such pressure of the looming international pro-Cherkessian 
media coverage, the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) grudgingly supported the 
inclusion of Cherkessian themes in the cultural programs at the Sochi Olympics in 
2014, a concession to those Cherkessians who felt Moscow had been planning to ignore 
them and a transparent effort by Russian officials to derail the efforts of other 
Cherkessians who hope to block the Sochi games. It is likely that some Cherkessians 
activists will indeed decide to back away from the efforts to block the games in return 
for financial entitlements in the coming months. This latest decisions by the ROC 
suggests that Moscow is increasingly concerned about the ongoing Circassian campaign 
against the most vociferous propagandistic events, especially because that effort is 
gaining support not only among Circassian diaspora in Turkey, Jordan, Europe and the 
United States but also because it is drawing the attention of European politicians and 
environmental activists. 
The issue of “Cherkessian Genocide” 
There is an almost universal agreement across the whole spectrum of 
Cherkessian society on the concept of the Genocide against the Cherkessian nation by 
the Russian Empire. Furthermore, the parliaments of both Kabardino-Balkaria and 
Adyghea passed laws, in 1992 and 1996 respectively, officially recognizing what they 
named “the Cherkessian Genocide” and also appealed to the Russian Duma for such 
recognition (Besleney 2010). This issue becomes divisive, as Besleney points out ,when 
organisations want to elevate the problem to international dimension by co-opting with 
the Cherkessian diaspora (2010). A good example of this would be the protest actions of 
some diaspora Cherkessian activists against the Sochi Olympics during the last Winter 
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Olympic Games in Vancouver. More recently in March 2010, following a conference on 
the issue in Tbilisi, an official appeal was made by Circassians delegates to the 
Georgian Parliament to recognize the Cherkessian Genocide (Besleney 2010). These 
efforts resulted in Georgia’s parliament formally recognised the Cherkessian genocide 
which took place towards the end of the Russian Empire’s conquest of the region, 
culminating in 1864.  
As I have already mentioned, Georgia became the first country to recognize 19 
century forced deportations of Cherkessians by the Tsarist Russia in the northwest 
Caucasus as “genocide”. While new activists want to further push the issue wherever 
possible, the established or state sponsored organisations are prone to a more 
conciliatory position with regard to the Russian authorities (Besleney 2010). On the one 
hand, it is a factor in the collective historical memory of the Cherkessian peoples, in 
their allegiance to a common historical narrative. On the other hand, the narratives of 
the numerous sacrifices attributed to the Cherkessians during the war with the Russian 
Empire from 1820s to the 1860s, and during their subsequent resettlement in the 
Ottoman Empire, are often used by the local elites of the Cherkessian republics to exert 
pressure on the federal authorities for further subsidies and subventions. At the same 
time, some specialists cast doubt upon the validity of applying the term “genocide” to 
the policy of the Russian Empire (Skakov and Silaev 2010). This critique stems not only 
from the fact that this term came into use in international law only after the Nuremberg 
trials, but also with the fact that the Russian empire did not seek to murder entirely the 
Cherkessians as an ethnic group. Rather, it is more appropriate to describe the policy of 
enforced resettlement in the Ottoman Empire as ethnic cleansings. However, the 
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outright denial of the Cherkessian sufferings as genocide does nothing to facilitate 
interethnic dialogue in the North Caucasus, but rather solidifies more radical position of 
the Cherkessian diaspora (Skakov and Silaev 2010). Even though after the Georgian-
Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, in which volunteers from the Cherkessian republics also 
played an active role by virtue of their ethnic kinship with the Abkhazians, the 
consolidation of the Cherkessian peoples had reached a new level, sufficient to 
transform the Cherkessian national movement into a new political player in the 
Caucasus, it did not happen (Skakov and Silaev 2010).  
Despite repeated attempts to create a single leadership for the Cherkessian 
national movement, there has been no visible success. Experts indicate that the reasons 
behind the failure of the Cherkessian national movement to come up with consolidated 
position are multiple. At present, various associations and centers aspire to represent the 
interests of the Cherkessian ethnic group. A few of them engage in cultural and 
educational activities, while others look out for opportunities to be active in politics, 
intervening frequently in the interests of various political actors in the region. As a 
result, Turkey-based Cherkessian organizations split in their attitude towards Russo-
Georgian in 2008 as well as in their intention to raise the question of Russian 
responsibility for the Cherkessian genocide carried out by the Russian Empire at the 
international level before the 2014 Olympic Games (Skakov and Silaev 2010). Political 
analysts suggest that contrary to the fact that Cherkessians have expected Turkey to 
back their efforts to restore justice in their homeland, Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations 
and domestic situation, together with Russia’s ability to play on both, severely limited 
Ankara’s ability to play that role. In his article written for the Prague-based information 
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agency “Caucasus Times”, Murat Kardanov outlines the main reasons why Turkey, 
despite the presence of a large Cherkessian diaspora and the role its members play in the 
Turkish armed forces, will never be the ally Cherkessians had hoped for. First, Turkey 
is extremely reluctant to press for Russian recognition of the genocide of the 
Cherkessians because that it will immediately change Russia’s stance toward the 1915 
mass murder of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, something the Turks are desperately 
trying to avoid. Second, Turkey is unwilling to play an ethnic card against Russia 
because it recognizes that Russia could play an ethnic card back with greater success, 
targeting the Kurdish national movement in Turkey in particular. Third, Turkey is 
vigorously trying to assert itself as  a key player in the larger geopolitics of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, a possibility that requires some level of cooperation with 
Moscow and that many in Ankara believe would be undercut if the Turks became more 
heavily involved in Cherkessian issues that temper with Moscow’s internal affairs. 
The republican status of Adyghea is another cause of continual friction between 
Cherkessians and the federal centre, as Moscow seems to have made plans to merge it 
with Krasnodar Krai, in which Adyghea is a geographical enclave. Among other issues 
Cherkessian activists currently have with Moscow are: the erosion of federalism and the 
diminished political autonomy of the Cherkessian republics under Putin’s 
administration; the abolition of presidential elections; the lack of local independent 
representation; the removal from passports of sections in non-Russian languages; forced 
changes to republican constitutions; general lack of freedom of expression and 
democratic rights. There are also serious conflicts between Cherkessians and the 
Mountain Turks (Karachay-Balkars) in both Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-
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Balkaria over political power and ownership of certain strips of land, both historically 
and currently, which have destabilized these republics for the past decades. There have 
been calls from Cherkessians for separation from Karachay-Cherkessia and for the 
reinstatement in the form of a republic of the Cherkessian Cherkessian Autonomous 
Oblast, which existed before 1957. Conversely some Balkar organisations have 
repeatedly voiced their desire to secede from Kabardino-Balkaria in order to establish a 
Balkar republic. The counter project supported by many Cherkessian activists (except 
for ICA, of cause) demands the creation of a single Cherkessian republic within the 
Russian Federation comprising Cherkessian populated lands in the Northwest Caucasus 
and Cirkassian diaspora. This idea is generally supported by all Cherkessian 
organisations as first significant step towards resolving other lingering problems. In 
particular, they want the Russian Federation to acknowledge responsibility for the 
historical injustice the Cherkessians suffered under its predecessor, the Russian Empire 
by granting the Cherkessian diaspora special rights and some financial assistance to 
enable them to return to their historical homeland. In fact, Karachay-Cherkessia and 
Kabardino-Balkaria republics already had specific legal provisions covering the return 
of the diaspora in the early 1990s. However, these legal provisions were amended to 
comply with Russian federal laws, removing the Cherkessian diaspora’s any special 
status. Without this status, very few foreign Cherkessians will want to obtain Russian 
citizenship and resettle in the Cherkessian republics. 
The importance of the Cherkessian factor is nevertheless systematically muted 
by the Russian authorities, as well as by the international community of independent 
political analysts, insofar as it affects, first, policy towards Abkhazia, and, second, the 
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situation in the Northern Caucasus. Due to the presence of an extensive and influential 
Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey, that country was and will remain a most important 
external partner for Abkhazia, on an equal footing with Russia (Skakov and Silaev 
2010). Indeed this was so even before Russia recognized Abkhazia, and will, to all 
appearances, continue to be so in the future. In the current context, Abkhazia’s 
“horizontal ties” with the diaspora may be more important than Ankara’s official 
position with respect to the political status of Abkhazia. The Cherkessian factor is also 
reflected in the attempts made by the Abkhazian government to find ways of 
surmounting the demographic problem posed by the dwindling Abkhazian population of 
the republic, immediately addressed by the repatriation of Abazins from countries in the 
Near East and Russia (Skakov and  Silaev 2010). In those republics of the Russian 
Federation that contain a Cherkessian ethnic component, more complex and multilevel 
processes are taking place during the past two decades: the privatization of budgetary 
allocations by local elites; the almost absolute freedom from supervision and pervasive 
corruption at all levels of governance, and the transformation of the law-enforcement 
and the judiciary into an instrument serving the rent-seeking ethnic clans. The slogan of 
ethnic consolidation has been also actively manipulated by local elites as they deemed 
necessary, both to garner additional subsidies from the federal center, as well as to block 
those political initiatives that might undermine their privileged status (Besleney 2010, 
de Waal 2011, Dzutsev 2011).  
Under conditions of yawning social gap within local ethnic groups, radical 
Islamists have begun to take upon themselves the role of spokesperson for the interests 
of marginalized social strata, acting on a supranational level. For example, in 2006, 
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when the federal government put forward the project of uniting Adyghea with the 
Krasnodar krai, the local elite in Maikop effectively played the ethnic card that Adyg 
rights were once again being violated, despite the fact that there were no major human 
or material resources standing behind the protest actions. Afraid of another ethnic 
conflict, Moscow backed away. Diversity of local conditions can explain differences of 
the ethnic factor in various republics that contain a Cherkessian component. Thus in 
Kabardino-Balkaria the Cherkessian factor is directed towards preserving the unity of 
this republic in face of rapidly growing religious extremism. In Karachay-Cherkessia, 
where the Cherkessians are in the minority, their ethnic consolidation is directed, on the 
contrary, towards the delimitation and creation of their own republic (Skakov and Silaev 
2010). In Kabardino-Balkaria, the Kabardins (i.e. Cherkessians) form a majority and 
traditionally dominate local politics, whereas in the Karachay-Cherkessia the 
Cherkessians is a minority. In both republics, the Cherkessians’ opponents are the 
Karachai and the Balkars, two closely related peoples, known prior to 1917 by the name 
of “Mountain Tatars” or “Mountain Turks”. Since both the Karachays and the Balkars 
advocate the division of “dual-identity” and the creation of a single Karachai-Balkar 
unit, the competition between these two hypothetical ethno-national projects (Greater 
Cherkessia and Greater Balkaria, depending on the circumstances) is intensified by the 
complex of mutual  territorial and political claims as well as the role of religion in 
public space. The ethnic consolidation of the Cherkessian peoples within the boundaries 
of distinct administrative and territorial formations, alongside the broad development of 
the radical Islamist movement, could become a powerfully destabilizing factor in the 
event that the current political order in the Northern Caucasus breaks down further. It is 
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more than likely that the elites of the Federation’s Cherkessian administrative 
subdivisions (Adyghea and the KBR) and the social activists of the Cherkessian 
movements (Adyghea and the KChR) will try to garner additional resources for the 
maintenance of stability in the region by playing on the idea of promoting security at the 
Games, a sore point for the federal center. The Circassian issue highlights once again 
how the breakdown of participatory political institutions and the absence of a free media 
make it excessively hard to resolve important political issues in Russia. Since there are 
no legally legitimate representatives of the people, it is very hard to arrive at any lasting 
agreements, and that makes the odds for Moscow and the Circassians finding common 
ground extremely low (Dzutsev 2011).  
On February 28, 2011 President Medvedev appointed two heads of North 
Caucasian republics, Karachay-Cherkessia and Chechnya. Ramzan Kadyrov was 
reappointed to continue to rule Chechnya since his first term as head of the republic was 
about to expire. Karachay-Cherkessia received a new leader, 35-year-old Rashid 
Temrezov, while the previous president of the republic, Boris Ebzeyev was dismissed 
from his post before completing his first term, which should have lasted until 2013 (RIA 
Novosti, February 28). Although the Medvedev’s decree cited “his own request” as the 
reason for Ebzeyev’s dismissal, the slow socio-economic development of Karachay-
Cherkessia was widely viewed as the primary reason (RIA Novosti, February 26, 2011). 
However, an activist from Karachay-Cherkessia, Murat Gukemukhov, told the Voice of 
America that Boris Ebzeyev failed control the republic. As late as February 24 2011, 
when he tried to rally the local parliament to support him to block his dismissal from the 
office, only 30 of 73 deputies of the republican parliament turned up. Gukemukhov 
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asserted that Ebzeyev lacked influence among high-ranking officials in Moscow, 
respect among local elites, and the necessary management skills to be in charge of this 
complex republic (www.voanews.com, February 26, 2011). Boris Ebzeyev’s sudden 
dismissal was evidence of one of the most spectacular failures of the new model for 
appointing regional governors in the North Caucasus, given that he was the first among 
Medvedev’s regional appointees and was unable to survive even for one full term. 
Having an extensive professional background as a professor of law, Ebzeyev was one of 
the contributors of the Russian constitution and served as a judge on Russia’s 
Constitutional Court from 1991 to 2008. The newly appointed head of Karachay-
Cherkessia, Rashid Temrezov, stated on March 1 2011 that his main goal would be 
improving the socio-economic situation in the republic and reducing its dependency on 
Moscow’s financial aid (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 1, 2011).54   
On March 16, 2011 Ismail Berdiev was re-elected in Karachay-Cherkessia as 
republican mufti for another five-year term. Berdiev said 100 mosques were functioning 
in the republic and another 30 were under construction. Having said that underfunding 
was the main problem of the republic’s Muslim community, Berdiev unexpectedly 
revealed that Muslims had been supported in previous years by the Russian presidential 
fund for the support of Islamic culture and education. The government fund for the 
support of Islamic culture, science and education was established in December 
2006.  Its website is in both Russian and Arabic. Curiously, no government body is 
listed among the founders of the fund, although the website admits the fund was 
                                                             
54 It must be noted, however, that during his predecessor’s presidency, republic’s dependence on centralized budgetary 
funds was in fact reduced from 71% in 2008 to less than 66 % in 2010. 
http://openbudget.karelia.ru/budnord/russian/north-caucasian/karachi-cherkess-republic/resp_cherkesia.htm  (assessed on 
July 5, 2011). 
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established with the Russian presidential administration’s involvement. The fund’s 
website does not specify where its funding comes from, saying only that it does not 
come from “budget sources” (www.islamfund.ru, accessed on June 22, 2011). The 
principal advisor of the Russian presidential administration’s department for internal 
policies, Aleksei Grishin, who is also on the board of the government fund to support 
Islam, stated that the fund was created to help “install a clear barrier to radicalism and 
the proliferation of extremism.” In Grishin’s view, much depends on imams “on the 
ground” and called on local clergy to set up Islamic media outlets to fight extremism 
(Dzutsev 2011).  
On June 21, 2011 the Russian Public Chamber’s55 working group on the North 
Caucasus held a public hearing on the problems of divided peoples who involuntarily 
found themselves separated by state boundaries. The Cherkessian issue was one of the 
most discussed themes, as a majority of ethnic Cherkessians have lived outside their 
homeland in Russia’s North Caucasus since the expulsions by the Russian empire in the 
nineteenth century. Besides the Cherkessians, the working group also recognized the 
Lezgins, Avars, Tsakhurs and Rutuls as divided peoples. The participants in the hearing 
produced a list of recommendations for the Russian government that particularly 
targeted Cherkessians. They advised the authorities in Moscow to make adjustments to 
Russian law in order to grant members of the Cherkessian diaspora the status of 
compatriots with a simplified path to Russian citizenship. The government was also 
asked to examine the possibility of organizing resettlement programs for members of 
                                                             
55 Technically, this is a non-governmental public organization that is supposed to represent all major interest groups 
in the Russian society. In fact, its creation was initialized and approved by the incumbent political regime to 
legitimize its monopoly on decision-making processes in Russia (http://top.oprf.ru/news/3355.html). 
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the Cherkessian diaspora willing to return to their historic homeland in Kabardino-
Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adyghea, the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions and the 
Mozdok district of North Ossetia. Zamir Shukhov, the leader of the Cherkessian 
organization “Khase” in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria, emphasized in his report for the 
Russian Public Chamber the benefits Russia would obtain from allowing the Circassians 
to return to their homeland in the North Caucasus. “[If] the correct political assessment 
[is present], the Russian authorities may find a solution to the Circassian issue before 
the start of 2014 Olympic Games, on the eve of the 150
th
 anniversary of the Russian-
Caucasian war’s end,” Shukhov stated. The world would evaluate the maturity of 
Russia’s democracy based on how Russia resolved the Cherkessian issue, Shukhov 
claimed. According to Shukhov, there are about 8.5 million Cherkessians in the world, 
of whom only about 10 % (900,000 people) live in Russia, mostly in the North 
Caucasus. An estimated seven million Cherkessians live in Turkey, 200,000 in Syria, 
130,000 in Jordan, 150,000 in EU countries, 40,000 in Iraq, 30,000 in Libya and about 
30,000 in North America (Dzutsev 2011).  
For the post-Soviet type of ethno-religious activism, the pivotal role of the 
electronic means of communication (with internet in the first place) is akin to the spread 
of print technology in the 16 century, described by Benedict Anderson as “print 
capitalism” in his Imagined Communities. Unlike many indoctrinated bureaucrats 
believe, this is not a centralized process: it consists of independent processes taking 
place both in the Caucasus and the communities in the diaspora worldwide, breaking 
down the hegemony over information. As long as the legal, financial and administrative 
restrictions on the media in Russia are in place, I assume that the means of mass 
243 
 
communication will continue to play its crucial part for Cherkessian activism in the 
foreseeable future. Possible avenues for the resolution of problems connected with the 
Cherkessian factor in the Northern Caucasus may be found in the realm of rapid 
reforms: full-scale privatization of landownership; implementation of the provisions of 
federal law for municipalities; and effective action against corruption at the level of the 
administrative subdivisions of the Russian Federation. These transformations would 
permit a significant portion of the population to return to normal economic activity, 
which is currently impossible, and would thus automatically reduce the unhealthy 
interest in politically charged questions of ethnic identity (questions of genocide, 
questions surrounding the Sochi region, questions of relations between neighbors of 
different ethnicities) and in radical Islamism. However, the Russian government shows 
no signs of readiness for such transformations in the republic, or even of an 
understanding of their necessity. Thus, ethnic identity will continue to be the main 
driving force of political mobilization of Karachay and Cherkessian peoples in the 
North Caucasus.   
Conclusion 
The core of the Circassian problem for the federal authorities appears to be the 
existence of a multi-million strong Circassian diaspora outside Russia that is still 
ignored by Moscow. The conflict in Syria has further galvanized Circassian activists, 
and the more the Kremlin postpones finding a resolution to the Circassian problem, the 
more negative is the international informational background. In spite of Moscow’s 
persistent attempts to soft-pedal and ignore the Circassian problem, this issue has gained 
momentum due to the changing map of the Middle East, rising Circassians activism, 
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and Russia’s own actions in the Caucasus, which have convinced Georgian 
policymakers to adopt a proactive strategy toward the North Caucasus. The ethnic 
consolidation of the Circassian peoples within the boundaries of distinct administrative 
and territorial formations, alongside the broad development of the radical Islamist 
movement, becomes a powerfully destabilizing factor in the event that the current 
political order in the Northern Caucasus breaks down further. The Circassian movement 
will evolve further and consolidate during the upcoming years before the 2014 Sochi 
Olympics, stopping the polarization inside the movement and the creation of a strong 
centrist strand.  
The Circassian movement has already developed a clear ideology and made 
significant efforts toward achieving its three strategic goals. The Circassian Genocide 
has been recognized by the parliaments of Kabardino-Balkaria (1992), Adygea (1996), 
Abkhazia (1997), and Georgia (2011). The opportunity to address – both in positive and 
negative approaches – the holding of the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, the last capital of 
Circassia, on the 150
th
 anniversary of the Circassian Genocide, created new possibilities 
for the Circassian movement, especially after the recognition of the Circassian Genocide 
by Georgia. After the 2012 presidential elections Russia has not yet developed coherent 
policy to address the Circassian issue which allows regional pro-government elites to 
come forward with provocative grass-root initiatives. On the one hand, the Kremlin 
cannot take any effective repressive measures against the Circassian movement because 
it has already become an international issue and it would further damage Russia’s 
reputation and undermine the very meaning of holding the prestigious Olympic Games. 
On the other hand, the Kremlin cannot positively resolve the Circassian issues because 
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that would put it in direct confrontation with other nationalistic movements, which are 
also gaining strength in the North Caucasus. In the absence of political will for dialogue 
and compromise, the Russian government will try either to ignore the Circassian 
nationalism or to split it by gaining control over a number of Circassian activist groups. 
It is no longer the armed resistance in the North Caucasus that is pressing for the 
separation of the region from the Russian Federation: the Russian authorities’ actions 
and policies are essentially advancing the same cause by tacitly encouraging hostilities 




Chapter 7. Conclusion 
A great number of articles, analytic reviews, monographs and books have been 
written about terrorism, religious radicalism, ethnocratism, clan-based organized crime, 
and the amalgamation of government structures with criminal groups in the North 
Caucasus. The study of these variables prevent experts from working on more important 
factors behind the regional developments – the systemic, functional and moral 
degeneration of state power, and its legislative and executive branches. Throughout 
Russian history, all constructive and destructive projects have been conceived and 
implemented from above. The half-decomposed state institutions in the republics of the 
North Caucasus are the main source and catalyst of highly dangerous social tendencies. 
Unlike the incessantly hesitant and pensive intellectuals, the professional bureaucrats 
know well what they want to achieve and how to do it. However, the ruling elites will 
never relinquish its own interests voluntarily and will continue to ignore this objective 
reality until the branch of the tree they are sitting on and chopping at the same time 
finally falls down along with the Russian statehood. 
This dissertation sought to shift the emphasis in studies of ethnic and religious 
mobilization from attempts to explain why this mobilization occurs to an effort to 
explain the process through which nationalist and religious movements emerge, 
develop, institutionalize, and fade or aggravate. In doing so, it focuses on the role of the 
institutional structure in promoting the development of ethnic self-identification and in 
strengthening ethnic and/or religious identities. It also sought to extend the 
institutionalist analysis of ethnic mobilization beyond elite-focused explanations by 
focusing on the mass-based nature of most nationalist and religious movements. 
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Analysis of ethnic and religious institutions can account not only for the behavior and 
motivations of nationalist leaders, politicians, and government officials, but also how 
these actors attempt to persuade potential followers to join these movements and why 
these followers accept or reject these efforts. In moving beyond elite-focused accounts 
of ethnic and religious mobilization, I emphasized the importance of collective identities 
and social networks in spreading the message beyond its initial staunch supporters. In 
doing so, I argued that ethnic groups are not easily manipulated and are able to mobilize 
at will in order to achieve their political ends. In order for members of an ethnic group 
to join a nationalist or religious mobilization effort, they must become convinced that 
they would gain either materially or psychologically from their participation. Many 
recent studies of nationalist and religious mobilization emphasize the role of ruling 
elites in the development of mobilization. According to the commonly shared “ethnic 
entrepreneur” view of nationalist mobilization, the emergence of nationalist movements 
in the North Caucasus is a function of the interaction between central and regional 
ruling elites in divided societies (Linz and Stepan 1996, Gorenburg 2003). Mobilization 
is usually described as part of endeavors by local elites who belong to ethnic minorities 
to increase their weight versus   central elites by advocating ethnic claims (Deutsch 
1961, Smith 1991, Chaganti and Greene 2002). The mobilization of popular support for 
these efforts is also viewed as a means of putting additional pressure on Moscow. In this 
research, however, I argued that mass ethno-religious mobilization could also arise 
independently of internal elite power struggle. The formation of nationalist movements 
in the ethnic republics of the North Caucasus can also be fuelled by a broader coalit ion 
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of intellectual, professional, and spiritual leaders, who at first opposed the emerging 
movements. 
This dissertation has analyzed competing sources of political mobilization, 
regime-building and political integration in the three most unstable regions of the North 
Caucasus: Chechnya, Dagestan, and Karachay-Cherkessia after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The cases of the above-mentioned republics offered a window into socio-
political contexts in which traditional identities and institutions constrain political actors 
in favor of informal institutions and trust networks, provided a comparative analysis of 
informal patterns of social integration and assessed their role in political mobilization. 
The dissertation adopted an interdisciplinary approach drawing on historical, social, and 
political science data and literature. My arguments were constructed primarily in 
supplement and opposition to the literature on ethnic and religious politics in the region. 
The findings of this research suggest the following conclusions. 
The period of political stability in Russia has come to an end. If the trends 
presented in this research sustain and nothing is done in response, the country would be 
heading for political cataclysms comparable to the crises of the early 1990s. Signs of a 
systemic crisis are mounting rapidly in the social and political spheres in the North 
Caucasus. By far the signs of an impending crisis are: plummeting support for Putin and 
Medvedev, the melting electorate of the “United Russia” and growing criticism of the 
political system they incarnate. If confidence in the authorities continues to fall over the 
next year a full-scale political crisis in the Russian Federation is a distinct possibility. In 
terms of intensity the future crisis may well surpass the upheavals of the late 1990s 
(when Russia defaulted on sovereign debt) and may be almost as grave as in the late 
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1980s which saw the breakup of the USSR (Belanovsky and Dmitriev 2011). The 
situation in the North Caucasus will become a special and the least manageable factor of 
the political crisis. It may get out of control at any moment: either as a result of the 
internal political crisis or under the impact of the international crisis in the Middle East. 
The situation in the North Caucasus will continue to deteriorate to the point where it 
would inflict a heavy and possibly crippling blow at the existing political system. The 
ability to control the situation in the North Caucasus has been a major source of 
legitimacy of the system crafted by Putin over the past eleven years. If a new spiral of 
destabilization in the North Caucasus begins later due to aggravating internal political 
contradictions it will make it much more difficult for the federal authorities to overcome 
the political crisis and sustain a stable political system. In the worst-case scenario it may 
trigger processes of disintegration. The possibilities to contain a new conflict in the 
Caucasus would be limited because its scale may be larger than all the previous 
conflicts in recent history. 
The fundamental question for the North Caucasus is its place within the Russian 
Federation. The future of North Caucasus hinges on whether it can gain an equal place 
within the Russian polity. The intricate nature of the region requires an in-depth 
understanding of options that may lead towards permanent stability. In spite of the 
plethora of ethnic and religious groups and the implicit rivalry between Sufi 
brotherhoods and radical Islamists, the additional deployment of Russian military to the 
region has managed to unite all of them against a common enemy. The indiscriminate 
brutality of Russia’s campaign in the Northern Caucasus along with its protracted socio-
economic problems has rekindled the spirit of disobedience and resistance among many 
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Muslims. While Chechnya still remains the focus of regional developments, the diverse 
Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia are experiencing similar problems – 
marginalization, popular dissatisfaction, ethnic hostilities, abject poverty, corrupt local 
leaders, and the complete dependence on the federal subsidies. The further alienation of 
the North Caucasus and the subsequent reshaping of borders would mean that a country 
named Russia in its present form would cease to exist. This tough prognosis of the 
foreseeable future will occur as inevitably as a cyclical natural phenomenon if the 
current tendencies continuo to develop according to their natural logic. Protracted 
discussions over particular features of a state failure in the post-Soviet Russia eclipse 
the fact that the same features has become fully applicable to the North Caucasus. 
Insurgency warfare has acquired a tenacity and regularity in that region. Events that 
were at one time confined to Chechnya are now propagated all across the North 
Caucasus. These events seem to have devolved into a systemic process with deep-lying 
sources of reproduction. That said, numerous official explanations that low-intensity 
ethno-religious conflicts are nothing more than a residual reaction to the suppression of 
Chechen separatism and chaotic acts of revenge turn out to be unfounded. Even though 
the immediate and tentative causes of the current situation in the region are widely 
known and already assessed, the experts, however, have a propensity to look out for 
more arguments of a speculative and ideological nature. Destabilizing factors in the 
North Caucasus are intertwined in a complicated and chaotic way, often making it hard 
to identify the primary and secondary elements. Nonetheless, my objective here is to 




Since 1991, Russia has been slowly but surely losing influence in the North 
Caucasus. The whole region has been pulling out of the legislative framework of the 
Russian Federation in two directions, which can be described as “chaotic” and 
“premeditated.” The chaotic element of this process stems from the realities of everyday 
existence that discourage the population from observing Russian legislation. Indeed, the 
extremely controversial Russian legal framework is widely looked at as a source of 
fabulous wealth for bureaucracy with affiliated entrepreneurs and a source of abject 
poverty and marginalization for others, inflicting irreparable damage on the region’s 
image and reputation in the eyes of its inhabitants, not to mention the international 
community. Moreover, feeble legislative framework inevitably creates a social, 
political, economic, ideological, cultural, and psychological environment that gives 
broad leeway to individuals with highly specified interests. Whatever the case, such 
interests always pose the major and most ominous threat of a total loss of touch with 
society, driving it to the verge of a social and political collapse. The very nature of 
corrupt power cancels out its ability to perform. Nonetheless, Moscow’s continuous to 
bargain support in a standoff between different contentious groups. While building 
partnerships with local ruling elites, it corrupts clan leaders, religious authorities, 
influential intellectuals, or generally anyone in the regional political arena who deviates 
from an accepted pattern and is hence dangerous. In order to secure the uninterrupted 
functioning of the corrupt administrative machinery, the ethnocratic regimes seek to 
prove that they are irreplaceable and trustworthy if stability is to be maintained. 
However, stability implies a commitment to law and order and, therefore, threatens to 
undercut power and material entitlements of those people who are accustomed to enjoy 
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the existing precarious situation. To perpetuate this status quo, local elites carefully 
aggravate tensions in all spheres of social relations, never allowing them to rise to the 
point of losing control, nor permitting them to completely vanish. Local ethnocratic 
regimes desperately need low-intensity emergency situations as an effective tool of 
proving to Moscow their importance that makes the federal government ignore the 
administrative and judiciary voluntarism as it continues to pay off the loyalty regardless 
of the ongoing collapse of the system of local government. It has become customary to 
describe the North Caucasian crisis as systemic. This system, however, will flourish as 
long as the federal center and the ruling elites of the North Caucasus republics, which 
live by the same corporate norms, have vested interests in maintaining it for their own 
benefit. The marginalization of the North Caucasus means that a country named Russia 
in its present form would cease to exist if the current trends develop. With every passing 
day, the resource of public trust in the Russian Federation is melting down as people in 
power continue acting in their personnel interests with no benefits for society.  
The turning point of ethno-religious mobilization and crystalizing sub-federal 
authoritarianism in the North Caucasus is related to three major events. (1) The financial 
crisis of 1998, which demonstrated the exclusive importance of stable relations for 
development and formed a public demand for re-centralization from major nation-wide 
political and economic actors (Mitrokhin 2001:74). (2) The active involvement of 
regional elites in the coalition “Fatherland – All Russia”, which lost during the 1999 
State Duma elections to the pro-Kremlin bloc “Unity” that was approved by Vladimir 
Putin (Golosov 2004, Hale 2006). (3) The economic growth of the early 2000s that led 
to the expansion of business groups from Moscow to the periphery and encouraged their 
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aspirations for the dismantling of bureaucratic barriers to local markets (Zubarevich 
2002). As a result, the recentralization of the government, initiated in 2000 by Putin 
(Gelman 2009, Reddaway, Orttung 2004-2005), became a major response to these 
challenges that aimed to re-establish Moscow’s control over coercive and distributive 
capacities of the Russian state and diminishing the resource base of regional elites. 
Administrative recentralization (including imposition of federal control over regional 
ministries) and concentration of financial resources (which concentrated financial flows 
in federal budget) became the major consequences of this turn. The re-establishment of 
the federal control over regional affairs led to immediate shift in province-center power 
balance when governors and chairs of regional legislatures lost their seats in the 
Federation Council (because single-member districts were abolished in the State Duma 
elections in favor of federation-wide party lists). According to Golosov, the use of the 
centralized state bureaucracy was the only enforcement tool of the Kremlin grip over 
regional nomenclature and demonstrated limited capacity to impose control over sub-
federal authoritarian regimes that managed by the early 2000s to cut on autonomy of 
potential oppositional local actors, such as local business, legislatures, branches of 
federal political parties or NGO’s (2008:25-26). Under these circumstances, Moscow 
secured new arrangement to exert direct influence over regional and local politics –
institutional changes and, in particular, advancement of party politics (without party 
competition) to the sub-federal level. In the context of political democratization, unlike 
in the Latin American cases, where these arrangements were oriented toward the 
dismantling of sub-national authoritarianism, in Russia, they were oriented toward co-
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optation of regional authoritarian regimes into federal authoritarian settings (Gibson 
2005) to nip growing ethnic and religious mobilization of the local peoples.  
Since early 2003, the Kremlin imposed the use of mixed electoral systems on 
regional legislative elections in order to beef up the influence of federal party “United 
Russia” at the sub-federal level (Gelman 2008, Reuter and Remington 2009). The 
imposition of de-facto appointment of regional chief executives paved the way for a 
new informal contract between the Kremlin and regional ruling elites that resolved the 
problem of mutual commitments and eliminated barriers toward transformation of 
“United Russia” into the fully-fledged dominant party (Reuter and Remington, 2009). 
Thus, formation of centralized party-based sub-federal authoritarianism in Russia in the 
2000s became a logical consequence of major trends of Russia’s development:  
recentralization of the state against the background of economic stagnation (Gelman 
2009, Petrov 2007), and building of an authoritarian regime, based upon the dominant 
party (Gelman 2008, Golosov 2008, Reuter and Remington 2009). This centralized 
authoritarian regime is able to produce more sustainable effects that are based on (1) the 
concentration of coercive and the distributive capacity of the federal center, which is 
able to prevent undermining of the status quo in regional politics «from above», and (2) 
the lack of potent actors, who are able to undermine it «from below». In this juncture, 
we should not expect that in short-term perspective regional authoritarianism in the 
North Caucasus will be substantially weakened or collapsed without deep liberalization 
and democratization of political regime in the Russian Federation. On the contrary, the 
preservation of federal authoritarian regime will lead to the conservation of sub-federal 
authoritarianisms on regional and local levels, at least, in the foreseeable future.  
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Public opinion in the North Caucasus is not endlessly loyal to the idea of further 
strengthening the vertical structure of state power. It demands that words finally give 
way to deeds. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union that removed Russia’s supra-
identity of a strong power, the peoples of the North Caucasus re-adopted ethnic, clan, 
corporate and other highly marginalized forms of self-identification, restoring 
traditionalist patriarchal relations dating from the early 17 century. In particular, this 
pattern legitimizes clan hierarchy with struggle for top positions on the hierarchic 
ladder, a system of subordination akin to that of vassals and suzerains, and the practice 
of subservience and tributes with a respective distribution of community wealth, 
collective cover-ups of crime and arbitrary punishment, implemented through the 
sporadic revival of common law. As Degoyev and Ibragimov (2006) point out, post-
Soviet experience demonstrates that building parties and democracies in small 
traditionalist societies becomes a plausible and “civilized” cover for inter-clan conflicts 
and organized crime’s activities. During nearly three hundred years Russian politics in 
the North Caucasus was a dilemma of choosing between “much violence” and “little 
violence.” The Caucasus war in the middle of the 19 century embodied a war between 
two civilizational projects – the Russian Imperial and the pan-Islamic Fundamentalist. 
After decades of fierce battles, the Caucasus elites were finally convinced that the 
Russian Empire could effectively provide both external and internal security 
arrangements to protect its subjects (Degoyev and Ibragimov 2006). 
 Followers of radical Islam have a clear-cut message for propagation among 
impoverished, multiethnic, corrupt, ethnocratic Caucasian societies with a shortage of 
order, justice and perspective – a supra-national spiritual identity based on the 
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commandments of pure Islam that oppose human and social vices, nationalism, and 
crime, on the one hand, and Russia’s immoral secular dominance as the embodiment of 
all those vices, on the other. In a situation where the Kremlin does not have a counter-
project with a comparable moral charge, these ideas are gaining momentum in people’s 
minds and hearts, especially among the younger generation. Taking into consideration  
such factors as high unemployment, a high level of crime, complete dependence of the 
local budgets from federal subsidies, a high level of migration of the ethnic Russians  
from the North Caucasus republics, the deepening Islamization of the region, growing 
anti-Caucasus sentiments in Russian society and rising nationalist feelings in the North 
Caucasus,  give us no reason to assume that the situation in the North Caucasus is 
changing for the better despite Moscow’s vigorous efforts. Besides, Georgia is 
emerging as a competitor and an alternative to Russian power, capable of influencing 
the situation in the region. In 2010, Tbilisi dramatically reconsidered its policy toward 
the North Caucasus and now seems to be poised to play a more active role in this part of 
the region. Russia will have to either ignore the changing circumstances or embark on a 
more aggressive policy toward Georgia, which looks unlikely against the background of 
its own problems. 
In Chechnya, where Russia had engaged in two atrocious wars with humiliating 
consequences, the Putin-Medvedev regime has empowered President Kadyrov to clamp 
down on both ethnicity and religion as potent mobilizing ideologies. Starting from 
2010, however, even inhuman methods have failed to keep Chechnya free from 
violence.  A growing number of deadly attacks on police and administrative officials 
have been reported since early 2011. It is no longer possible to explain the spike in 
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violence on the seasonal factor (as insurgents are most active in the spring and summer) 
or international terrorist brotherhood. However, as the terrorist attacks  began to 
decrease, Kadyrov’s highly valued service and his loyalty to the Kremlin secured him 
impunity despite the fact that his tenure has been rife with abominable human rights 
violations. Kadyrov’s rivals and enemies have been methodically eliminated all across 
Russia and even beyond its borders. Today, Kadyrov is generously granted “free rein”; 
enjoying more autonomy than his insurgent predecessors  ever hoped to achieve. What 
started as the Kremlin’s project to “Chechenization” of the conflict by converting it into 
a domestic struggle rather than one between Russian troops and local population has 
now turned into a so-called “Kadyrovization” of the problem, with all of its numerous 
drawbacks, humongous political and human costs. As a result, Moscow is becoming 
increasingly annoyed with Kadyrov’s absolutism and the way his meretricious loyalty to 
the Kremlin is coupled with gradually successful attempts to transform Chechnya into 
something bordering on an independent sultanate. Finally, there is yawning frustration 
in Moscow over Kadyrov’s dictatorial ambitions to extend his political influence 
beyond Chechnya to include the entire North Caucasus region with Dagestan in the first 
place. His persistent attempts to extend his control over neighboring Ingushetia has 
caused much anxiety in both Moscow and Ingushetia, and has also aggravated many 
people with his continual attempts to interfere in Dagestan’s internal affairs. 
Nonetheless, as long as Kadyrov’s regime is be able to subdue effectively both ethnicity 
and religion in order to maintain order and generate political support for whatever 
Vladimir Putin contemplates, there will be no room for any kind of political 
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mobilization in Checnhya. Nor will Chechnya become a model for democratic solution 
to the challenges of ethnicity and religion in the North Caucasus.  
It has been a decade since Moscow began to dismantle systematically 
Dagestan’s previous political structure, based on general principles of consociational 
democracy.  Dagestan’s political authority is now rapidly diverging from its traditional 
social structure and turning away from the ethno-parties (Ware and Kisriev 2001a), the 
traditional village-based interest groups that have provided the Dagestan’s political 
system with an internal flexibility, resilience and stability. Personal political weight is 
no longer based upon internal political conditions, but upon the bureaucratic authority, 
leaning for power on higher-level administrative organs that are connected ultimately to 
the Kremlin. The revival of the old Soviet centralized political structure is likely to 
deprive Dagestan of its traditional ethnic tolerance and to conflict-avert politics. From 
now on, the ruling elites no longer consider their service to local population as an 
indispensable condition of their support base, leaving terrain to a number of alternative 
ideological appeals. Large-scale warfare is unlikely to develop in Dagestan, but 
violence is expected to continue because of competition over resources and 
administrative jobs, Chechnya’s influence and the rise of local radical religious groups. 
The roots of the present spike in violence lie in the “hunt for the Wahhabis” carried out 
by the Dagestan’s authorities after the 1999 Chechen incursion and the arbitrary 
persecution of pious youth by local law enforcement units. The violence in Dagestan’s 
streets is also fuelled by the Islamist militants across the porous border with Chechnya, 
as well as by the republic’s omnipresent corruption and criminality. Reprisals by local 
and federal security forces have fail to subdue the violence; instead they seem to be 
259 
 
further escalating it. If neither traditional Islam, the Dagestan authorities, the federal 
government, nor a combination of these institutions is able to alleviate the staggering 
economic problems, social injustice, and clan system, radical Islam is likely to have 
increased appeal and will become a powerful substitute for the above-mentioned 
institutions. This substitution will replace centuries-long ethnic divisions in favor of 
supra-ethnic religious affiliation as the most acceptable and legitimate source upon 
which new law and order are established. 
Karachay-Cherkessia is now at an important crossroads. Violence in the republic 
reaches unprecedented levels, as the insurgents have already expanded their insurgency 
activities and their recruitment propaganda aimed at young people in the republic. In 
February 2011, insurgency leaders called for mobilization of all their forces in response 
to the announcement of the counter-terrorist operation in both Karachay-Cherkessia and 
Kabardino-Balkaria. Regular reprisal actions against insurgents’ relatives also reflect 
the growing tensions between insurgency and local populations. As an inadequate 
response to the terrorist actions, the Parliament of the KBR released a new initiative to 
place legal charges against insurgents’ families. Also, an unknown group identifying 
themselves as an anti-Wahhabi militia named the “Black Hawks” has threatened 
counter-violence against insurgents’ relatives. The new wave of terrorist attacks in the 
second half of 2010 demonstrated that the younger generation of insurgents has 
reconsidered their ideological positions. In the past, violence was mainly targeted 
against security forces as insurgents avoided terrorist acts against civilians. Now, 
civilians are also becoming targets in growing numbers. If the insurgency developed 
tactics of interfering with political events and even siding with political groups in 
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Karachay-Cherkessia, it could mean that terrorist acts might increase after the 
parliamentary (December 2011) and presidential (March 2012) elections. Instead of 
engaging in various programs to promote political participation and social integration 
among young people and to create a channel for political opposition that offers a non-
violent alternative to voice political and religious grievances, authorities continue to rely 
on repressive policies. While officially supporting the ideologies of moderate and 
traditional Islam against radical Islam, the government continues to interfere with 
nationalist ideology, which could effectively take part in the battle to win the hearts and 
minds of the young people and limit the influence of radical Islam on them. Nationalist 
ideology has been emerging in the last two years in connection with the upcoming 2014 
Sochi Olympics, which coincides with the 150
th
 anniversary of the Cherkessian exile in 
1864. Up until 2010, neither the federal authorities nor the Islamic radicals have paid 
much attention to the issue of the Cherkessian ethnic cleansing that took place in Sochi, 
the last stronghold of independent Cherkessia. The former used to denounce the very 
existence of the Cherkessian issue, which makes followers of the nationalist ideology 
more active in their support for the insurgency. The case of Karachay-Cherkessia 
suggests that if no political solution is put forward to counter insurgents’ propaganda 
and recruitment, further destabilization of the republic along ethnic lines (Karachay – 
Cherkess) will result in escalation of violence, spilling over to adjacent Stavropol and 
Krasnodar krais on the eve of the 2014 Winter Olimpics. 
When President Dmitry Medvedev participated in a meeting of the presidential 
council for the development of civil society and human rights, which was held in 
Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria on July 5, 2011, the council’s members harshly criticized 
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the law enforcement agencies in the North Caucasus in such a way that even 
Medvedev’s barely defended his government or denied the abuses that law enforcement 
agencies regularly commit in the North Caucasus. Medvedev not only silently listened 
to the facts, but, most strikingly, he did not make any standard promises to change the 
situation. According to Emil Pain, a prominent Russian expert on ethnic politics, 
Medvedev was unequivocally informed that the situation in the North Caucasus is 
rapidly deteriorating and the government has to provide legal ways for constructive civil 
expression in the region. Otherwise, as Pain put it, the fact that in 2011 “for the first 
time for all the years of surveys” over half and up to 60 % of the Russians agree with 
the slogan “Get rid of the North Caucasus!” In Pain’s words, the North Caucasus is a 
“painful problem that Russian society does not understand, but perceives just as a 
wound” that does not seem to be going away. He further noted that very different 
Russian political forces, like nationalists, liberals, conservatives and imperialists, are 
united in the idea of Russia’s complete withdrawal from the North Caucasus 
(http://kremlin.ru, July 5, 2011). Aleksander Khloponin’s task as the incumbent 
presidential envoy in charge of the new North Caucasus Federal District seems to be 
about sorting out the situation with financial support for the North Caucasus republics 
and ensuring that at least part of the multi-billion transfers sent from Moscow actually 
reach their intended recipients. It is obvious that the problem is not that the Kremlin 
does not see the North Caucasus as an indispansable part of the Russian Federation in 
the future. The problem is that the Kremlin’s near-sighted rent-seeking agenda has 
driven itself into a complete dead-end, and instead of facing the real challenges that are 
clearly mentioned in this research, it is able only to make a public show of action on the 
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eve of a number of crucial political campaigns: imaginary peace in Chechnya for the 
presidential elections, abolition of major constitutional rights and freedoms, or the 2014 
Winter Olympics in Sochi. The 2012 presidential election campaign inflicted another 
potent blow at the legitimacy of power because political manipulation was evident 
(International Democrat Union 2012). The continuation of that trend will keep the 
political crisis simmering and sooner or later it will erupt into the open. According to 
Belanovsky and Dmitriev (2011), there are a number of factors contributing to the 
spread of the political crisis in the North Caucasus which at a certain point may lend it a 
systemic character: 
1. Given the silent conformism of the majority, which favored the authorities by 
expanding the passive support base and ensuring political equilibrium on the basis of 
status quo, in the context of diminishing confidence in the authorities conformism will 
turn into its opposite and will create a new political equilibrium based on the majority of 
society opposing the authorities. Mass disapproval of the ruling elites will turn a critical 
attitude to the authorities into a behavioral norm. The conformist majority in the North 
Caucasus will rally more actively around alternative centers of influence such as ethnic 
clans (Chechnya and Karachay-Cherkessia) and religious groups (Dagestan). Such a 
shift will take place not only at the grassroots’ level but within the “United Russian” 
party and state bureaucracy. Protest sentiments will also become widespread within the 
security and military establishments and they will be much harder to contain by targeted 
financial entitlements. 
2. Another aspect of the ongoing crisis in the North Caucasus is the final loss of 
moral and ideological leadership by the authorities at all levels; the authorities become 
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the target of universal criticism, ridicule and discontent. Devaluation of the words and 
ideas emanating from the ruling elites will only aggravate the crisis. Under such 
circumstances the authorities will expose themselves to ever greater risk by putting 
forward new initiatives. The right to put forward popular slogans will gradually shift to 
new political leaders and opposition movements based on ethnic (Chechnya and 
Karachay-Cherkessia)  or religious grounds (Dagestan). The appearance of such 
attractive slogans will totally discredit the former policies that emanated from the 
authorities. Being unable to adjust the new challenges, the authorities will have to poach 
ideas from the opposition that would only boost the influence of their opponents. The 
utterly controversial parliamentary (December 2010) and presidential (March 2012) 
elections will trigger the spread of the systemic crisis from central regions to the North 
Caucasus, because the electoral mechanism no longer ensures a meaningful dialogue 
with the majority of population. Even managed elections have barely provided the tiny 
majority in the Duma to the “United Russia” (50,1 %). Moreover, the parliamentary 
elections have further catalyzed the deligitimization of elections in principle and put 
into question the legitimacy of the presidential election and the elected candidate. 
Conditions will be created for the political crisis to grow after the elections.  
3. The mounting hostility towards any official actions and initiatives creates a 
favorable environment for protest actions. Given a low level of overall support for the 
authorities even an insignificant event can trigger protest actions that would be 
practically impossible to contain. The existence of a strong law enforcement apparatus 
provides nothing, but an illusion that it is possible to maintain stability by brute force. 
Any attempt to use force will, however, quickly turn against the authorities because they 
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will lose any legitimacy in the eyes of the population and cause an escalation of 
conflicts on that basis. Belanovsky and Dmitriev further argue that “the use of force will 
also be constrained by international pressures that become more real as a result of the 
holding of a serious of major international events in the North Caucasus, notably the  
2014 Sochi Olympics and the 2018 World Football Cup. The failure of any one of them 
would mean loss of face in the eyes of local communities and would further complicate 
the internal political situation (2011:6-7). Having failed to contain protests, the 
authorities will increasingly make concessions to the protesters. In turn, the success of 
early protest actions will contribute to their spread. Further degradation of 
socioeconomic indicators will continue to undermine unpopular administrations in their 
respective communities at all levels.  
The common assumption that the boundaries of a state and its national identity 
have the same border or cover the same area is quite problematic in the North Caucasus 
where contemporary communities are defined by an overlapping ethnic and/or religious 
identity in terms of their spatial organization. By doing comparative analysis of grass-
root mobilization potential in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Karachay-Cherkessia, I 
suggested that both radical religious and nationalistic elites are using diasporic practices 
of identity formation as a means of generating economic and political support in an 
increasingly competitive environment. Furthermore, this balance between a territorially 
defined administrative units and extra-territorial practices of collective identity 
formation is rapidly shifting toward the later. Moscow’s attempts at socio-political 
engineering through the appointment of regional governors in the North Caucasus have 
proven ineffective and self-aggravating. As Moscow seeks to introduce complex 
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bureaucratic constructions in place of competitive elections for regional leaders, the 
appointment system in the North Caucasus provokes further deterioration of the 
situation and complete loss of control over the regional processes. My analysis has also 
demonstrated how state bureaucracy,  leaders of ethnic groups, and emissaries of 
religious movements in order to achieve recognition and political support, use words 
that carry special meaning  and reanimate within it mystical arguments - a reaction to 
traumas mainly experienced by previous generations. Collective identity, as a matter of 
fact, exists on a variety of levels in the North Caucasus: family or clan, ethnic group, 
religion, territory and, for some, a certain “Soviet” identity. Ethnicity and religion is 
only one of the multi-layers of identity of the peoples, and not necessarily the primary. I 
am convinced, however, that unifying religious affiliation will gradually eclipse 
multiple ethnic identities in Dagestan and will perform a leading role in the politics of 
the republic. In Chechnya, where internal stability of the Kadyrov’s regime is 
completely dependent upon Moscow’s willingness to  tolerate it, both religion and 
ethnicity will be held at bay by brute force as long as material and financial resources 
continue to flow in. The rise of Cherkessian ethnic nationalism is irreversible, because it 
has already gained unequivocal support of the Cherkessian diaspora, attention of a 
number of international none-government organizations, and substantial on-going media 
coverage in major European languages. Although the possibility of recreating a 
Cherkessian homeland is contingent upon the ground-breaking concessions on the part 
of the Russian government, there would still be major obstacles to overcome, both 
locally and at the international level. 
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The research has examined differences and similarities between the use of 
religion and ethnicity as mobilizing ideologies in three republics of the North Caucasus. 
It has argued that while the underlying causes of conflict generally emanated from a 
combination of conflicts over control of resources and distribution of federal subsidies, 
both religious and ethnic identities play a pivotal role. In all case studies, I have found a 
number of overlapping religious and ethnic identities that changed over time. Even 
though one or the other identity was clearly dominant at certain periods of time, both 
identities might be employed instrumentally to identify and differentiate competing 
groups. According to Fearon and Laitin, despite the fact that there are more ethnicities 
than religions in the world, only a very small proportion of potential ethnic conflicts 
turn into actual conflicts (1996).  However, while both identities are clearly used 
instrumentally by activists as mobilizing ideologies, comparative analysis of the case 
studies shows that religious leaders have a stronger belief in their cause than ethnic 
activists who essentially exploit ethnic identities rather than believe in them. That is 
why religious leaders are much more appealing and convincing in their fight for the 
cause and the necessity to kill or die for it. In the case of religious mobilization, 
different historical events and ancient scriptures might be invoked and reinterpreted to 
the advantage of religious leaders. In the case of ethnic mobilization, there are no such 
scriptures to draw upon or external resources to rely on. While effective mobilization 
for conflict requires organization, training and support that are provided by both 
religious and ethnic organizations, religious mobilization also has a strong institutional 
advantage over ethnic groups that often lack clear organizational forms. Moreover, the 
potency of religious mobilization is usually multiplied by its ability to reach out to 
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external resources, both domestic and international. The research suggested that if 
competing groups differ in both religion and in ethnicity, there is some leeway as to 
which is employed for political mobilization. Two factors influence which ideology is 
chosen: which ethnic identity is used politically in the allocation of resources and the 
demographic situation with the mobilizing identity being one that unites a large and 
effective group. It is neither religious nor ethnic identity that is most appealing to people 
from an individual perspective as a basis for political mobilization. Rather it can be the 
one that it is perceived as being crucial from the point of view of the access to material 
resources. These findings support the conclusion that the identity that is chosen for 
political mobilization is defined largely instrumentally, and is a result of amalgamation 
of resources and politics, rather than a hangover of deep primordial beliefs. However, 
the pre-existence of strong identities provides the propitious context in which such 
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